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ABSTRACT 
 
Trade in wild-caught animals as pets is a global conservation and animal-welfare 
concern. Illegal and poorly-regulated legal wildlife trade can threaten biodiversity, 
spread infectious diseases, and result in considerable animal suffering and mortality. I 
used illegal wildlife trade in Peru, specifically native bird trade, as a case study to 
explore important aspects and consequences of the trade for domestic markets. With data 
collected from a five-year market survey and governmental seizure records, I applied a 
statistical modeling approach to investigate the influence of Peru’s legal export quota 
system on the country’s illegal domestic bird trade. I used an infectious-disease 
mathematical modeling approach to analyze how illegal harvest influenced disease 
dynamics in a wild parrot population. Finally, I used qualitative research methods to 
investigate the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their members’ 
philosophical perspectives toward wildlife in combating illegal trade. I found that Peru 
had a thriving illegal trade in native birds (mostly parrots) for domestic consumers; 150 
species were recorded in markets and/or seizures with over 35,250 individuals offered 
for sale (2007–2011). Peru’s current legal export quota system did not influence avian 
abundance in markets, but historic export trade did. Because authorities frequently 
release confiscated birds without health evaluation, infectious pathogens may be 
introduced into wild populations. I determined that the hypothetical release of white-
winged parakeets infected with Newcastle disease would provoke a disease outbreak 
with considerable mortality in a susceptible population. Higher rates of illegal harvest 
dampened the magnitude of the outbreak, but the combined effects of high harvest and 
disease-induced mortality may threaten population survival. According to interviewees, 
Peru’s government was considered lax in combating illegal wildlife trade and as such, 
many NGOs supplemented the government’s efforts. The five NGOs most dedicated to 
decreasing illegal wildlife-pet trade in Peru had strong, dual philosophical perspectives 
that prioritized both wildlife populations and individual wild animals. In conclusion, 
there is considerable avian trafficking for Peru’s domestic consumers that (1) is 
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independent of Peru’s export market, (2) provides a mechanism to introduce harmful 
infectious diseases into wild population, and (3) is combated most by dual-perspective 
NGOs. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Illegal wildlife trade is a well-documented conservation and animal-welfare 
concern. Numerous scientific articles have described the scale of the trade, critiqued 
legislative enforcement efforts, and debated best economic policy responses (Moyle 
1998; Warchol 2004; Rosen & Smith 2010; Bennett 2011; Lyons & Natusch 2011; 
Biggs et al. 2013; Reuter et al. 2015). Most scholarly research has broadly focused on 
regulation and the supply-side of wildlife trade. Only recently have investigations 
extended to include the demand-side of the trade, for example, to understand social 
drivers of wildlife trade (Gratwicke et al. 2008; Wasser & Bei Jiao 2010; Drury 2011), 
the structure of trade chains (Tieguhong et al. 2006; Nguyen 2008; Wyatt 2009), and the 
effectiveness of interventions (Lee et al. 2005; Nijman et al. 2011a; Wyatt 2013b; Lam 
et al. 2014). The aim of this dissertation is to improve understanding of an illegal 
wildlife trade system to ultimately help improve mitigation. I used illegal wildlife trade 
in Peru as a case study, specifically native bird trade for the domestic pet market, to 
explore three facets of the trade: (1) the interaction between legal and illegal wildlife 
trade, (2) disease risks associated with the trade, and (3) the role of organizations 
working within the country to combat the illegal domestic trade. The following literature 
review provides background information for these three topics.  
Literature review 
Illegal wildlife trade 
Illegal wildlife trade is a broad and complex societal problem that intertwines 
biodiversity conservation, animal welfare, and judicial concerns. Illegal and poorly 
regulated wildlife trade can result in over-harvest and threaten populations and species 
survival (Nekaris et al. 2010; Shepherd 2010; Sung et al. 2013). Illegal trade can also 
undermine natural resource management (Broad et al. 2003), foster corruption and 
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violence (Warchol 2004; Kakabadse 2011; Ratchford et al. 2013), and facilitate spread 
of infectious, sometimes zoonotic, diseases (Karesh et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2009; 
Hueston et al. 2011; Karesh et al. 2012) and invasive species (Carrete & Tella 2008; 
Westphal et al. 2008; García-Díaz et al. 2014). In addition, the considerable suffering 
and mortality of wild-caught animals caused by illegal pet trade has received recent 
scientific attention (Cantú et al. 2007; Baker et al. 2013; Sollund 2013; Warwick 2014). 
In many parts of the world, such as Asia and the Middle East, demand for 
wildlife and their derivatives appears to be growing (Bailey 2011; Drury 2011; Nijman 
et al. 2012; Bush et al. 2014; Giangaspero & Al Ghafri 2014). Several reasons for 
increased trade have been suggested, including improved transportation and 
communication infrastructure (Giovanini 2006; International Fund for Animal Welfare 
2008; Wu 2010; Basu 2014), opening of borders (Zhang et al. 2008), growing popularity 
in exotic pets (Bush et al. 2014) and most importantly, economic growth (Robinson & 
Bennett 2002; Milner-Gulland & Bennett 2003; World Bank 2005; Drury 2009; Harris et 
al. 2013). Annual estimates of legal trade in (live) wild animals range from $400–800 
million (Broad et al. 2003; Engler & Parry-Jones 2007). Illegal wildlife trade is difficult 
to quantify in economic or biological terms, but published reports estimate it at a fourth 
to a third the value of legal trade (Cook et al. 2002; Ratchford et al. 2013). 
Illegal wildlife trade, with help from the media, frequently congers images of 
slaughtered rhinos and burning towers of confiscated ivory smuggled to fulfill demand 
from international markets (e.g., Davies 2005; Anon. 2014; Narula 2014). The egregious 
slaughter of charismatic megavertebrates represents just one aspect of illegal wildlife 
trade—international smuggling of wildlife products. During the past decade, the 
scientific community has raised awareness of another side of illegal smuggling—trade in 
live wild-caught animals for the booming global exotic pet industry, including highly 
coveted rare species and color mutations by collectors and breeders (Webb et al. 2002; 
Rosen & Smith 2010; Bush et al. 2014; Harrington 2015). Illegal trade in wild-caught 
animals for domestic consumers receives less media attention, although recent studies 
have documented the magnitude of illegal domestic trade, particularly involving avian 
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species (Drews 2001; Shepherd 2006; Cantú et al. 2007; Gastañaga et al. 2010; Alves et 
al. 2012).  
Trade in wild-caught birds  
Birds are popular pets in many countries throughout the world. Wild-caught birds 
have a long history of being traded as pets, both legally and illegally for international 
markets (Banks 1970; Inskipp 1979; Inskipp et al. 1988; Thomsen et al. 1992). In the 
early 1970s, international trade was estimated at 7.5 million exotic birds annually, many 
of which were parrots (Clapp 1975; Inskipp 1979). A global pandemic of Newcastle 
disease (1968–1973), largely blamed on the pet bird trade, caused many countries to 
introduce importation regulations, which caused the first dramatic reduction in legal 
international trade (Utterback 1973; Clapp 1975; Lancaster 1976; Inskipp 1979). In 
1975, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) entered in force to “ensure that international trade in specimens of wild 
animals and plants does not threaten their survival” (CITES 2014c). Due to strong 
international demand for parrots and the threat of over-harvest, most psittacines were 
listed by 1981 on either CITES Appendix I or II to stop or better regulate international 
trade (CITES 2013), although smuggling into the United States (and likely elsewhere) 
continued (Nilsson 1989). 
Bird imports into the United States decreased further after the U.S. Congress 
passed the Wild Bird Conservation Act in 1992, which banned importation of all CITES-
listed birds (WBCA 1992; Wright et al. 2001), following calls of concern from the 
scientific community regarding over-exploitation of wild populations (Beissinger et al. 
1991). In 2005, another global infectious disease outbreak, highly-pathogenic H5N1 
avian influenza, raised public and animal health fears in addition to conservation and 
animal-welfare concerns about international bird trade (World Parrot Trust 2004b; 
Appenzeller 2005). Following pressure from conservation and animal-welfare 
organizations, the European Union passed a blanket importation ban of all wild-caught 
birds (European Commission 2007), which effectively closed the largest legal import 
bird market. It is not yet clear the impact this ban has had on global bird trade, but it is 
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reasonable to assume that it has declined (Shepherd 2006; Nijman 2010).Thus, global 
trade in wild-caught birds peaked in the 1970–1980s (Inskipp 1979; Thomsen & 
Mulliken 1992), and subsequently declined largely due to international trade treaties and 
import bans (Beissinger 2001; Wright et al. 2001; Pain et al. 2006), along with captive-
breeding of many popular pet species (Clubb 1992; Jepson & Ladle 2009; Li & Jiang 
2014).  
Despite the decline in international trade, Birdlife International (2012) reported 
almost 40% of at-risk birds (i.e., avian species with a conservation status other than 
least-concern on International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(IUCN) Red List), are threatened by over-exploitation from hunting and/or pet trade. 
Much of today’s demand for illegally-captured birds comes from domestic pet markets 
in source countries, such as in the Neotropics, where international trade regulations have 
little influence on domestic trade (Drews 2001; Wright et al. 2001; Herrera Scott 2004; 
Cantú et al. 2007; Herrera & Hennessey 2007; Gastañaga et al. 2010; Asmussen et al. 
2011; Alves et al. 2012). Although the history of domestic bird trade in source countries 
is not as well documented as international trade, it is likely that many domestic wildlife 
markets were established in the 1960s and 1970s secondary to high international exports. 
Once domestic markets were established, many have remained active despite decline in 
global trade. One recent survey of Peruvian animal markets estimated 80,000–90,000 
wild-caught parrots were sold yearly (Gastañaga et al. 2010). A nationwide survey in 
Costa Rica found 18% of the 1,021 households surveyed had illegally wild-caught 
parrots (Drews 2001). A conservative estimate of the captive population of native parrots 
in Costa Rica was 151,000 individuals with a yearly extraction rate of 25,000–40,000 
individuals. Illegal trade in wild-caught songbirds for singing contests in Brazil has been 
a recognized conservation problem for decades (Levinson 1987) and continues in many 
parts of the country (Alves et al. 2010; Alves et al. 2012; Regueira & Bernard 2012). 
Interestingly, perhaps because Brazil has prohibited commercial export of native wild-
caught birds since 1967 (Thomsen & Mulliken 1992), the songbird trade in South 
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America appears to have developed and remained primarily for Brazil’s domestic 
consumers.  
Psittacidae is one of most threatened bird families in the world, with 152 of the 
350 extant species (43%) listed in a threatened category on the IUCN Red List (i.e., 
critically endangered, endangered, vulnerable, or near threatened; Butchart et al. 2004; 
BirdLife International 2015). Many parrot species are susceptible to exploitation because 
of their low reproductive rates, late age of first reproduction, and limited access to nest 
sites (Beissinger 2001; Wright et al. 2001; Cornelius et al. 2008). Destruction of suitable 
habitat, particularly nesting sites, and over-harvest for the pet trade are considered the 
primary threats facing wild parrot populations (Collar 2000; BirdLife International 
2012). Clarke & de By (2013), however, suggested that that poaching and habitat loss 
were at least equal causes of parrot decline in the Neotropics, with poaching possibly 
being a stronger threat. From 1991–1996, 1.2 million parrots were legally traded 
globally, the majority originating from the Neotropics (Beissinger 2001). This number 
was considered an underestimation of the actual amount taken from the wild because it 
did not include domestic and/or illegal parrot trade. More realistically, 400,000–800,000 
parrots may have been captured from the wild annually for the pet trade (Beissinger 
2001). Several Neotropical countries that have problems with illegal domestic parrot 
trade, and native bird trade in general, also have limited legal international trade, which 
may complicate law enforcement and fuels debate over the perceived factors 
contributing to illegal trade (Fischer 2004; Kirkpatrick & Emerton 2010; Beckert & 
Wehinger 2012).  
Legal and illegal wildlife trade  
A common, yet overly simplified, criticism of legal wildlife trade is that it 
facilitates illegal trade by the mere existence of its legality. Opponents of legal trade 
frequently call for a complete trade ban or at the very least a ban on the transport and 
import of wildlife or wildlife products claiming that a ban is the easiest measure to 
implement (World Parrot Trust 2004b; Gilardi 2006; Homberger & Beissinger 2006). 
The European Union recently adopted this strategy by banning the import of all wild-
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caught birds, regardless of their conservation status in the exporting country of origin 
(European Commission 2007). The interaction between legal and illegal wildlife trade is 
far from definite—more clearly defined are individual elements of the pro-trade and pro-
ban arguments.  
Advocating bans 
In many cases, pro-ban advocates prefer blanket import bans over export bans 
because import bans are claimed to be easy to implement for border personnel, deter 
smugglers and ultimately decrease demand (World Parrot Trust 2004b; Homberger & 
Beissinger 2006). Import bans are also touted as being more realistic and effective than 
export bans or trade regulated by exporting countries such as required by CITES, 
because many exporting countries inadequately regulate their exports (Shepherd et al. 
2004; Carpenter et al. 2005; Gilardi 2006; Shepherd & Nijman 2007; Nijman & 
Shepherd 2010; Nijman et al. 2012; Shepherd et al. 2012; Lyons & Shepherd 2013). Pro-
ban advocates argue that conditions in wildlife exporting countries, which are typically 
economically underdeveloped, facilitate illegal trade because they are (1) plagued by 
corruption, (2) unable or lack political will to adequately enforce national wildlife 
legislation let alone fulfill international requirements for non-detriment findings of 
harvested CITES-listed species, and (3) have too few adequately trained inspectors to 
control exports, detect forged documents, and correctly identify traded species (World 
Parrot Trust 2004b; Smith & Walpole 2005; Nguyen 2008; Wyatt 2009; Bennett 2011; 
Kakabadse 2011).  
Legal wildlife trade has many risks and negative consequences according to pro-
ban advocates. Legal trade provides a pathway to launder illegally-harvested goods such 
as what was found with domestic trade in tiger pelts in China (Environmental 
Investigation Agency 2013), reptiles (Shepherd & Nijman 2007; Lyons & Natusch 2011; 
Nijman et al. 2011b; Sung et al. 2013), birds (Alves et al. 2012; Shepherd et al. 2012) 
and other species (Brooks et al. 2010; Gomes Destro et al. 2012). Trade in wild-caught 
animals for the pet trade risk introducing infectious diseases (Smith et al. 2009) and 
invasive species (Carrete & Tella 2008), and causes considerable animal suffering and 
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high mortality along the trade chain (Cantú et al. 2007; Sollund 2013). With the risk of 
poorly controlled legal trade and potential over-harvest, less wildlife would remain in 
native ranges, which could otherwise provide non-extractive economic opportunities that 
benefit local communities such as from ecotourism (Brightsmith et al. 2008; Steven et al. 
2013; Welford & Barilla 2013). Fewer wild-caught animals for sale in the market (i.e., 
resulting in less competition) would provide entrepreneurs opportunities to develop or 
expand captive-breeding operations that could be certified to minimize laundering 
(Jepson & Ladle 2009) and would benefit species conservation (World Parrot Trust 
2004b; Damania & Bulte 2007). Finally, legal trade in controversial products, especially 
from endangered species such as ivory, reduces consumer stigma, which may 
subsequently increase demand and poaching (Heltberg 2001; Vasquez 2003; Fischer 
2004; Stiles & Stiles 2004). Pro-ban advocates argue that when trade bans are 
consistently enforced over time, such as India’s ban on ivory trade, they help conserve 
endangered species (Environmental Investigation Agency 2013).  
Advocating trade 
On the other side of the wildlife trade argument, pro-trade advocates question 
much of the anti-trade rationale. For instance, effective enforcement of trade bans may 
not be any easier than regulating trade because trade bans require demand-reduction 
campaigns that are expensive and have largely proven ineffective (Biggs et al. 2013). 
Pro-trade advocates are also skeptical that an international trade ban would decrease 
demand for wildlife and wildlife products (Cooney & Jepson 2006). Numerous bans or 
more strictly regulated trade have increased demand in specialty markets, particularly for 
products with inelastic demand such as for rhino horn and ivory (Cooney & Jepson 
2006; Courchamp et al. 2006; Hall et al. 2008). In such cases, increasing penalties for 
illicit trade, including the death penalty, has not prevented poaching (Conrad et al. 
2013). Inelastic demand with high profit potential was the first of five ingredients that 
Conrad (2013) suggested contributed to a “perfect storm” where a wildlife trade ban may 
have the unintended effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, illegal trade. The other 
four components were: (1) long history of trade and a strong cultural affinity for the 
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animal or animal product, (2) ambiguous property rights, (3) human-animal conflict 
causing negative incentives for conservation, and (4) inadequate enforcement. 
Trade proponents describe many benefits from legal, well-regulated trade. Legal 
trade, for example, keeps the trade transparent instead of pushing it underground where 
it is more difficult to detect and increases the risk of introducing infectious diseases by 
bypassing health screening protocols (CITES 2007; Karesh et al. 2012). When managed 
properly, legal trade can reduce prices and out-compete illegal sources (Hutton & Webb 
2002; McAllister et al. 2009). Legal trade can also provide revenue for conservation, 
offer economic opportunities to the poor, and incentivize local communities—who are 
most effective at preventing poaching and protecting habitat—to conserve their natural 
resources (Cooney & Jepson 2006; CITES 2007; Roe 2008; Weber et al. 2015). Trade 
advocates point out that most legal international trade involves abundant species, not 
threatened by trade in their source countries, such as West African finches (CITES 
2007). By eliminating a legal supply of common, non-threatened species, basic 
economic logic suggests that the value of these common species would increase, thereby 
creating opportunities for smugglers (Moyle 1998, 2005). Furthermore, pro-trade 
advocates argue that captive breeding may not be able to meet demand (Clayton et al. 
2000), or in some circumstances consumers may prefer wild-caught animals or products 
(Gratwicke et al. 2008; Phelps et al. 2014). For instance, demand remains high in Brazil 
for some wild-caught song birds because they are considered better singers (Levinson 
1987).  
Complexity and enforcement 
While both sides of the wildlife trade debate provide compelling arguments, 
consensus is a distant prospect and in the meantime, global trade remains complex and 
filled with many uncertainties (Damania & Bulte 2007; Wiersema 2013). It is unclear, 
for example, whether communities benefit more from non-extractive uses of wildlife or 
from legal wildlife trade. No scientific evidence has demonstrated that a blanket trade 
ban is more cost-effective and easier to implement than regulated legal wildlife trade. 
The conservation benefit of controlled legal trade or trade bans, especially in endangered 
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species products such as ivory and rhino horn, remains unanswered. What is clear is that 
international wildlife trade, just like other aspects of biodiversity conservation, is context 
dependent and the pros and cons of each trade system should be evaluated independently 
to understand the drivers and dynamics of the trade and to determine the best policy 
response (Fischer 2004; Fischer 2010; Lindenmayer & Hunter 2010). The same is true 
for situations of overlapping legal and illegal markets and for domestic wildlife trade, 
which occurs largely independent of international markets where traditional mechanisms 
to regulate wildlife trade, such as CITES, have little influence. 
Only a few studies have investigated regulatory interventions in domestic 
wildlife markets. In an attempt to control illegal parrot trade, Mexico implemented a 
complete ban on the import, export, captive-breeding and commercialization of native 
psittacine species with apparent success (Neme 2012). Following the 2005 outbreak of 
avian influenza and subsequent new legislation, illegal trade decreased significantly in 
Vietnam’s urban bird markets (Brooks-Moizer et al. 2009). Increased enforcement of 
wildlife legislation in Indonesia decreased trade in protected species for local markets 
during a two-year study period (Lee et al. 2005).  
Poor enforcement of wildlife legislation and trade regulations in source countries 
is a legitimate concern (Keane et al. 2008; Bennett 2011; Lyons & Natusch 2011; 
Cottee-Jones et al. 2014). A potential disincentive to enforce legislation occurs when 
live animals are involved because enforcement usually requires confiscating the animals 
(IUCN 2002). Most developing countries are hampered by limited financial and 
technical resources to provide adequate husbandry for confiscated wildlife. The lack of 
housing options for confiscated parrots was considered one of the primary reasons why 
authorities rarely confiscated illegally-traded parrots in Peru (Ríos et al. 2008). Lack of 
rescue facilities likely influenced customs officials to inconsistently confiscate illegally-
traded Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) in Morocco and Spain (van Uhm 2014).  
Wildlife rehabilitation centers and permanent-captivity facilities (zoos, aviaries) 
are scarce in most developing countries and they often have no space or desire to receive 
more individuals, especially of the most commonly traded species (Karesh 1995). In 
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Colombia, the most traded psittacine, the spectacled parrotlet (Forpus conspicillatus), 
was one of the least confiscated by authorities (Baquero & Baptiste 2004). Because 
authorities are reluctant to euthanize confiscated animals and have limited options to 
house them even temporarily, they frequently release the animals back to the wild 
without proper medical screening. Release often occurs without documenting the 
confiscation event and pertinent details to adequately monitor illegal trade, such as 
correct species identification (Karesh 1995; Troncoso & Naranjo-Maury 2004). 
Releasing individuals back to the wild under most circumstances is the least-
recommended option for handling confiscated wildlife (IUCN 2002). One reason is 
because releasing confiscated wildlife without medical screening, similar to 
translocation of wild animals for conservation purposes, risks releasing novel and 
potentially harmful pathogens into susceptible wildlife populations (Snyder et al. 2000; 
Jiménez & Cadena 2004; Kock et al. 2010). 
Disease and wildlife trade 
Documenting that a disease was introduced into a wild population through illegal 
wildlife trade is problematic given the illicit nature of the trade. Infectious pathogens, on 
occasion, have been identified from confiscated animals smuggled internationally, which 
demonstrates illegal trade as a potential source for disease outbreaks. In 2004, two 
crested hawk-eagles (Spizaetus nipalensis) seized at the Brussels international airport 
were carrying a highly pathogenic H5N1 strain of the avian influenza virus (Van Borm 
et al. 2005). Raccoons (Procyon lotor), illegally imported into Norway were infected 
with a zoonotic nematode Baylisascaris procyonis. One of the raccoons escaped before 
confiscation and it is unknown if it was carrying the nematode (Davidson et al. 2013). 
More commonly, legal or accidental movement of wild animals harboring infectious 
pathogens have provoked disease outbreaks (Woodford 2000; Williams et al. 2002; 
Chipman et al. 2008; Kock et al. 2010). In 1985, raccoons translocated from Texas to 
West Virginia to supplement the local hunting stock were considered to have introduced 
parvoviral enteritis, previously absent in West Virginia and now enzootic (Kock et al. 
2010). Many amphibian species worldwide are now threatened or extinct due to 
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chytridiomycosis, a fungal disease spread, in part, through the pet trade (Fisher & Garner 
2007; Skerratt et al. 2007). In other cases, infectious pathogens were identified in time to 
prevent the spread of disease. In 2004, a highly pathogenic paramyxovirus was identified 
in a legal shipment of wild-caught and captive-bred birds imported for the pet trade from 
Pakistan to Italy; all 4,000 imported birds were euthanized in quarantine (World Parrot 
Trust 2004a). The introduction of a novel Mycoplasma spp. into a healthy population of 
wild pancake tortoises (Malacochersus tornieri) was averted when the confiscated 
individuals were examined prior to release (Karesh 1995).  
Epidemiology of introduced infectious diseases in wildlife populations is 
challenging because rarely is a disease identified early in an outbreak, and may only be 
noticed after causing considerable mortality or after the disease becomes endemic 
(Hudson et al. 2002). Field studies are logistically difficult and, along with diagnostic 
testing, often prohibitively expensive. Without basic knowledge regarding the infectious 
pathogen, such as how it spreads and how effectively it infects a host, and fundamental 
host demographic data, it can be difficult predicting how a disease will respond in a wild 
animal population. Mathematical modeling allows us to use the information available 
about an infectious pathogen and the host population and, by accounting for uncertainty 
in the data, project how the pathogen will likely progress (i.e., will it go extinct or 
remain endemic and possibly impact the long-term stability of the host population). 
Models also provide a framework to help evaluate and compare potential interventions, 
such as vaccination programs (Keeling et al. 2003; Sterner & Smith 2006). Deterministic 
compartmental models are frequently used to depict wildlife disease outbreaks where 
transition rates from one class of the population to another are mathematically expressed 
as derivatives in continuous time (Anderson & May 1991; Hudson et al. 2002).  
Epidemiological modeling typically is based on one of two theoretical concepts: 
threshold theory and fadeout theory (Swinton et al. 2002). The basic reproduction 
number (R0) is the foundation of the threshold theory and defines the conditions for a 
pathogen to invade, specifically when R0 > 1. Fadeout theory is founded on what 
happens, for example, if a highly infectious pathogen runs out of susceptible hosts and 
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subsequently goes extinct. R0 is defined as is the average expected number of secondary 
infections produced by one typical infectious individual introduced into a fully 
susceptible host population (Heesterbeek 2002). It usually is estimated because rarely 
are all of the parameters known to calculate R0 from actual epidemiological data 
(Heesterbeek 2002). The force or speed with which susceptible individuals become 
infected, the per capita rate, is called the force-of-infection. R0 and the force-of-infection 
are influenced by the form of pathogen transmission between infected and susceptible 
individuals. Density-dependent transmission implies that R0 is proportional to the size of 
the host population and that there exists a threshold host density or population size 
below which the pathogen cannot invade. Frequency-dependent transmission implies 
that R0 is independent of the population size and has no effect on the pathogen’s ability 
to invade the population (McCallum et al. 2001; Swinton et al. 2002; Lloyd-Smith et al. 
2005).  
The use of simulation modeling to estimate or mimic the spread of infectious 
diseases affecting agriculture animals is fairly common (Harvey et al. 2007). The 
agriculture industry is most concerned about highly infectious diseases that can provoke 
substantial morbidity, mortality and/or economic losses such as foot-and-mouth disease, 
swine fever, and highly-pathogenic avian influenza (Bates et al. 2003; Keeling et al. 
2003; Bolzoni & de Leo 2007; Karsten 2007; Paarlberg et al. 2007). Model predictions 
for these high-risk diseases are increasingly being used to inform policy decisions 
(Guitian & Pfeiffer 2006) and guide response strategies (Harvey et al. 2007; Brooks-
Pollock et al. 2014). Less common are simulation models that evaluate the “what if” 
scenarios of introducing an infectious disease into a susceptible wildlife population; 
although, discrete-time stochastic models were developed to investigate enzootic 
conditions for Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis, an often fatal fungal disease devastating 
many amphibian populations (Briggs et al. 2005; Skerratt et al. 2007; Briggs et al. 2010). 
It is more common that wildlife disease models are developed to investigate different 
management strategies to mitigate the spread or impact of a disease such as culling 
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(Wonham et al. 2004; Cox et al. 2005; Donnelly et al. 2006; Foley et al. 2011; Brooks-
Pollock et al. 2014) or vaccination (Sterner & Smith 2006; Panjeti & Real 2011). 
With respect to illegal wildlife trade, simulation models provide a method to 
explore potential consequences of pathogen introduction via illegal trade and disease 
dynamics in exposed and harvested host populations. Wild animal populations are at risk 
from introduced diseases by contacting confiscated individuals that were infected with 
an infectious pathogen while in captivity, and then subsequently released by authorities 
or escaped back to the wild. Minimizing the risk of introducing infectious diseases 
would require either euthanizing the confiscated animals, which is often the preferred 
and most responsible option (IUCN 2002), or improving confiscation management to 
include, for example, quarantine and proper health screening prior to release (Woodford 
2000; IUCN 2002). In developing countries, quarantine and medical screening are 
problematic because husbandry and diagnostic expenses are typically beyond what 
governments can provide (Karesh 1993, 1995). For example, the minimum 60-day 
quarantine suggested for high risk species of infectious diseases such as Newcastle 
disease, would tax most governments’ resources (Woodford 2000). Even most wildlife 
rehabilitation centers may not have the financial resources to care for and test individuals 
prior to release (Karesh 1995). The most direct approach to minimize the risk of disease 
introduction through illegal trade would be to decrease the illegal trade.  
Non-governmental organizations 
Historically, conservation and preservation groups have been the entities to raise 
alarm about international wildlife trade. One of the earliest anti-trade campaigns, started 
in the mid-1800s in the United States and England, confronted the perceived cruel and 
excessive slaughter of plume birds to harvest feathers for the fashion industry (Doughty 
1975). The “plumage campaigns” used both conservation and animal-welfare arguments 
to influence the consuming public and politicians to decrease demand and increase 
commercial regulation. Since these earliest campaigns, conservation organizations have 
continued to tackle wildlife trade issues, while animal-welfare groups, until recently, 
have focused mostly on domestic and farm animals. Starting in the 1960s, conservation 
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs) grew into major actors on the international 
environmental stage. They were the driving force behind the development of key 
multilateral agreements in the 1970s such as the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance (Ramsar), the Convention of Migratory Species (CMS), and 
CITES (Cobb et al. 2007; Prideaux 2014). After establishment of CITES, NGOs adopted 
“the role of guardians of the spirit and purpose of CITES by monitoring both compliance 
and enforcement” (Sands & Bedecarré 1990: pg. 779).  
In developing countries, increasingly powerful global conservation NGOs have 
established close relationships with governments and today drive much of the 
conservation policy (Duffy 2006; Brockington & Scholfield 2010a). Governments in 
many developing countries do not prioritize wildlife conservation and/or rarely have 
funding for conservation efforts (Lowther et al. 2002; Balmford et al. 2003; Balmford & 
Whitten 2003; Bruner et al. 2004; Nurse 2011; Shanee 2012; Miller et al. 2013). To 
compensate for governmental gaps, NGOs assist with wildlife management and policy 
development, and often directly support efforts to combat illegal wildlife trade (White 
2012; Boehmelt et al. 2013; Nurse 2013; The Last Great Ape Organization 2013; 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Bondaroff 2014). Conservation NGOs typically prioritize 
combating illegal trade of endangered species, which is consistent with the original edict 
for biodiversity conservation (Soulé 1985). Animal-welfare NGOs, on the other hand, 
when active against illegal trade, usually consider all wild animals regardless of their 
conservation status (Singer 1975; Irwin 2003).  
Efforts to combat illegal wildlife trade range widely from broad indirect 
initiatives involving international policy, to supporting local demand-reduction 
interventions, and rehabilitation of confiscated wildlife (Lee et al. 2005; Brooks-Moizer 
et al. 2009; Humane Society International 2011; World Wildlife Fund / Dalberg 2012; 
Jiang et al. 2013; Challender & MacMillan 2014; Challender et al. 2015). Nurse (2011) 
categorized NGOs involved in combating wildlife crime as: (1) campaigning, (2) law 
enforcement, or (3) political-lobbying NGOs. Public-awareness campaigns and political 
lobbying have long been the cornerstones for both conservation and animal-welfare 
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NGOs (World Wildlife Fund / Dalberg 2012; African Wildlife Foundation 2013; 
Conservation International 2013b; Humane Society International 2013). Improving 
wildlife law enforcement has received international attention recently following 
egregious poaching of rhinos and elephants (Anon. 2014; Narula 2014). Strengthening 
enforcement was also the first of three recommendations made by the U.S. President’s 
Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking, in addition to reducing demand for illegally 
traded wildlife, and expanding international cooperation and commitment (McHale & 
Hayes 2014). Large international initiatives involving conservation NGOs, such as the 
Freeland Foundation and TRAFFIC, helped create the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations’ Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN), considered the world’s largest 
regional wildlife law enforcement network spanning across ten countries (ASEAN-WEN 
2014). Locally, NGOs have helped train wildlife authorities and provide salary and 
equipment (Holmern et al. 2007; Freeland Foundation 2013; International Fund for 
Animal Welfare 2013; The Last Great Ape Organization 2013; Wildlife Conservation 
Society 2013; Wyatt 2013a). The outcomes of the various NGOs’ efforts to combat 
illegal wildlife trade have not been systematically evaluated. 
Research objectives and dissertation outline 
The goal for my dissertation research was to improve understanding of illegal 
wildlife trade, particularly native bird trade, for the domestic pet market in Peru. My 
dissertation is divided into four primary chapters designed for publication; each chapter 
addresses different research objectives: 
(1) Establish the relationship between Peru’s legal export quota system and illegal 
domestic trade in native birds. (Chapter II)  
(2) Evaluate how illegal harvest and the potential introduction of the infectious 
pathogen, Newcastle disease virus, interact to affect a susceptible population of 
white-winged parakeets. (Chapter III) 
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(3) Explore the role of transmission threshold values when predicting disease 
epidemics associated with potential pathogen introduction via wildlife 
rehabilitation. (Chapter IV) 
(4) Examine NGOs and the influence of different philosophical perspectives toward 
wildlife on their effort to decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade in Peru. (Chapter V) 
I end with a summary chapter including recommendations and opportunities for future 
research. (Chapter VI)    
Study area 
Peru, located on South America's central Pacific coast, is roughly the size of 
Alaska with 1,300,000 km
2
 and is bordered by Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile to the east and 
south, and Colombia and Ecuador to the north. The current human population is almost 
31 million (INEI 2014). Geographically, Peru is divided into three natural regions; the 
western coastal lowlands, the Andes Mountains and the eastern Amazonian lowlands 
that cover over 50% of the nation's territory. Politically, Peru is divided into 24 
departamentos (provinces); provincial capitals are important transport links and wildlife 
trade sites. Lima, the capital, is the largest city (~ 9 million inhabitants) and the 
country’s largest consumer base for wildlife (INEI 2014). Traditional animal markets 
were surveyed in Lima and eight other cities (Fig. 1). 
Peru offered a unique opportunity to explore illegal wildlife-pet trade issues 
because (1) it has a long history of legal export trade with limited quotas still regulated 
for many native species, in contrast to most neighboring countries (Dourojeanni 1985; 
Falero & Sánchez 1990; Thomsen & Mulliken 1992), (2) illegal wildlife-pet trade for the 
domestic market is ubiquitous, and demand for unusual pets may be growing along with 
Peru’s improved economy (TRAFFIC 2008; Castano 2011; Vera & Yu 2013), (3) 
infectious diseases such as Newcastle disease are endemic in poultry, offering 
opportunities for transmission between domestic and wild animals via illegal trade (The 
Poultry Site 2009), and (4) many conservation and animal-welfare NGOs are in Peru and 
could potentially be working to decrease the illegal wildlife-pet trade.  
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CHAPTER II  
ILLEGAL DOMESTIC BIRD TRADE AND THE ROLE OF EXPORT QUOTAS IN 
PERU 
 
Synopsis 
Legal international trade of wild animals is controversial because some experts 
speculate that it facilitates illegal domestic trade in source countries. Wild-caught birds 
are commonly traded as pets, both legally and illegally, for international and domestic 
markets. I used Peru’s native bird trade as a case study to explore the relationship 
between legal international and illegal domestic trade. Peru’s current quota system 
started in 2001 and is designed to permit limited export of wild-caught birds, while 
domestic trade is largely prohibited. I evaluated survey data from 40 markets in nine 
cities (March 2007–July 2011), tabulated government seizure records and export quotas, 
and compared proportions of native birds with and without quotas in markets and 
seizures. Sixteen independent variables were evaluated using generalized linear models 
to explain native bird abundance in the markets and government seizures. I observed a 
thriving illegal domestic market with 130 native species (n = 35,279 birds) offered for 
sale. Parrots were the most abundant birds. I found no evidence that Peru’s current quota 
system facilitated illegal domestic trade; authorities confiscated birds regardless of their 
quota status. While the current quota system did not influence market abundance, 
historic export trade did. Peru’s domestic market, and likely other illegal Neotropical 
bird markets, developed as a consequence of high historic exports and now appears 
driven, in part, by tradition and which birds harvesters are accustomed to trapping. 
Improved enforcement of Peru’s wildlife legislation, including species-identification and 
records-management training, would likely be more effective in decreasing illegal 
domestic trade than eliminating quotas.  
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Introduction 
Exotic animals are popular pets in many parts of the world. Growing consumer 
demand for these novel creatures drives a complex, lucrative, and often illicit 
international trade in wild-caught animals (Christy 2008; Laufer 2010; Bush et al. 2014). 
Legal and illegal trade of the same or similar species frequently occurs simultaneously 
for national and international markets (Cheung & Dudgeon 2006; Lyons & Shepherd 
2013). Intertwined legal and illegal markets complicate trade regulation, and fuel debate 
regarding the perceived costs and benefits of wildlife trade. On the one hand, legal 
sustainable trade can provide important economic benefits for rural communities and 
developing nations while conserving wild populations (Broad et al. 2003; Carpenter et 
al. 2005; Cooney & Jepson 2006). On the other hand, illegal or poorly regulated trade of 
wild-caught animals can result in over-harvest and threaten populations and species 
(Nekaris et al. 2010; Shepherd 2010; Sung et al. 2013).  
Enforcement of wildlife trade legislation varies among countries, but typically is 
insufficient in developing source nations (Brack & Hayman 2002; Bennett 2011; World 
Wildlife Fund / Dalberg 2012), and where control is complicated by the intersection of 
legal and illegal markets (Fischer 2004; Zhang et al. 2008). Some have suggested the 
existence of legal international trade, such as an export quota system, can enable illegal 
domestic trade in wild-caught animals in source countries (Herrera & Hennessey 2007; 
Gastañaga et al. 2010; Pires & Clarke 2011). A legal quota system may facilitate illegal 
trade, in part, through falsification of permits, deliberate or accidental misidentification 
of species, and corruption of wildlife officials. While authors debate the pros and cons of 
international wildlife trade and trade bans (e.g., World Parrot Trust 2004b; Burton 2006; 
Cooney & Jepson 2006; Gilardi 2006; Roe 2006; CITES 2007), few have evaluated the 
influence of legal export quotas on illegal domestic markets.  
Wild-caught birds are commonly traded as pets, both legally and illegally, for 
international and domestic markets (Wright et al. 2001; Tieguhong et al. 2006; Herrera 
& Hennessey 2007; Alves et al. 2012; Shepherd et al. 2012). Despite declining 
international trade largely due to trade treaties, import bans, and captive-breeding 
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(Wright et al. 2001; Jepson & Ladle 2005; Pain et al. 2006), almost 40% of threatened 
birds experience over-exploitation from hunting or pet trade (BirdLife International 
2012), and illegal domestic trade of native birds still flourishes in many countries 
(Shepherd 2010; Regueira & Bernard 2012). Legal and illegal trade in wild-caught birds 
are likely to continue because demand for pet birds remains strong (Jepson & Ladle 
2005; RSPCA 2006; AVMA 2012), and wild-caught birds are inexpensive options for 
international markets and domestic consumers (Cantú et al. 2007; Alves et al. 2012).  
Peru has among the highest avian diversities in the world (n = 1,780 species, 
BirdLife International 2014a), and many species have legal export quotas and/or are 
traded illegally for the domestic pet-bird market (Ríos et al. 2008; Shanee 2012). 
Domestic demand for wild-caught native birds is high, in part, because they are often 
less expensive than locally captive-bred ornamental species. Because no captive-bred or 
legally-harvested native bird options exist, native birds are captured from the wild and 
illegally offered for sale in traditional animal markets throughout Peru (González 2003; 
Ríos et al. 2008; Gastañaga et al. 2010). Trafficked birds range from common species, 
such as Brotogeris versicolurus, to threatened endemics (e.g., Forpus xanthops) 
(BirdLife International 2014d), and globally endangered species (e.g., B. pyrrhoptera) 
(BirdLife International 2014b). Gastañaga et al. (2010) estimated that 80,000–90,000 
wild-caught parrots were illegally sold annually to domestic consumers in Peru. Authors 
noted that seven of the most commonly traded parrot species had export quotas 
(Gastañaga et al. 2010; Pires 2014). Better understanding of the relationship between 
legal and illegal markets should provide valuable insight into whether legal wildlife 
export quotas facilitate illegal domestic trade. 
I used the native pet-bird trade in Peru as a case study to evaluate the relationship 
between a legal quota system and illegal domestic trade. I first evaluated the numbers of 
birds recorded in the domestic pet trade through a five-year survey of animal markets 
and government seizure records (2007–2011). To assess the role of export quotas, I 
explored differences in proportions of native birds with and without quotas recorded in 
markets and seizures. I hypothesized that if the quota system facilitated illegal domestic 
 20 
 
trade, birds with quotas would be (1) more abundant in the markets, and (2) less 
abundant in government seizures. I then used regression models to evaluate the influence 
of current export quotas and 15 other factors on avian abundance in the markets and 
seizures.  
Methods 
Export quota system and wildlife commercialization legislation 
Peru became a Party to CITES in 1975 (CITES 2014a) and published its first 
commercial avian harvest-export quotas in 2001 (INRENA 2001). The commercial 
quota system was designed to permit limited legal export of wildlife and wildlife 
products. The Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), Peru’s CITES Management Authority, 
regulates wildlife commercialization and publishes an annual calendar of commercial 
export quotas for native wildlife (MINAG 2001a). The number of avian species with 
export quotas nearly doubled from 56 in 2001 to 100 in 2011, but the maximum number 
of potential exports decreased by 7%, from 86,600 to 80,555 individuals over the same 
period.  
During the study period, wildlife commercialization for the domestic market was 
largely considered illegal because it typically was performed without appropriate permits 
and licenses (Daut et al. 2015). The Forestry and Wildlife Law regulations (MINAG 
2001a) stated that legal trade required a commercial hunting license and annual 
authorizations that specified the permitted species, number of specimens, time, location 
and method of harvest, and fees/taxes to be paid according to a published annual 
commercial calendar (e.g., MINAG 2011). A transport permit was required for internal 
movement of wildlife, including a list of the unique tags/bands used to identify each 
specimen being transported. Regulations also stipulated that a wild animal may only be 
kept as a pet if it was a permitted (quota-listed) species, the specimen originated from an 
authorized management area, breeding facility, or a temporary custodial center, and must 
be properly identified with a tag/band and registered with MINAG. The commercial sale 
of wildlife was prohibited in public spaces or places not authorized for that purpose, 
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which included all markets surveyed during the study (Congreso de la República 2000). 
As a result, all domestic native-bird trade monitored during this study was illegal for one 
or more reasons. 
Market survey 
Forty animal markets in nine cities were surveyed for pet birds for sale at varying 
frequencies between March 2007 and July 2011, excluding March–June 2010 (see Fig. 1 
for map). These nine cities represent roughly 73% of Peru’s human population (INEI 
2014) and seven of the country’s 24 political departments. Because the primary objective 
for the market visits was to survey wild animals for infectious diseases, not all markets 
were visited regularly; markets with large numbers of wild animals were prioritized to 
maximize sample collection. Annual market visits varied from a low in 2007 (n = 51) to 
a high in 2009 (n = 516), totaling 994 visits. Most markets were located in Lima (n = 
25), with 1–3 in the other eight cities. Markets varied from informal roadside stands to 
permanent stalls reminiscent of pet stores. Given the fluid and often illegal nature of 
animal markets, many closed, moved, or became inactive during the study. New markets 
were investigated when they were identified.  
During market visits, Peruvian technicians recorded the avian species and 
number of birds offered for sale in each vendor’s stall. Wild-caught Peruvian species 
(native), South American native species not found in Peru (regional), introduced exotic 
birds, and captive-bred ornamental birds were recorded. Most individuals were identified 
to species, but otherwise to genus or family. Identification of native species followed 
Schulenberg et al. (2007) and nomenclature was updated according to del Hoyo et al. 
(2014). When possible, the asked selling price was recorded. 
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Figure 1.  Map of Peru; cities included in the market survey (2007–2011) are indicated 
by a black dot.  
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Quota and seizure data 
I compiled avian commercial export quotas from annual calendars published by 
MINAG (e.g., MINAG 2007b) for all years of our study period except 2010 when no 
quotas were published. Data included the species permitted for harvest and extraction 
period per geographic location. Government seizure records of native birds (2007–2011) 
were compiled from reports published by the National Police and MINAG, and 
information requested from regional offices of the Technical Administration of Forestry 
and Wildlife (ATFFS) through Peru’s Transparency Law (Congreso de la República 
2002). I recorded the confiscated species (or most specific taxonomic level provided), 
number of individuals, year, and political department or governmental region where 
individuals were confiscated.  
Biological and trade variables 
I identified 16 variables that could influence abundance of the 150 avian species 
found in animal markets and/or government seizures. Eight variables represented 
biological factors related to avian species (region, range size, abundance, conservation 
rank, capture, body mass, color, and voice), and eight variables were related to bird trade 
(current quota, past quota, total quota, quota years, U.S. import, CITES permit, price, 
and CITES status) (Table 1; for more detailed descriptions see Appendix A).  
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Table 1.  Description of 16 independent variables included in the analysis of avian 
abundance in Peruvian animal markets and in governmental seizure records (2007–
2011). See Appendix A for detailed descriptions. 
 
 
Variable name 
 
Variable type 
 
Description 
 
 
Biological factors   
Region Nominal 1 of 4 major biogeographic regions in Peru 
Range size Continuous Estimate of wild-range size (km
2
) 
Abundance Ordinal 3-point scale;  1 = uncommon, 2 = fairly 
common to common, 3 = abundant 
Conservation 
rank 
Ordinal 2-point scale;  1 = least concern, 2 = near 
threatened, vulnerable, or endangered 
Capture Ordinal 3-point scale;  1 = easy, 2 = moderate, 3 = 
difficult 
Body mass Continuous Body size (gm) 
Color Continuous Composite value: number of contrasting colors 
x percent body coverage 
Voice Ordinal 3-point scale;  1 = poor talking ability or 
simple/harsh vocalizations, 2 = medium 
talking ability or semi-pleasing vocalizations, 
3 = excellent talking ability or pleasing 
singing vocalizations 
Trade factors   
Current quota Continuous Commercial harvest/export quota (2007–2011) 
Past quota Continuous Commercial harvest/export quota (2001–2006) 
Total quota Continuous Commercial harvest/export quota (2001–2011) 
Quota years Continuous Number of years with published quota (2001–
2011) 
U.S. import Continuous U.S. Import of avian species from Peru (1970–
1974 and 1980–1989)  
CITES permit Continuous CITES export permit for avian species from 
Peru (1975–1979 and 1990–2006) 
Price
a
 Continuous Average market selling price during study 
period (U.S. dollar) 
CITES status Nominal 2-point scale;  1 = not listed on any Appendix, 2 
= listed on either Appendix I or II  
a 
Included only in parrot-subset models.  
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Analyses 
To minimize duplicate market-survey counts of the same individual bird from 
frequent visits to the same market, I removed species’ duplications < 10 days apart for 
each market stall. I used a 10-day interval based on estimated turnover rates suggested 
by vendors. During the study period, 115,409 birds were recorded for sale in markets. 
Following removal of 22,648 potential duplicate counts, 92,761 birds and 947 market 
visits were used for analyses. To evaluate market-survey effort, I constructed an 
accumulation curve of the native avian species identified at the 40 markets surveyed 
across 577 market-visit days.  
I used generalized linear models to evaluate the influence of current export 
quotas and 15 other variables (Table 1) on the number of individuals of native species in 
(1) animal markets and (2) government seizures, assuming a normal distribution for the 
response variables. A parrot-only subset of the global markets model was also evaluated 
and was the only group of models to include price. Suitable transformations were 
performed to fulfill assumptions (Appendix A). Residuals of the statistical models 
followed a normal distribution and residual plots were randomly distributed. I used 
variance inflation factors (VIF) to identify multi-collinearity among explanatory 
variables, and where necessary (VIF > 5; O’brien 2007), included only the variable that 
contributed most to the model (Appendix A). For example, the four quota variables 
(current quota, past quota, total quota, and quota years) were highly collinear (VIF > 5), 
so I retained only one of these four variables (quota years). Therefore, 12 variables were 
retained for the market and seizure model sets and 11 in the parrot-only market subset.  
I used an information-theoretic approach employing Akaike’s information 
criterion corrected for small sample sizes (AICc) to identify plausible models (Burnham 
& Anderson 2002). For the two model sets and one subset, I began with the global 
model including biologically relevant twofold interactions and progressively dropped 
non-significant terms until the most parsimonious model with significant terms was 
obtained. All analyses were conducted using JMP Pro 11.0 (SAS Institute, North 
Carolina, USA). 
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Results 
Diversity and numbers in markets and seizures 
There were 92,761 birds counted for sale during 2007–2011; 38% (n = 35,279) 
were wild-caught native species belonging to 41 families, 97 genera, and 130 species 
(Appendix B). The remaining individuals were captive-bred ornamental, regional or 
exotic species. An accumulation curve for native species stabilized at approximately 
market-visit day 500 (Fig. 2). Parrots made up 76% of the native market (n = 26,661) 
and was the family with the largest number of species (n = 34; 65% of Peru’s 
psittacines), followed by Thraupidae (n = 16) and Columbidae (n = 11). The 12 most 
abundant native species represented 81% of all native birds observed, but only 9% of 
species diversity (Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Accumulation curve for native avian species (n = 130) based on observations 
made during 577 market-visit days in nine Peruvian cities (2007–2011). Market-visit 
days include multiple visits to different markets on the same day.   
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Observations 
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Authorities registered 21,745 confiscated birds during the study; 31% (n = 6,656) 
were identified to species (n = 64). In most cases, individuals were listed as a generic 
“bird” (n = 13,285, 61%; Appendix B). The 39 genera identified included 17 raptor and 
eight parrot species. Most individuals (92%) identified to family were parrots. Forty-
three (68%) of the confiscated native species were also recorded in the market survey. 
Nine of the 12 most frequently recorded species in the markets and seizure records were 
the same (Table 2). Avian market and seizure data were moderately correlated (rs = 0.19, 
p < 0.02, n = 150). 
Export quotas 
Commercial export (harvest) quotas were published for 103 avian species with a 
maximum potential export of 24,005 individuals (2007–2011; Appendix B). The actual 
number of exported birds is unknown because, despite multiple requests, I was unable to 
obtain those data from the Peruvian government. The number of species with quotas 
varied annually from seven in 2009 to 100 in 2011 (Table 3). The family Thraupidae had 
the highest number of quota species (n = 42), followed by Columbidae (n = 9), 
Fringillidae (n = 7), Icteridae (n = 8), and Psittacidae (n = 7) together representing 71% 
of all quota-listed species. The majority of species recorded in the market survey and/or 
in government seizures did not have published export quotas; however, the majority of 
individual birds did (Table 3). Seven of the 12 most abundant native species observed in 
the markets had quotas published three or four years of the study (Table 2). 
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Table 2.  Twelve most abundant native birds observed for sale in Peruvian animal 
markets and in government seizure records (2007–2011). Quota is the sum of 
published export quotas.  
Genus species 
Market 
counts 
% of  
market  
Quota  
Seizure 
counts 
% of  
seizure   
Brotogeris versicolurus 12,093 35.3 5,000 5,012 77.1 
Forpus coelestis 3,504 10.2 600 70 1.1 
Brotogeris cyanoptera 2,568 7.5 5,000 54 0.8 
Dives warszewiczi 2,041 6 0 0 0 
Sicalis flaveola 1,741 5.1 11,000 441 6.7 
Brotogeris sanctithomae 1,349 3.9 4,350 36 0.5 
Psittacara erythrogenys 1,072 3.1 0 73 1.1 
Amazona amazonica 1,027 3 0 111 1.7 
Psittacara leucophthalmus 775 2.3 0 146 2.2 
Aratinga weddellii 609 1.8 5,000 160 2.4 
Sporophila luctuosa 569 1.7 10,500 0 0 
Amazona festiva 520 1.5 0 22 0.3 
Total 27,868 81.4  6,151 93.8 
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Table 3.  Number of native avian species (n) recorded in published export quotas, markets, and government seizures, and 
percent of quota-listed species and individuals in markets and seizures in Peru (2007–2011). 
 
     % with quotas   % with quotas 
Year 
Quota 
species  
% in 
markets 
 Market  
species Individuals  
 Seizure 
species 
 
Individuals  
 
2007 (62) 32.2  (58) 34.5  (20) 73.6  (2,025)  (3)    66.7  (2) 99.5  (193) 
2008 (58) 41.4  (91) 26.4  (24) 71.4  (6,024)  (38)   18.4  (7) 85.5  (1,008) 
2009 (7) 100  (81) 8.6    (7) 60.5  (7,769)  (41)   17.1  (7) 70.1  (1,234) 
2010 (0)
a
 0  (48) 0 0          (26) 0         0         
2011 (100) 20.0  (54) 37.0  (20) 59.6  (4,335)  (40) 17.5  (7) 88.1  (973) 
 
a 
No quotas were published in 2010, but 2,944 individuals were observed in markets (excluding March–June) and 2,314 
in seizures. 
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Market and seizure abundance 
U.S. import, CITES permit, voice, body size and region and a twofold interaction 
term (CITES permit*body mass) were included in the most plausible model explaining 
abundance of avian species in markets (Table 4). According to evidence ratios, the 
second most supported model differed only marginally from the best by an additional 
interaction term. Together these two models comprised the 95% confidence set.  
 For the subset model, parrot species in markets, the best approximating model 
included U.S. import, voice, range size, price and quota years along with interaction 
price*quota years (Table 4). Because price and body mass were highly correlated (VIF = 
9.96; r = 0.84, p < 0.0001, n = 34), they should be considered surrogates when 
comparing avian and parrot species in markets models. The second most plausible 
model included CITES permit and received only marginally less support than the best 
model (Table 4). CITES permit, along with U.S. import and voice, were also included in 
the most plausible avian species in markets model. The remaining models in the 95% 
confidence set contributed little to explaining parrot abundance in the markets. 
For avian species in seizures, U.S. import, CITES permit, voice, range size, and 
quota years and a twofold interaction term (CITES permit*range size) were included in 
the best approximating model (Table 4). The second most plausible model also included 
body mass plus an interaction term (US import*body mass), and received only 
marginally less support than the best model. The summed weight (wi) for the top two 
models was 0.65 (Table 4). Different combinations of these effects were retained in the 
next two best plausible models of the 95% confidence set, with evidence ratios < 3.8. 
The remaining models in the 95% confidence set had little support, meaning the top 
model was almost ten times better than the fifth (Table 4).  
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Table 4.  Model selection results for all native avian and parrot (subset) species (n) observed in market surveys and 
recorded in governmental seizures in Peru, 2007–2011. Models were ranked by Akaike’s Information Criterion with small-
sample correction (AICc). Statistics include: number of parameters including intercept (K), twice the negative log-
likelihood (-2l), difference between AICc of each model and the best model (ΔAICc), Akaike model weight (wi), evidence 
ratio (wi/w1), and R
2
. Models listed under each heading include the 95% confidence set (+1 for avian species in markets).  
 
Model K -2l AICc ΔAICc wi wi/w1 R
2
 
 
Avian species in markets (129) 
 
       
US import + CITES permit + voice + body mass + 
region + CITES permit*body mass 
9 226.27 245.79 0 0.537 1 0.59 
US import + CITES permit + voice + body mass + 
region + US import*CITES permit + CITES 
permit*body mass  
11 222.02 246.27 0.487 0.421 1.276 0.60 
US import + CITES permit + voice + body mass + 
US import*CITES permit + CITES permit*body 
mass  
10 231.25 253.11 7.325 0.014 38.96 0.55 
 
Parrot species in markets
a
 (34) 
 
       
US import + voice + range size + price + quota years 
+ price*quota years 
9 30.87 56.37 0 0.519 1 0.81 
US import + CITES permit + voice + range size + 
price + quota years + price*quota years 
10 28.34 57.91 1.538 0.24 2.158 0.82 
US import + voice + range size + price + quota years 
+ US import*voice + price*quota years 
13 15.92 60.12 3.746 0.08 6.506 0.83 
US import + voice + range size + price + quota years 7 42.7 61.01 4.637 0.051 10.159 0.75 
US import + voice + range size + price + quota years 
+ US import*voice 
11 27.38 61.38 5.014 0.042 12.266 0.80 
US import + CITES permit + voice + range size + 
CITES permit*range size 
8 40.68 62.44 6.067 0.025 20.769 0.74 
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Table 4.  Continued        
Model K -2l AICc ΔAICc wi wi/w1 R
2
 
Avian species in seizures (63) 
 
       
US import + CITES permit + voice + range size + 
quota years + CITES permit*range size  
9 68.47 89.86 0 0.419 1 0.55 
US import + CITES permit + voice + body mass + 
range size + quota years + US import*body mass + 
CITES permit*range size  
12 60.69 91.06 1.195 0.231 1.817 0.66 
US import + CITES permit + voice + body mass + 
range size + quota years + CITES permit*range 
size  
10 68.16 92.48 2.616 0.114 3.698 0.63 
US import + CITES permit + voice + range size + 
quota years + CITES permit*range size + range 
size*quota years 
11 65.37 92.54 2.679 0.109 3.818 0.60 
US import + CITES permit + voice + quota years + 
US import*CITES permit 
8 75.73 94.39 4.531 0.043 9.638 0.59 
US import + voice + CITES status + quota years 6 81.53 95.03 5.17 0.032 13.26 0.57 
a
 CITES-status variable was not included because all parrots are listed on either Appendix I or II; abundance and region 
variables were re-scaled due to small sample size (Appendix A). 
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Conservation 
Individuals of threatened species were rarely recorded in the market study or in 
government seizures. Thirteen market species (10%) and 2,034 individuals (6%) were 
listed as threatened on the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources Red List (IUCN; 2013b), Peru’s list of threatened species (MINAG 2004), or 
both (Table 5). Three species made up the vast majority of threatened individuals in the 
markets (n = 1,808; 89%, i.e., Psittacara erythrogenys, Amazona festiva, and B. 
phyrroptera). A higher diversity of threatened species was confiscated than recorded in 
the markets. Nineteen of the 64 confiscated species (30%) and 211 individuals (3%) 
were listed in a threatened category (Table 5). Fifty-seven market species (44%) and the 
majority of confiscated species, (n = 51; 80%) were listed on either CITES Appendix I 
or II largely due to the family group listings including parrots and raptors (Appendix B).  
Ornamental, regional, and exotic birds 
Captive-bred ornamental cage birds were frequently recorded in the market 
study. Over 57,000 individuals were observed for sale (62% of market), representing 14 
species in three families and outnumbering native birds in six of the nine cities surveyed 
(Appendix B). Melopsittacus undulatus was the most commonly recorded ornamental 
species (n = 43,521), representing 76% of ornamental birds and 47% of the entire 
market. Native and ornamental bird species were observed for sale together at most 
markets surveyed (n = 35; 88%). Four regional species (A. aestiva, B. chiriri, Myiopsitta 
monachus, Paroaria coronata), and one exotic species (Passer domesticus) were 
recorded in low numbers (n = 322, 0.4%; Appendix B).  
  
 34 
 
 
Table 5.  Conservation status of native species and counts recorded in the market 
survey and seizure records in Peru (2007–2011). 
 
Genus species Common name 
IUCN 
status
a
 
Peru 
status
a
 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Amazona festiva Southern Festive 
Amazon 
NT NT 520 33 
Andigena hypoglauca Grey-breasted 
Mountain-toucan 
NT NT 
 
2 
Ara chloropterus Red-and-green Macaw 
 
VU 82 10 
Ara macao Scarlet Macaw 
 
VU 47 15 
Ara militaris Military Macaw VU VU 7 4 
Brotogeris 
pyrrhoptera 
Grey-cheeked 
Parakeet 
EN EN 216 4 
Buteogallus solitarius Black Solitary Eagle NT 
  
1 
Falco peregrinus Peregrine Falcon 
 
NT 3 15 
Forpus xanthops
b
 Yellow-faced Parrotlet VU VU 24 22 
Harpia harpyja Harpy Eagle NT VU 
 
1 
Mitu tuberosum Razor-billed Curassow 
 
NT 21 
 
Patagioenas oenops Peruvian Pigeon VU VU 4 
 
Phalacrocorax 
bougainvilliorum 
Guanay Cormorant NT EN 
 
2 
Phoenicopterus 
chilensis 
Chilean Flamingo NT NT 
 
1 
Pionites leucogaster
c
 White-bellied Parrot VU 
 
17 7 
Pseudastur 
occidentalis 
Grey-backed Hawk EN EN 2 
 
Psittacara 
erythrogenys 
Red-masked Parakeet NT NT 1072 73 
Pyrilia barrabandi Orange-cheeked 
Parrot 
NT 
 
19 
 
Ramphastos 
ambiguus 
Yellow-throated 
Toucan 
NT NT 
 
1 
Rhamphastos toco Toco Toucan 
 
NT 
 
1 
Spheniscus humboldti Humboldt Penguin VU EN 
 
9 
Sula variegate Peruvian Booby 
 
EN 
 
1 
Vultur gryphus Andean Condor NT EN 
 
9 
a
 NT = near threatened, VU = vulnerable, EN = endangered. 
b
 Endemic species. 
c
 Currently called P. xanthomerius, Black-legged Parrot, and is listed as Least Concern. 
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Discussion 
My study demonstrates that a large number of Peru’s native birds, predominantly 
psittacines, are captured from the wild and illegally offered for sale in animal markets to 
domestic consumers. I found that Peru’s current legal quota system, which started in 
2001, had little influence on avian species abundance in domestic markets. I anticipated 
that if the quota system facilitated illegal domestic trade, birds with export quotas would 
make up a higher proportion of birds in the markets and a lower proportion of birds in 
seizures because they would be considered more “legal” by authorities. I found, 
however, that the majority of individual birds observed in both the markets and in 
seizures, representing 44 of 150 species, had export quotas (Table 3). This pattern 
indicates that Peru’s domestic market was dominated by a few popular species that have 
export quotas, but their quota status did not facilitate illegal domestic trade or deter 
confiscation (Table 2). Authorities confiscated birds that were commonly available in 
the markets, regardless of their quota status, meaning risk to vendors was no less for 
selling quota-listed birds. Further, relatively few species (~ 1/3) observed in the markets 
had export quotas (Table 3), suggesting that harvesters and traders were not taking 
advantage of the potential “cover” offered by the legal export quotas.  
My regression analyses demonstrated that high historic export trade influenced 
avian species abundance in Peru’s illegal domestic markets, but not the current quota 
system (Table 4). Interview data suggest that high exports to the United States and 
elsewhere, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, helped establish the domestic market 
because surplus birds, or those not selected for export, were then sold nationally (Daut et 
al. 2015). Much of Peru’s domestic bird trade appears to be a consequence of tradition—
dependent on which birds harvesters are accustomed to capturing—regardless whether 
the species has a quota or not. For example, all of the top 12 most abundant species in 
the markets (Table 2) were heavily exported from 1970–2001 (?̅? = 10 years, SE = 6.5). 
Correspondingly, nine of the top 12 species were common to abundant in a 1989 market 
study in Lima, meaning 30–60 to > 60 individuals, respectively, were observed per visit 
(Begazo 1989). 
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Other factors associated with increased avian abundance in Peru’s domestic 
market included originating from the Amazon or coastal regions and having a larger 
body size and a pleasant singing voice or “talking” abilities (Table 4). Songbirds, and 
especially species with aesthetically-pleasing songs popular for singing competitions, 
were most abundant in markets in Taiwan (Su et al. 2014) and Brazil (Alves et al. 2012). 
Talking ability was also associated with higher parrot poaching in Mexico (Pires & 
Clarke 2011), and when combined with bright colors and large size to represent parrot 
species’ attractiveness, resulted in disproportionate selective poaching (Tella & Hiraldo 
2014). In Peru, neither color nor large size influenced the parrot market; in fact, smaller 
body mass (i.e., lower price), was associated with higher market abundance.  
Parrot abundance, unlike the full bird market, was influenced by both Peru’s 
current quota system (i.e., more years with a published quota, 2001–2011), and historic 
trade (Table 4). In Mexico, parrot species with longer legal trade similarly correlated 
with higher poaching (Pires & Clarke 2011). The reason why the quota system 
influenced parrot abundance and not the full bird market was likely because parrots that 
were commonly exported in the past, and already popular in Peru’s domestic markets, 
were assigned formal quotas in 2001 (Table 2). Having a formal export quota did not 
suddenly increase their market abundance (Begazo 1989); just as eliminating the quotas 
did not decrease market abundance. For example, two species, a parrot (P. 
erythrogenys), and a songbird (Dives warszewiczi), had quotas for only two years under 
the current quota system (2002–2003), but were still among the top 12 most abundant 
species in the market surveys (2007–2011). Furthermore, while Peru’s historic domestic 
market was supplied with surplus birds harvested for a strong export market, 
contemporary international demand is not filling Peru’s quotas. From 2001–2011, 
exports of the eight quota-listed parrots were only 43% of the published quotas. This 
implies that eliminating the quota system would not stop domestic trade and emphasizes 
the importance of domestic consumer demand and the influence of historic trade and 
traditional harvest, which have been recognized as important drivers of wildlife trade 
elsewhere (Cantú et al. 2007; Mancini et al. 2011; Cao Ngoc & Wyatt 2013).  
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Larger geographical ranges were also associated with higher parrot abundance 
(Table 4). Pires and Clarke found that larger ranges with overlapping human populations 
increased accessibility and contributed to higher poaching in Mexico (2011), Bolivia and 
Peru (2014). While this study did not investigate overlapping human population, it is 
reasonable to assume that a larger geographical range would provide greater accessibility 
for harvesters, particularly opportunistic villagers that poach nestlings during breeding 
seasons (Pires & Clarke 2011).  
Government seizure records offer an independent perspective of Peru’s illegal 
domestic bird trade and provide insight into what authorities consider worthwhile 
confiscating. Avian seizure and market abundances were explained by many of the same 
factors, including high historic trade levels, a pleasant singing voice or “talking” 
abilities, and small body size as seen with the parrots-only subset (Table 4). Confiscated 
birds also paralleled parrot abundance by having larger ranges and more years with a 
published quota. Similarity between abundance in confiscations and the parrot market 
was unsurprising given that 77% of all confiscations were B. versicolurus, a quota-listed 
parrot and the most abundant native species in the markets (Table 2). Removing this 
species from the seizure regression models did not change the variables in the most 
plausible model. Why authorities confiscated so many B. versicolurus may be, in part, 
because vendors appear less concerned about losing this inexpensive species compared 
to others, as B. versicolurus are often transported and displayed in large numbers at 
markets making them more difficult to hide from authorities. Having an export quota 
certainly did not protect B. versicolurus from confiscation compared to non-quota-listed 
species (Table 2).  
Brotogeris versicolurus deserves further discussion given its high market and 
seizures abundance (this study; Ríos et al. 2008; Gastañaga et al. 2010), second only to 
captive-bred M. undulatus for the entire bird market (Appendix B). This small (75 gm, 
Dunning Jr. 2008), mostly green parakeet with average talking ability, is fairly common 
within its relatively average-sized geographical range in Amazonian Peru (Schulenberg 
et al. 2007). It does not represent the highly-attractive (large and colorful) psittacines 
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disproportionately poached in Mexico (Tella & Hiraldo 2014). However, B. versicolurus 
nestlings are particularly easy to take from their nests in arboreal termite mounds close 
to the ground, and even though the capture variable was not retained in the most 
plausible models (Table 4), it was considered important for parrot poaching in Mexico 
(Pires & Clarke 2011). Two additional, yet potentially important, factors that I did not 
consider in the regression analyses were adaptability and hardiness. Brotogeris 
versicolurus readily adapts to secondary habitats, such as those close to urban areas, 
making them accessible to harvesters (Forshaw 2010). Furthermore, this parakeet was 
considered by local veterinarians and owners to be hardy and able to survive the stress of 
captivity better than other species (E. Daut, unpublished data).  
It was encouraging that captive-bred ornamental birds were offered as legal pet 
options for Peru’s domestic consumers (Appendix B). Ornamental birds made up more 
than half of the entire bird market and their market appears to be growing. Conversations 
with pet-store owners and veterinarians indicated that ornamental birds were now 
commonly available in Amazonian cities, when ten years ago, the only pet-bird options 
were wild-caught native birds (E. Daut, unpublished data). Reports from Southeast Asia, 
a region with high illegal bird trade, indicated that captive-bred ornamental birds 
likewise comprised substantial portions of bird markets (Shepherd et al. 2004; Jepson & 
Ladle 2005; Brooks-Moizer et al. 2009). 
Although most of the native birds in markets and seizures were not threatened, 
2,222 birds (n = 23 threatened species) were illegally taken from the wild (Table 5). Of 
particular concern were the six globally and/or nationally endangered species, including 
iconic species such as Vultur gryphus and Spheniscus humboldti. Authorities confiscated 
a greater diversity of threatened species than what was observed in the markets (Table 
5). This could be explained by where authorities typically confiscate animals—at 
highway control posts versus crowded markets that are notoriously dangerous. The 
relatively low number of threatened species in the markets could be due to the growing 
use of the internet and entrega directa—home-delivery service—which bypasses the risk 
of confiscation from displaying individuals in the markets (Ríos et al. 2008; Gastañaga 
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et al. 2010). This implies that there could be considerable hidden and specialized bird 
trade in Peru for domestic consumers and/or for smuggling internationally.  
Peru’s economy is strong and as it continues to grow (Vera & Yu 2013), it may 
drive trade in rarer species as status symbols (Shepherd et al. 2004; Courchamp et al. 
2006). Households owning threatened avian species in Indonesia, for example, were 
richer and better educated (Jepson & Ladle 2005). Moreover, a stable economy has 
spurred Peru’s domestic and international tourism, which may increase demand for 
native birds at “rescue centers” to display for tourists (Daut et al. 2015). Authorities have 
also commented that the frequency of wildlife confiscations from tourists has risen at 
Lima’s international airport in recent years (P. Mendoza, Wildlife Conservation Society 
(WCS), unpublished data). The potential for increased trade targeting wealthy 
consumers and tourists calls for greater vigilance to enforce wildlife legislation by 
Peru’s authorities, whom typically do not prioritize wildlife (Shanee 2012; Daut et al. 
2015). Better training and capacity building of authorities should improve enforcement 
(Bennett 2011). Interview data indicated there was high turnover for wildlife officials 
(e.g., often every 3–6 months), and limited knowledge regarding details of Peru’s quota 
system (Daut, unpublished data). Because only 30% of confiscated birds were identified 
to species, training should include species identification and record management—banal 
suggestions, yet critical steps—to improve the ability to monitor the illegal trade and 
develop targeted interventions (Brooks-Moizer et al. 2009; World Wildlife Fund / 
Dalberg 2012).  
In conclusion, my results show no evidence that the quota system, facilitated 
illegal domestic trade, and it is doubtful that eliminating the quotas would stop the 
domestic trade in the short term. It was the historic export trade that helped create Peru’s 
domestic bird market and shaped the current species composition—a scenario likely 
repeated elsewhere in the Neotropics. While improving enforcement of Peru’s wildlife 
legislation should be encouraged, I recognize that enforcement is just one aspect of 
combating illegal wildlife trade (Challender & MacMillan 2014). Better understanding 
of consumer demand and the effectiveness of strategies to raise public awareness, 
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modify consumer behavior, and promote market substitutions would provide much 
needed information to develop an integrated approach to help decrease illegal native bird 
trade in Peru (Challender et al. 2014). 
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CHAPTER III  
INTERACTING EFFECTS OF NEWCASTLE DISEASE TRANSMISSION AND 
ILLEGAL TRADE ON A WILD POPULATION OF WHITE-WINGED PARAKEETS 
IN PERU: A MODELING APPROACH 
 
Synopsis 
Illegal wildlife-pet trade can threaten wildlife populations directly from over-
harvest, but also indirectly as a pathway for introduction of infectious diseases. This 
study evaluated consequences of a hypothetical introduction of Newcastle disease (ND) 
into a wild population of Peru’s most trafficked psittacine, the white-winged parakeet 
(Brotogeris versicolurus) through release of infected confiscated individuals. I 
developed two mathematical models to describe ND transmission and the influence of 
illegal harvest in a homogeneous (model 1) and age-structured population of parakeets 
(model 2). Infection transmission dynamics and harvest were consistent for all 
individuals in model 1, which rendered it mathematically more tractable compared to the 
more complex, age-structured model 2 that separated the host population into juveniles 
and adults. I evaluated the interaction of ND transmission and harvest through changes 
in the basic reproduction number (R0) and short-term host population dynamics. My 
findings demonstrated that ND introduction would provoke considerable disease-related 
mortality, up to 24% population decline in two years, but the magnitude of the outbreak 
would be dampened by high harvest rates. Model 2 produced moderate differences in 
disease dynamics compared to model 1 (R0 = 2.66 and 3.63, respectively), and 
highlighted the importance of adult disease dynamics in diminishing the epidemic 
potential. Therefore, I suggest that future studies should use a more realistic, age-
structured model. Finally, for the presumptive risk that illegal trade of white-winged 
parakeets could introduce ND into wild populations, my results suggest that while high 
harvest rates may have a protective effect on the population by reducing virus 
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transmission, the combined effects of high harvest and disease-induced mortality may 
threaten population survival. My results capture the complexity and potential 
consequences of the interaction between ND transmission and harvest in a wild parrot 
population and highlight the importance to protect these populations from illegal trade in 
the first place. 
Introduction 
Illegal wildlife trade and infectious diseases are recognized conservation threats 
affecting wildlife populations (Daszak et al. 2000; Fèvre et al. 2006; Rosen & Smith 
2010). Illegal and poorly regulated wildlife trade can result in over-harvest and threaten 
population and species survival (Nekaris et al. 2010; Nijman et al. 2012; Shepherd 2012; 
Sung et al. 2013). Introduced infectious diseases have been linked to major declines of 
wildlife populations (Daszak et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2006; Frick et al. 2010), and even 
species extinctions (Warner 1968; Wyatt et al. 2008). The influence of legal harvest or 
culling on disease dynamics in wildlife populations has been examined (Wonham et al. 
2004; Choisy & Rohani 2006; Woodroffe et al. 2006), but the influence of illegal 
wildlife trade on the introduction and spread of infectious diseases has rarely been 
investigated (but for related topics see: Brooks-Moizer et al. 2009; van den Berg 2009; 
Gilbert et al. 2012). The risks of introducing infectious diseases are particularly high in 
developing nations where illegal wildlife trade for domestic consumers flourishes and 
law enforcement and disease surveillance are lacking (Karesh 1995; Keane et al. 2008; 
Bennett 2011; Karesh et al. 2012). As a case study, I used simulation modeling to 
evaluate a hypothetical introduction and outbreak of Newcastle disease (ND) in a 
population of Peru’s most trafficked psittacine, the white-winged parakeet (Brotogeris 
versicolurus) (Table 2, Chapter 2; Ríos et al. 2008; Gastañaga et al. 2010). Threat of 
infectious disease and illegal harvest of wildlife should be of concern for Peru because it 
is a megadiverse country and a high priority area for biodiversity conservation (Myers et 
al. 2000). 
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The white-winged parakeet is a small, non-threatened, highly gregarious species 
that is common throughout most of its Amazonian range (Schulenberg et al. 2007; 
Birdlife International 2014c). Peruvian authorities consider domestic trade of the white-
winged parakeet and other native birds illegal because harvest and commercialization are 
conducted without proper licenses and authorizations (Chapter 2). During a five-year 
market survey in Peru, supply of white-winged parakeets was surprisingly constant 
throughout the year, which may stem from the dual harvest techniques employed (E. 
Daut, unpublished data). These two techniques include taking nestlings from easily 
accessible nests located in arboreal termite mounds during the breeding season, and 
capturing adult parakeets throughout the year using mist nets at roost and feeding sites 
(Begazo 1989). It is impossible to determine whether harvest is sustainable (Beissinger 
& Bucher 1992), but local experts assume current harvest rates do not negatively 
influence abundance (J. Álvarez, Dirección General de Diversidad Biológica, personal 
communication).  
Newcastle disease is a highly infectious and fatal viral disease caused by avian 
paramyxovirus serotype-1 that affects many avian species including parrots and poultry 
(Leighton & Heckert 2007). Large epidemics have occurred in poultry operations 
(Walker et al. 1973; Kinde et al. 2005), racing pigeons (Alexander et al. 1986), and free-
ranging double-crested cormorants (Kuiken 1999). The frequency of such epidemics in 
free-ranging populations appears to be increasing (White et al. 2015). Even though 
vaccination programs have largely prevented recent outbreaks in commercial flocks, ND 
is still a serious problem in backyard poultry in rural areas throughout the developing 
world and in the pet trade (Awan et al. 1994; Spradbrow 2005; Jibril et al. 2014). In 
2004, ND virus was isolated in a shipment of imported parrots and other species from 
Pakistan to Italy (World Parrot Trust 2004a).  
The ND virus spreads horizontally between healthy and infected birds through 
direct contact with bodily secretions from infected birds (Alexander 2009). Crowded 
confinement typical of poultry houses or large breeding rookeries provides ideal 
conditions for virus transmission (Alexander 2009). Disease in parrots is suspected to 
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result from contact with infected poultry, particularly at animal markets (Kaleta & 
Baldauf 1988; Hines & Miller 2012). Wild-caught parrots smuggled into the United 
States in the 1970s were suspected to have acquired ND while at animal markets in 
South America (Walker et al. 1973; Kaleta & Baldauf 1988; Panigrahy et al. 1993). 
Subsequent outbreaks of ND in chickens cost the U.S. poultry industry millions of 
dollars (Panigrahy et al. 1993). The most common clinical signs in captive psittacine 
species were respiratory, but ranged from lethargy to limb paralysis (Erickson et al. 
1977; Clubb et al. 1980; Hirai 1981; Bruning Fann 1992). Mortality can reach as high as 
100% (Panigrahy et al. 1993), but typically ranged from 20 to 80% (Grausgruber 1972; 
Erickson et al. 1977; Clubb et al. 1980).  
White-winged parakeets are susceptible to ND. During an outbreak in Austria, 
53% (n = 32) of parakeets died from ND following importation (Grausgruber 1972). In 
the early 1980s, ND was diagnosed in importation lots of white-winged parakeets from 
Argentina and Bolivia four times according to United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) quarantine records (Nilsson 1985). Newcastle disease is considered endemic in 
Peru. Twelve outbreaks were reported to the World Organization for Animal Health 
(OIE) during 2008–2011 in unvaccinated backyard (criollo) chickens and fighting cocks 
(e.g., The Poultry Site 2009). In animal markets throughout Peru, it is common to 
observe wild-caught parrots alongside criollo chickens (E. Daut, personal observation), 
thus providing the opportunity for cross-species ND transmission. Authorities frequently 
confiscate white-winged parakeets (Chapter 2) and immediately release these individuals 
into the wild (González Medina 2004), typically without health evaluation because they 
do not have financial or diagnostic means to conduct medical screening (Karesh 1995; 
Jiménez & Cadena 2004; Marini & Garcia 2005; Zhang et al. 2008; Godoy & 
Matushima 2010; Gomes Destro et al. 2012). Although ND has not been identified in the 
limited studies of psittacines in the wild to date (Johnson et al. 1986; Goodman & 
Hanson 1988; Gilardi et al. 1995; Karesh et al. 1997; Deem et al. 2005), I expect that 
illegal trade provides a mechanism for ND to reach susceptible wild white-winged 
parakeets due to the release of confiscated individuals infected at animal markets. 
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Infectious disease modeling is a useful tool for conservationists and 
epidemiologists to evaluate potential synergistic effects of illegal trade and disease on 
wildlife populations and to compare mitigating strategies (Dubé et al. 2007). The 
influence of illegal trade—specifically harvest—on pathogen transmission can be 
evaluated by comparing the pathogen’s basic reproduction number (R0) at different 
harvest rates (Heesterbeek 2002). R0 is the average expected number of secondary 
infections produced by one typical infectious individual introduced into a fully 
susceptible host population (Heesterbeek 2002), and is often used as a threshold value to 
determine whether or not a pathogen can invade and persist in the population i.e., when 
R0 > 1, or fades out (R0 < 1). 
Under certain density-dependent pathogen transmission conditions, harvest can 
decrease transmission and is the reason for culling to prevent disease spread (Wobeser 
2002; Haydon et al. 2004). In other cases, where a host population is under strong 
density-dependence that stimulates natality, harvest can increase the number of 
susceptible individuals, disease prevalence and disease-induced mortality (Choisy & 
Rohani 2006). Because harvest is often selective for specific age groups, and diseases 
can disproportionately affect some age groups, age structure can be an important 
demographic component in mathematical models. Recent studies have demonstrated that 
incorporating age structure into disease modeling can have strong, yet often 
unpredictable, influences on wildlife disease dynamics (Heisey et al. 2006; Brooks-
Pollock et al. 2010). 
I hypothesized that (1) introducing ND into a susceptible population of white-
winged parakeets would result in an outbreak with considerable mortality and (2) 
increasing harvest would lower disease transmission and the magnitude of the outbreak. 
To evaluate these hypotheses, I developed two deterministic, continuous-time, 
mathematical models, with and without age structure, to assess whether predictions 
about ND dynamics would differ between a simplified model with a homogeneous bird 
population and a presumed more realistic, but less tractable, model with an age-
structured host population. Both models were considered under different harvest 
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scenarios and R0 and disease-related mortality were assessed using a combination of 
analytical and numerical approaches. I conducted sensitivity and scenario analyses to 
evaluate the robustness of the models’ results in the presence of uncertainty to individual 
parameters. Lastly, I discussed the limitations and implications of my results, including 
the conservation relevance of illegal trade and ND emergence in wild populations of 
white-winged parakeets.   
Materials and methods 
Model formulation 
Because ND typically results in severe but short-lived epidemics in avian 
species, I focused my attention on short-term infection dynamics without including 
density-dependent responses from the host population to the disease-induced mortality 
(e.g., increased fecundity). Given the possibility of long-term chronic infections in 
parrots, I did consider an endemic state where ND persists in the population.  
In model 1 (Fig. 3), I described the parakeet population as homogeneous where 
the SEIAICR model assumed no differences in the infection–transmission dynamics and 
harvest among age groups. The host population was divided into susceptible (S), 
exposed (E), acutely-infected (IA), chronically-infected (IC) and recovered (R) classes 
(Anderson & May 1991). I included two infectious stages (IA and IC) because 
experimental evidence suggested two levels of severity of clinical signs, which I used as 
a proxy for viral shedding (Erickson et al. 1977; Erickson et al. 1978).  
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Figure 3.  Compartmental diagram of model 1, the dynamics of Newcastle disease in a 
homogeneous population of white-winged parakeets. Five transition states include: susceptible 
(S), exposed (E), acutely-infected (IA), chronically-infected (IC) and recovered (R). See Table 6 
for parameter descriptions. 
 
 
 
In model 2, I divided the host population into juvenile and adult stages to account 
for age-related differences in harvest and disease transmission and severity (Fig. 4). 
While model 2 was demographically more realistic than model 1, it was also far more 
complex and less tractable, which makes its application by non-mathematicians more 
difficult and brings up a question of whether model 1 could be an acceptable alternative 
for studying interaction of infection and harvest in a wild bird population. To assure a 
fair comparison of results between both models, model 2 was structured to collapse into 
model 1 when the two age stages had the same parameter values. Both models included 
a baseline harvest rate (hb) and I conducted scenario analyses to evaluate the interaction 
of ND dynamics and additional harvest (h1) on R0 and host population size. 
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Figure 4.  Compartmental diagram of model 2, the dynamics of Newcastle disease in an age-structured population of white-winged 
parakeets. Transition states for juvenile parakeets are: susceptible (Sj), exposed (Ej), acutely-infected (IAj), chronically-infected (ICj) and 
recovered (Rj) and for adult parakeets the states are: susceptible (Sa), exposed (Ea), acutely-infected (IAa), chronically-infected (ICa) and 
recovered (Ra). See Table 6 for parameter descriptions.
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My mathematical framework started with the following assumptions: 
(1) The host population was a single, free-mixing population and individual parakeets 
were equally likely to encounter an infected individual. This was a realistic 
assumption given the gregarious nature of white-winged parakeets and the large 
number of individuals at communal roost sites.  
(2) The host population was stable under initial conditions, closed to immigration and 
emigration, and the parakeet natality and mortality were not under the influence of 
density dependence. While these conditions may not always hold true, they were 
useful simplifying assumptions that helped isolate the evaluation of harvest and ND 
dynamics.  
(3) At hatching, chicks were susceptible to ND virus, and both sexes were equally 
affected (Jibril et al. 2014).There is limited evidence that psittacine chicks can 
receive maternal antibodies through the egg (Lung 1996); however, no studies have 
evaluated whether protective maternal ND antibodies are transferred to psittacine 
chicks.   
(4) Transmission of ND was density-dependent where the number of contacts per unit 
time was proportional to the number of individuals in the population (McCallum et 
al. 2001). Density-dependent transmission was a reasonable assumption and has 
been suggested for systems where the pathogen is transmitted through random 
contact among individuals and/or by aerial transmission (May & Anderson 1979; 
Anderson & May 1981). Airborne transmission was considered to contribute to 
spread of the ND virus near poultry facilities (Hugh-Jones et al. 1973; Li et al. 
2009). In laboratory experiments involving two Neotropical psittacine species, 
100% of contact-exposed individuals (those housed with aerosol-exposed birds), 
became infected (Erickson et al. 1977).  
I used a system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to describe 
transmission of ND in white-winged parakeets for each model (equations (1–5) for 
model 1 and equations (6–15) for model 2).  
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Model 1   
  
dS /dt = Ʌ – (d+h)S – βASIA – βCSIC + 𝜈R 
 
Where Ʌ = N(d+h) and N changes over time as N(t) = S(t) + E(t) + IA(t) + IC(t) 
+ R(t) 
 
 
(1) 
 dE /dt = βASIA + βCSIC  – (d+h+α)E 
 
(2) 
 dIA /dt = αp1E – (d+h+µA+δ)IA 
 
(3) 
 dIC /dt = α(1 – p1)E + δ(1 – p2)IA – (d+h+µC+γ)IC 
 
(4) 
 dR /dt = δp2IA + γIC – (d+h+𝜈)R 
 
(5) 
Model 2 
 
 
 Juvenile  
  
dSj /dt = Ʌ2 – (dj+hj+ Ω)Sj – βAjSjIAj  – βCSjICj – βAaSjIAa – βCSjICa + 𝜈Rj 
 
Where Ʌ2 = N(dj+hj+Ω)(da+ha)/(da+ha+Ω) and N changes over time as N(t) = 
Nj(t) + Na(t) where Nj(t) = Sj(t) + Ej(t) + IAj(t) + ICj(t) + Rj(t) and Na(t) = Sa(t) + 
Ea(t) + IAa(t) + ICa(t) + Ra(t) 
 
 
(6) 
 dEj /dt = βAjSjIAj  + βCSjICj + βAaSjIAa + βCSjICa  – (dj+hj+Ω+α)Ej 
 
(7) 
 dIAj /dt = αp1jEj – (dj+hj+Ω+µAj+δ)IAj 
 
(8) 
 dICj /dt = α(1 – p1j)Ej + δ(1 – p2)IAj – (dj+hj+Ω+µC+γ)ICj 
 
(9) 
 dRj /dt = δp2IAj + γICj – (dj+hj+Ω+𝜈)Rj (10) 
  
Adult 
 
  
dSa /dt = ΩSj  – (da+ha)Sa  –  βAaSaIAa  – βCSaICa – βAjSaIAj – βCSaICj + 
𝜈Ra 
   
 
(11) 
 dEa /dt = ΩEj + βAaSaIAa  + βCSaICa + βAjSaIAj + βCSaICj – (da+ha+α)Ea 
 
(12) 
 dIAa /dt = ΩIAj + αp1aEa – (da+ha+µAa+δ)IAa 
 
(13) 
 dICa /dt = ΩICj + α(1 – p1a)Ea + δ(1 – p2)IAa – (da+ha+µC+γ)ICa 
 
(14) 
 dRa /dt = ΩRj  + δp2IAa + γICa – (da+ha+𝜈)Ra 
 
(15) 
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For both models, the initial (time t = 0) susceptible population, S(0), was set equal to the 
total population, N(0), minus one individual, which represented an acutely-infectious 
parakeet introduced into the population, IA(0) = 1 and IAa(0) = 1 for models 1 and 2, 
respectively. All remaining stages were set to zero. Additionally for model 2, the 
proportions of Nj and Na were fixed according to disease-free equilibrium (DFE) 
conditions so that the initial age composition (i.e., the fraction of juvenile and adult 
parakeets) was the same across all iterations irrespective of the varying total population 
size (N). Model analysis was conducted in Matlab (MathWorks, USA). 
Basic reproduction number (R0) 
To calculate R0 for the systems of ODEs, I used the next-generation method 
(NGM; Diekmann et al. 1990; van den Driessche & Watmough 2002). See Appendix C 
for the full derivations of R0. For model 1 the derived expression for R0 (Eq. C1) was: 
R0 = R0A + R0C,  
The terms R0A and R0C represent the average number of secondary infections resulting 
from interactions between susceptible and acutely- and chronically-infected hosts, 
respectively. For model 2, the derived expression for R0 (Eq. C2) was: 
 R0 = ½[ 𝑅01 + 𝑅02  +  √(𝑅01 − 𝑅02 2 + 4𝑅03𝑅04].    
The terms R01 and R02 represent the average number of secondary juvenile or adult 
infections, respectively, produced by one exposed juvenile Ej during its entire infection 
period. The terms R03 and R04 represent the average number of secondary juvenile or 
adult infections produced by one exposed adult Ea during its entire infection period, 
respectively.  
Parameter estimates 
Parameter notations, definitions, mean values, distributions for sensitivity 
analyses, and sources of information are described below and in Table 6. All 
demographic parameters except population size were constant and disease parameters 
were allowed to vary around their corresponding baseline values.  
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Table 6.  Definitions and values of parameters for the model of Newcastle disease (ND) transmission in a homogeneous (model 1) and age-
structured (model 2) population of wild white-winged parakeets.   
Notation Definition (unit) Baseline value 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles Model Source 
N(0) Initial number of individuals of white-winged 
parakeets in a typical flock in Ucayali, Peru  
200  Log-normal  
(ln(189), 
ln(1.4)) 
109, 329 1 (Shroads 1974; 
Forshaw 1989) 
Nj,  
Na 
Initial number of individual juvenile (Nj) and 
adult (Na)white-winged parakeets in a typical 
post-breeding flock in Ucayali, Peru  
Nj = 0.08N,  
Na = 0.92N 
   2 Estimated for Dd=5 
years
a
 
Dd Life expectancy (year) 5.0
b 
   1, 2 (Young et al. 2012) 
d Natural mortality rate (day
-1
) 1/Dd   1, 2  
DΩ Duration of juvenile stage (day) 135   2 Informed from: 
(Rowley 1983; Ritchie 
et al. 1992; Lindsey et 
al. 1994; Lung 1996; 
Salinas-Melgoza & 
Renton 2007; Denadai 
et al. 2010; Cox et al. 
2014)  
Ω Rate of leaving juvenile stage (day-1) 1/DΩ   2  
dj Natural juvenile mortality rate (day
-1
) 1/–DΩ/ln(0.6)
c
    2 (Sandercock & 
Beissinger 2002; 
Salinas-Melgoza & 
Renton 2007) 
da Natural adult mortality rate (day
-1
)  1/(1/d–1/dj)   2  
hb Baseline harvest rate (year
-1
)
d
 1%   1, 2 P. Mendoza, WCS, 
unpublished data 
h1 Additional harvest rate (year
-1
)
d
 0
e
   1, 2  
h Total harvest rate (year
-1
)
d
 hb+h1   1, 2  
hj Total juvenile harvest rate (year
-1
)
d
 0.4h   2 P. Mendoza, WCS,  
unpublished data  
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Table 6  Continued 
Notation Definition (unit) Baseline value 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles Model Source 
ha Total adult harvest rate (year
-1
)
d
 0.6h   2 P. Mendoza, WCS,  
unpublished data  
βA Transmission rate from an acutely-infected 
parakeet (individual
-1 
day
-1
) 
0.00107 Uniform 
(0.00107*0.5, 
0.00107*1.5) 
0.000601, 
0.0016 
1, 2 (Johnston 1992) 
 
Ir Infectiousness reduction coefficient for 
chronically infected parakeets  
0.1 Uniform 
(0.05, 0.15) 
0.055, 
0.145 
1, 2 Assumed 
βC
 
Transmission rate from a chronically-infected 
parakeet (individual
-1 
day
-1
) 
βAIr   1, 2  
cβA Age-dependent acute transmission factor 0.25 Uniform 
(0.25*0.5, 
0.25*1.5) 
0.1375, 
0.3625 
2 Informed from: 
(Erickson et al. 1980; 
Alexander et al. 2004; 
Kapczynski et al. 2006) 
βAj Transmission rate for acutely-infected juvenile 
parakeet (individual
-1 
day
-1
) 
(1+cβA)βA   2  
βAa Transmission rate for acutely-infected adult 
parakeet (individual
-1 
day
-1
) 
(1–cβA)βA   2  
Dα Duration of infected but not yet infectious 
stage (day) 
5.5 Exponential  
(1/5.5) 
0.3, 16.5 1, 2 (Leighton & Heckert 
2007) 
α Rate of becoming infectious (day-1) 1/Dα   1, 2  
Dδ Duration of acute-infectious stage (day) 30 Exponential 
(1/30) 
1.5, 89.9 1, 2 (Erickson et al. 1978) 
δ Rate of leaving acute-infectious stage (day-1) 1/Dδ   1, 2  
Dγ Duration of chronic-infectious stage (day)  39 Exponential 
(1/39) 
2.0, 116.8 1, 2 (Erickson et al. 1977) 
γ Rate of leaving chronic-infectious stage (day-1)  1/Dγ   1, 2  
Dν Duration of immunity (day) 243 Uniform  
(120, 365) 
132.25, 
352.75 
1, 2 (Erickson et al. 1977) 
𝜈 Rate of losing immunity (day-1) 1/D𝜈   1, 2  
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Table 6  Continued 
Notation Definition (unit) Baseline value 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles Model Source 
p1 Probability of acute infection  0.625 Uniform  
(0.5, 0.75) 
0.5125, 
0.7375 
1 (Erickson et al. 1977) 
p2 Probability of recovery from acute infection 0.5 Uniform 
(0.375, 0.625) 
0.3875, 
0.6125 
1, 2 Informed from: (Parede 
& Young 1990; 
Carrasco et al. 2009; 
Chukwudi et al. 2012) 
p1j Probability of acute juvenile infection 0.75 Uniform 
(0.625, 0.875) 
0.6375, 
0.8625 
2 Informed from: 
(Panigrahy et al. 1993; 
Kuiken et al. 1998b; 
Alexander 2009; 
Barman et al. 2010) 
p1a Probability of acute adult infection 0.5 Uniform 
(0.375, 0.625) 
0.3875, 
0.6125 
2 Informed from: 
(Panigrahy et al. 1993; 
Kuiken et al. 1998b; 
Alexander 2009; 
Barman et al. 2010)  
pdA Probability of acute disease-related death 0.25 Uniform 
(0.1,0.4) 
0.115, 
0.385 
1, 2 Informed from: 
(Grausgruber 1972) 
µA Disease-related mortality rate for acutely-
infected parakeet (day
-1
) 
pdA/Dδ 
 
  1, 2  
pdC Probability of chronic disease-related death 0.075 Uniform  
(0.025, 0.125) 
0.03, 0.12 1, 2 (Erickson et al. 1977; 
Erickson et al. 1978) 
µC Disease-related mortality rate for chronically-
infected parakeet (day
-1
) 
pdC/Dν   1, 2  
cm Age-dependent acute mortality factor  0.25 Uniform 
(0.25*0.5, 
0.25*1.5) 
0.1375, 
0.3625 
2 Informed from: 
(Panigrahy et al. 1993; 
Kuiken et al. 1998b; 
Alexander 2009; 
Barman et al. 2010)  
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Table 6  Continued 
Notation Definition (unit) Baseline value 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles Model Source 
µAj Disease-related mortality rate for acutely-
infected juvenile parakeet (day
-1
) 
(1+cm)µA   2  
µAa Disease-related mortality rate for acutely-
infected adult parakeet (day
-1
) 
(1–cm)µA   2  
 
a
 Proportions of Nj and Na were fixed according to disease-free equilibrium (DFE) conditions and remained constant for all iterations. When 
life expectancy Dd=2,  Nj=0.22N, Na=0.78N; and when Dd=9,  Nj=0.05N, Na=0.95N. 
b
 Scenario analysis was conducted at 2, 5, and 9 years.  
c
 0.6 represents 40% mortality in the juvenile stage. 
d 
Annual rates were prorated to daily rates. 
e
 Scenario analysis was conducted at 0, 2, 5, and 10%. 
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Model 1 
Host demography and harvest   
Flocks of white-winged parakeets can range from 700 to 1,000 individuals 
(Forshaw 1989; Tossas et al. 2012), but flocks of 200 birds have been commonly 
reported (Shroads 1974; Forshaw 1989). Therefore, I defined the initial population of 
parakeets as (N(0) = 200), which included those birds roosting together at a communal 
site throughout the year, except during the breeding season when pairs separate for 
nesting. I set population recruitment (Ʌ) equal to the sum of natural mortality (d) and 
baseline harvest (hb) to maintain a stable population in absence of additional harvest (hl), 
so that Ʌ = N(d+hb), as supported by local experts (see Introduction). Daily natural 
mortality was calculated as the inverse of the mean life expectancy (Dd = 5 years) from 
captive white-winged parakeets, so that d = 1/Dd (Young et al. 2012). Baseline harvest of 
white-winged parakeets was set at a conservatively low constant daily rate for a 
cumulative total annual harvest of 1% (hb = 0.01/365).  
Transmission rate 
Transmission coefficients (β) for ND in psittacines have not been published; 
therefore, I adapted a transmission probability published for backyard poultry that was 
considered to reasonably represented ND dynamics in wild white-winged parakeets. In a 
mathematical model describing density-dependent ND dynamics in a backyard chicken 
flock, Johnston (1992) estimated 3% infection probability during a 14-day period. I 
prorated this probability to a per day rate for the population size and used it as a baseline 
transmission rate for acutely-infectious individuals, so that βA = (3/14)200 individual
-1
 
day
-1
 (Table 6). Chronic ND transmission rate was assumed to be a fraction (Ir = 10%) of 
the acute transmission rate, so that βC = βAIr.  
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Infection stages 
According to the standard assumption of exponentially-distributed periods of 
infection (Anderson & May 1991), the reciprocal values of the mean durations in days 
that a parakeet spends in the exposed (E), acutely-infected (IA), chronically-infected (IC), 
and recovered (R) stages were used as the daily rates α, δ, γ, and 𝜈, respectively (Table 6; 
Fig. 3). The daily rate of becoming infectious, therefore, was the inverse of the duration 
of an average latent period reported for most studied avian species (α = 1/5.5) (Leighton 
& Heckert 2007). I based the duration of the acute-infectious stage on the study by 
Erickson et al. (1978) where individual Neotropical psittacines (n = 48) shed ND virus 
on average for 30 days so that δ = 1/30. Although some individuals continued to 
chronically shed for over a year, on average individuals had stopped shedding by 39 
days post infection (Erickson et al. 1977), which represented the baseline recovery rate 
from chronic infection γ = 1/39 and was consistent with shedding duration observed in 
other avian species (Vickers & Hanson 1979; Kuiken et al. 1998a; Kapczynski et al. 
2006). I used this same duration for individuals that became chronically infected directly 
following exposure and for those individuals transitioning from an acute infection (Fig. 
3). I based the recovery rate on the average duration of effective ND antibody titers (> 
1.2 log10; Alexander et al. 2004) in experimental infections so that the average daily rate 
of immunity loss was 𝜈  = 1/243 (Erickson et al. 1977).  
Acute and chronic infections 
According to ND infection rates in psittacines in captive and experimental 
conditions, I assumed that all effectively contacted white-winged parakeets would 
become either acutely- or chronically-infected, with acutely-infected parakeets shedding 
more ND virus (Pearson 1976; Erickson et al. 1977; Clubb et al. 1980; Bruning Fann 
1992). Following Erickson et al.’s (1977) experimental study, I considered that 63% (p1) 
of newly infected white-winged parakeets would become acutely infected, and 1–p1 
would become chronically infected (Fig. 3). After acute infection, parakeets could 
recover or become chronically infected where individuals continued to shed virus but at 
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lower levels. Little has been published regarding recovery or progression to a chronic 
ND state; however, a chronic-like state is common following live ND vaccination and 
has been considered a concern for environmental contamination and consequent 
infection spread (Parede & Young 1990; Carrasco et al. 2009; Chukwudi et al. 2012). 
Therefore, I considered that 50% of acutely-infected individuals would recover (p2), 
while the remainder (1–p2) would become chronically infected.  
Disease-related mortality 
Mortality from ND was over 50% in captive white-winged parakeets 
(Grausgruber 1972). Under free-ranging conditions, I assumed that mortality would be 
lower, so considered that 25% of individuals would die from ND during the acute-
infectious period (30 days) making the daily rate, µA = 0.25/30 (Table 6). To obtain 
disease-related mortality in chronically-infected parakeets, I averaged mortality recorded 
in experimentally-infected psittacines during the nine days following the acute-infection 
period so that µC = 0.075/39 (Erickson et al. 1977; Erickson et al. 1978).  
Model 2 
Host demography and harvest   
I set the initial population size of the two age classes according to their 
distribution at the disease-free equilibrium with life expectancy (Dd), so that N(0) = Nj + 
Na. For instance, when Dd = 5 years and N(0)=200, Nj = 16 (8%) and Na = 184 (92%) 
(Table 6). I estimated the duration of the juvenile stage based on two factors: (1) the age 
when juveniles develop immune-competence, and (2) when their survival rate starts to 
increase. Development of immuno-competence in psittacines and other altricial species 
is poorly understood (Apanius 1980; Schat et al. 2013), but appears to occur between six 
weeks (Ritchie et al. 1992; Lung 1996) and five months (Denadai et al. 2010). 
Considering juvenile survival, it is widely recognized that juveniles of many avian 
species suffer their highest mortality during the first several months after fledging 
(Rowley 1983; Lindsey et al. 1994; Salinas-Melgoza & Renton 2007; Cox et al. 2014), 
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which for white-winged parakeets occurs at roughly six weeks of age (Shroads 1974). 
Combining these two factors I considered that juveniles transition to adults at DΩ = 135 
days (4.5 months), meaning that the maturation rate was Ω = 1/135. 
I fixed juvenile mortality at 40% during the 135-day long juvenile period 
(Sandercock & Beissinger 2002; Salinas-Melgoza & Renton 2007). The corresponding 
juvenile population was modeled as an exponential decay Sj(t) = Sj(0)e
(–dj*t)
 so that 60% 
of the population remained after the juvenile period. The daily natural mortality was then 
estimated as dj = 1/(–DΩ/ln(0.6)) = 1/264. Adult daily natural mortality (da) was 
calculated from the difference between the natural mortality already defined for model 1 
(d) and the juvenile mortality (dj), so that da = 1/(1/d–1/dj) (Table 6). According to 
market survey data in Peru, roughly 20% more adult white-winged parakeets were 
harvested annually than juveniles (P. Mendoza, WCS, unpublished data), therefore, I set 
60% of the total harvest (h) to represent adults (ha = 0.6h) and 40% juveniles (hj = 0.4h).  
Transmission rate 
Transmission coefficients (β) for ND in juvenile or adult psittacines have not 
been published; however, acutely-infected juvenile chickens, pigeons, and other species 
were considered more infectious than adults (Erickson et al. 1980; Kuiken et al. 1998b; 
Rupiper 1998; Alexander et al. 2004; Kapczynski et al. 2006; Hoque et al. 2012). It is 
reasonable to assume that the same would be true for juvenile parakeets. For simplicity, I 
parameterized an acute-transmission factor (cβA) to represent a 25% increase for acutely-
infected juveniles over the baseline rate of transmission (βA) in model 1, so that βAj = 
(1+cβA)βA, and a 25% decrease for adult transmission below baseline so that βAa = (1–
cβA)βA (Table 6; Fig. 4). I used the same chronic transmission rate (βC) for juveniles and 
adults as in model 1. The transition rates for leaving infectious states, α, δ, γ, and 𝜈, used 
in model 2 were previously defined for model 1 (Table 6). 
Acute and chronic infections and disease-related mortality 
In natural outbreaks and experimental studies, juvenile birds frequently 
disproportionately suffered acute clinical signs and high mortality following ND 
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exposure compared to adults (Panigrahy et al. 1993; Kuiken et al. 1998b; Alexander 
2009; Barman et al. 2010). Therefore, I considered that 75% of juvenile white-winged 
parakeets would become acutely infected following exposure (p1j = 0.75), while 1–p1j 
would become chronically infected (Table 6; Fig. 4). For adults, I considered a 50% 
probability of becoming acutely or chronically infected, p1a and 1–p1a = 0.5. The 
proportion of acutely-infected individuals that would recover (p2) versus becoming 
chronically infected was defined as in model 1. I used an acute-mortality factor (cm) to 
estimate a + 25% age-related difference so that disease-related mortality for acutely-
infected juveniles was µAj = (1+cm)µA and for adults, µAa = (1–cm)µA. Little is known 
about age-related mortality from chronic ND infection. I assumed that little difference 
existed among juveniles and adults and, therefore, used the parameter µC from model 1 
for both.  
Scenario analysis 
Because life expectancy (Dd) is unknown in the wild, I conducted a scenario 
analysis to compare the baseline scenario (Dd = 5 years) with two extreme scenarios (Dd 
= 2 and Dd = 9 years for both models. I also evaluated the effect of additional harvest 
(hl) at 2%, 5%, and 10% along with the 1% annual baseline (hb) harvest (so that the total 
harvest h = hb + hl) through two scenarios for each model. In the first scenario, 
population recruitment was fully compensated to include baseline and additional harvest 
to maintain a stable population in absence of infection, so that Ʌ = N(d+h) in model 1 
and Ʌ2 = N(dj+hj+Ω)(da+ha)/(da+ha+Ω) in model 2 (Table 6). In the second scenario, 
additional harvest and infection were introduced simultaneously into the host population, 
but additional harvest was uncompensated by recruitment and both additional harvest 
and infection-induced mortality caused the population to decline so that Ʌu = N(d+hb) in 
model 1 and Λ2u = N(dj+hbj+Ω)(da+hba)/(da+hba+Ω) in model 2 , where hbj=0.4hb and 
hba=0.6hb. These two scenarios provided a means to evaluate the interaction between 
harvest and disease under two extreme host reproductive responses to additional harvest 
 61 
 
(i.e., compensated additional harvest by increased natality in scenario 1 and 
uncompensated additional harvest because of a stable natality in scenario 2).     
Sensitivity analysis  
I examined the sensitivity of the predicted disease-related population decline and 
R0 to parameters’ uncertainties (Table 6). Parameter distributions were selected 
supported by literature; population size was Log-normally distributed (Limpert et al. 
2001), values for Dα, Dδ, and Dγ were exponentially distributed (Anderson & May 1991), 
and the remaining parameters with insufficient support were uniformly distributed 
(Table 6). I performed a sensitivity analysis by simulating 10,000 iterations of the (1) R0 
expressions (Eq. C1 and C2) and (2) ODE models (Eq. 1–5 and 6–15) run up to 10,000 
days. Parameters were varied simultaneously using the Monte Carlo method and Latin 
Hypercube sampling that randomly-selected parameter values from their respective 
distributions (Helton & Davis 2003). With this number of iterations, R0 was estimated 
with a precision of +/- 0.08. 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient (rs) was used to calculate and test correlation 
between each uncertain parameter and R0 (Table 6). I used α = 0.05 as the statistical 
significance, which was adjusted for multiple testing by implementing the Bonferroni 
correction. The corrected significance level was α = 0.0045 for model 1 and α = 0.0028 
for model 2. To explore how parameters interacted to create conditions of disease-free 
(R0 < 1) or endemic (R0 > 1) states, I used the parameter values and the associated R0 
estimates from 10,000 iterations per scenario to construct classification trees—binary 
decision trees that identify the most influential parameters in predicting disease-free or 
endemic conditions for the homogeneous and age-structured populations (Ivanek et al. 
2009). The classification trees were build using the rpart package (Therneau et al. 2014). 
The gini index was used as a measure of node impurity along with a 10-fold cross-
validation to select the tree with the smallest misclassification error (Vayssières et al. 
2000). In the classification-tree analysis, results from all of the scenario analyses on life 
expectancy (Dd) and additional harvest (h1) were combined for a total of 120,000 data 
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points (iterations) to determine whether these two, and other, model parameters were 
important predictors of disease-free or endemic states. 
In a separate analysis, I compared differences in R0 estimates produced by 
models 1 and 2, by starting with equal parameters so that each model produced the same 
R0 (i.e., age-structured parameters were set to be equal and to match those in model 1). I 
then varied the age-structured parameters (e.g., cβA, cm, p1j, and p1a) one at a time to 
evaluate their individual influence on R0. This provided a method to compare results 
between the two models and to identify which parameters made the biggest difference in 
R0 estimates.  
Results 
Dynamics of ND transmission, R0, and harvest  
The baseline R0 estimates without additional harvest were 3.63 and 2.66 for 
models 1 and 2, respectively (Table 7). These baseline values were similar to mean R0 
estimates obtained from 10,000 simulations. The distribution range of the R0 estimates 
(represented by the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles) were slightly wider in model 1 compared to 
model 2 (Table 7). With just baseline harvest (i.e., no additional harvest), 21 and 28% of 
R0 simulated values were < 1 for models 1 and 2, respectively, meaning that ND failed to 
become established in the host population (Table 7). The majority of simulated R0 
estimates were < 5 for both models (77% and 87%, respectively). The baseline outbreak 
dynamics peaked at approximately 120 days for the homogeneous population of white-
winged parakeets (Fig. 5A), and closer to 150 days with less infected individuals and 
longer duration in the age-structured population (Fig. 5B). Short-term ND dynamics 
oscillated in both models, but the second infection cycle was slightly delayed in model 2 
compared to model 1(Fig. 5; See Appendix E for separate juvenile and adult 
trajectories).  
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As shown in both panels in Fig. 6, population size was relatively stable for 
approximately the first 20 days, after which abundance decreased sharply and similarly 
for all tested harvest rates until approximately 180 days in model 1 and 200 days in 
model 2. This sharp decline, related to the disease outbreak and disease-induced 
mortality shown in Fig. 5, was followed by further, but slower, decline in population 
size. By two years (t = 730 days) post ND introduction with baseline compensated 
harvest, ND caused the initial population of 200 individuals to decrease by 33% in the 
homogeneous population (N(730) = 135; Fig. 6A, blue line), but only by 24% (N(730) = 
153) when age structure was considered (Fig. 6B, blue line). 
  
Table 7.  Scenario analysis of the effect of uncompensated additional harvest (h1) on the 
basic reproduction number (R0) and population size following introduction of Newcastle 
disease into a homogeneous (model 1) and age-structured (model 2) populations of 
white-winged parakeets.
a
 
Additional 
harvest, h1 
(%) 
Baseline 
R0 
Mean R0 
(5
th
, 95
th
 percentiles) 
Proportion of 
simulations 
where R0 < 1 
(%) 
N(730)
b
 
(5
th
, 95
th
 percentiles) 
 
model 1 
   
 
 
0
c
 3.63 3.65  (0.35, 11.30) 21 154.8  (84.9, 254.5) 
2 3.31 3.32  (0.31, 10.29) 24 149.3  (81.9, 245.0) 
5 2.92 2.93  (0.28, 9.05) 27 141.4  (77.6, 231.6) 
10 2.44 2.44  (0.23, 7.52) 33 129.1  (71.1, 211.2) 
model 2      
0
c
 2.66 2.62  (0.28, 7.53) 28 168.6  (94.9, 272.2) 
2 2.54 2.50  (0.27, 7.18) 29 165.0  (92.9, 266.3) 
5 2.39 2.34  (0.26, 6.71) 31 159.7  (89.9, 257.6) 
10 2.17 2.12  (0.23, 6.07) 34 151.2  (85.2, 243.9) 
a
 For each scenario, results were based on 10,000 simulations. 
b
 Population size at day 730 post infection introduction was chosen to capture the short-
term effect of harvest on the population size (the initial population size was Log-
normally distributed with mean of 200 and the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles were 109 and 329, 
respectively). 
c
 In all scenarios, the uncompensated additional harvest (h1) was added to the 1% 
baseline harvest (hb).  
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Figure 5.  Deterministic two-year time trajectories for Newcastle disease transmission. 
Simulated outbreak dynamics from homogeneous (model 1) and age-structured (model 
2) populations of white-winged parakeets with (A-B) no additional harvest (hl = 0%) and 
(C-D) 10% additional (uncompensated) harvest (hl = 10%). Depicted states of infection 
are: susceptible (S), exposed (E), acutely-infected (IA), chronically-infected (IA) and 
recovered (R). Age-structured panels (B, D) show summed juvenile and adult parakeets 
for each infection state. See Appendix E for separate juvenile and adult trajectories for 
model 2.  
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
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By 20 years post ND introduction, homogeneous and age-structured populations 
deceased more than 50% before stabilizing in an endemic state with no additional 
harvest (Fig. 7, blue lines). The distribution of the estimated number of parakeets from 
10,000 ODE simulations was slightly wider for model 2 than model 1, which likely 
reflects additional uncertain parameters in model 2 (Table 7). When I fixed the initial 
population size to the baseline value (N = 200) so that I could evaluate the effects of 
harvest and disease-related mortality on population decline without the influence of the 
uncertain initial population size, the width of the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles decreased by 
over half for both models (45–60%, results not shown).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Population decline during two years post Newcastle disease introduction in 
(A) homogeneous (model 1) and (B) age-structured (model 2) populations of white-
winged parakeets with no additional harvest and three additional, uncompensated harvest 
rates (h1; 0-blue, 2%-red, 5%-green, and 10%-black).  
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Scenario analyses 
Varying life expectancy where Dd = 2 or 9 years produced minimal effect in ND 
transmission represented by mean R0 estimates and host population size for either 
homogeneous or age-structured populations of white-winged parakeets (Appendix D). 
Uncompensated additional harvest dampened R0 in both homogeneous and age-
structured populations (Table 7). Increasing the additional harvest rate from 2 to 10% 
increased the probability of an infection fade out (measured by the proportion of R0 < 1), 
by 9% in model 1, but by only 5% in model 2 (Table 7). Compensating for additional 
harvest, where natality (lambda) increased in response to higher harvest, caused R0 to 
remain stable with increasing additional harvest in both models (Fig. 8); however, the 
confidence intervals for R0 estimates with compensated and uncompensated harvest 
largely overlapped. Overall, disease dynamics were minimally affected by higher harvest 
(Fig. 5). The recovered class, which was the longest stage in the compartmental models, 
was the most affected by higher harvest rates in both models as noted by the lower 
number of individuals with 10% additional harvest versus baseline harvest (Fig. 5, 
panels C–D versus panels A–B, respectively).  
Higher uncompensated harvest decreased the size of both homogeneous and age-
structured populations of white-winged parakeets, although the decrease was more 
notable in model 1 versus model 2 and the decline was steeper with higher harvest rates 
(Fig. 6). At two years post ND introduction, 10% additional harvest decreased the 
homogeneous population of 200 individuals by 35%, but only by 24% in model 2 for the 
age-structured population (Table 7). The combination of ND and 10% uncompensated 
additional harvest (without density-dependent population regulation) caused the 
population to steadily decline, approaching zero within 35 and 60 years for models 1 and 
2, respectively (Fig. 7).  
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Figure 7.  Population decline during 100 years post Newcastle disease introduction in (A) 
homogeneous (model 1) and (B) age-structured (model 2) populations of white-winged parakeets 
with no additional harvest rate and three additional uncompensated harvest rates (h1; 0-blue, 2%-
red, 5%-green, and 10%-black). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Comparison of mean estimates of the basic reproduction number (R0) under 
assumptions of compensated (red) and uncompensated (blue) additional harvest rates (hl) for (A) 
homogeneous and (B) age-structured populations of white-winged parakeets following 
introduction of Newcastle disease.   
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Sensitivity analysis 
The duration of the acute-infectious stage (Dδ) was the most influential 
(positively correlated) parameter in determining R0 for both homogeneous and age-
structured populations of white-winged parakeets (Fig. 9). Initial population size and the 
transmission rate for acutely-infected individuals were also positively correlated with R0. 
The probability of acute disease-related death (pdA) was negatively correlated with R0 in 
both models, but had a much stronger influence in model 2 (Fig. 9B). Along with pdA, 
disease-related mortalities for acutely-infected juvenile (μAj) and adult (μAa) parakeets, 
both of which were partially derived from pdA (Table 6), were highly negatively 
correlated with R0 in model 2. The probability of chronic disease-related death (pdc) was 
likewise negatively correlated with R0, but only significant in model 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Spearman’s coefficients indicating the strength of the relationship between 
parameters of the (A) homogeneous (model 1) and (B) age-structured (model 2) models 
and the basic reproduction number (R0) with 10% additional harvest from 10,000 
simulations. Only parameters with statistically significant coefficients are shown. See 
Table 6 for parameter descriptions. 
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In the correlation analysis, parameters were evaluated individually; in the 
multivariable classification trees analyses all uncertain parameters as well as life 
expectancy (Dd) and additional harvest (h1) were evaluated simultaneously. Parameters 
Dd and h1 were not identified as influential in predicting disease-free or endemic 
conditions. As with correlation analyses, the most optimal classification trees identified 
the duration of the acute-infectious stage (Dδ) as the most important factor determining 
whether the infection would persist or undergo fade-out, indicated by its position closest 
to the root of the tree (Fig. 10). By following the rule for branches to the right, endemic 
conditions (R0 > 1) were predicted to occur under two scenarios in model 1: (1) Dδ > 11 
days, and (2) Dδ < 11 days, but with a duration of chronic-infectious stage Dγ > 48 days, 
and a transmission rate for chronically-infected parakeets βc > 0.0001071 (Fig. 10A). In 
model 2, the most optimal classification tree indicated that an endemic state was 
predicted by four parameters following three different pathways (Fig. 10B). As with 
model 1, Dδ, Dγ, and βc were influential parameters in predicting endemic ND, along 
with the initial population size, N(0). Cross-validation indicated that the predictive error 
rates were relatively low and similar for models 1 and 2 (12.5% and 12.7%, 
respectively). 
By directly comparing models 1 and 2 and the age-related parameters that 
differed between the two, I determined that the age-dependent acute transmission factor 
(cβA), which increased or decreased the transmission rate by 25% for acutely-infected 
juveniles and adults, respectively, made the biggest difference in R0 between the two 
models. Specifically, lowering the transmission rate for acutely-infected adult parakeets 
(βAa) decreased R0 by 21% from 3.63 in model 1 to 2.88 in model 2. Lowering the 
probability of acute adult infection (p1a) in model 2 compared to the homogenous value 
(p1) in model 1 decreased R0 by 15%. The acute mortality factor (cm), which lowered the 
disease-related mortality rate for acutely-infected adult parakeets (µAa), resulted in 
increasing R0 slightly by 4% compared to homogenous acute mortality. The 
corresponding increase in juvenile parameter values associated with cβA, p1j and cm, in 
model 2 minimally influenced R0 compared to model 1.
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Figure 10.  Classification tree for disease-free (basic reproduction number, R0 < 1) or endemic (R0 > 1) conditions of 
Newcastle disease (ND) in (A) homogeneous and (B) age-structured populations of white-winged parakeets. The rule for data 
partitioning is on top of each node. For example, in panel (A), the root node rule is the duration of the acute infectious stage 
(Dδ) less than 11.08 days; the subset of simulations satisfying this rule partitioned to the left daughter node and consecutively 
down the nodes. The terminal nodes represent disease-free (DF) or endemic (E) conditions for ND. See Table 6 for parameter 
descriptions. 
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Discussion 
My study shows that illegal harvest would play an important role in virus 
transmission during a ND outbreak. I developed two mathematical models to compare 
the influence of harvest on ND dynamics in a homogeneous and an arguably more 
realistic age-structured population of white-winged parakeets. I determined that 
introduction of ND would likely provoke considerable disease-related mortality, but the 
magnitude of the outbreak would be dampened by high harvest rates. Incorporating age 
structure into the model produced moderate differences in both R0 and disease dynamics, 
primarily due to lower adult disease transmission, compared to the homogeneous 
population model. Most importantly, it demonstrated that the homogenous model likely 
overestimated the severity of an ND outbreak and highlighted the importance of 
incorporating even simplistic age structure in disease modeling despite increased 
complexity and reduced tractability. 
R0 and ND outbreak 
The deterministic compartmental models demonstrated that introducing just one 
ND-infected individual would provoke an outbreak (R0 > 1) in susceptible populations of 
white-winged parakeets with roughly 75% probability (Table 7). In the short term, 
without population compensation through density-dependent recruitment, population 
size decreased by 24–44% depending on the harvest rate and host population structure 
(Fig. 6). Even the low end of this range, observed in the age-structured population 
(model 2) with baseline harvest, is a conservation concern (Fig. 6B, blue line). The fact 
that some psittacine species can chronically shed the ND virus for extended periods 
(Erickson et al. 1977), implies this disease has the potential to become endemic and 
remain in the population causing low-level disease-related mortalities (Fig. 7). In a case 
of another infectious disease affecting wild avian populations, Hochachka & Dhondt 
(2000) found that epizootic Mycoplasma sp. conjunctivitis caused significant population 
decline in house finches along the eastern United States.  
 72 
 
My results indicate that, in the long term, ND alone would not cause population 
extinction; however, the combination of ND and consistently high annual harvest (10%) 
would provoke > 75% population decline in 20 years without a density-dependent 
response in reproduction (Fig. 7). While I did not investigate the interaction between 
density-dependent effects and illegal harvest on the host population, it would be 
reasonable to expect that density-dependent regulation would help replenish the 
population by increasing reproduction (Ricklefs 2000). Higher recruitment could 
potentially increase the supply of ND susceptible parakeets, and thereby exacerbate 
and/or prolong the outbreak (Woodroffe et al. 2004; Choisy & Rohani 2006). The 
combination of illegal harvest and ND-related mortality could have potential devastating 
population-level effects, but without better demographic data for the white-winged 
parakeet, it is unclear from what level of decline the population could recover, or at least 
stabilize at a new carrying capacity (Hochachka & Dhondt 2000; Beissinger 2001). 
Age structure 
The importance of including realistic population demographic factors in disease 
modeling is well established (Hudson et al. 2002). In the case of ND, age structure is an 
important factor to consider because the disease disproportionately affects juveniles. The 
modeling results demonstrated that without including age structure (model 1), the 
severity of a potential ND outbreak was up to 28% higher based on mean R0 estimates 
(Table 7) and disease-related population decline was 9–13% higher, depending on the 
harvest rate, in model 1 versus model 2 at two years post ND introduction (Fig. 6). To 
put this in perspective, a higher R0 observed in model 1 compared to model 2 suggests 
that higher effort is needed to control the infection based on the herd immunity threshold 
(HIT), which denotes the minimum proportion of population to be vaccinated to control 
the infection (HIT = 1-1/ R0). Although currently not feasible for psittacines in the wild, 
a higher proportion of population would need to be vaccinated in model 1 (74%) 
compared to model 2 (62%) (John & Samuel 2000; van Boven et al. 2008).  
The dynamics of an ND outbreak were similar in homogeneous and age-
structured populations of white-winged parakeets (Fig. 5); however, the mildly 
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prolonged infectious periods (IA, IC) in model 2 (Fig. 5B,D) would likely provide more 
opportunities for contact and cross-species exposure. Psittacine species, especially 
species of similar size, often interact at fruiting trees or clay licks (Galetti 1997; Burger 
& Gochfeld 2003). Up to 17 species and hundreds of individuals have been identified at 
clay licks in Peru (Powell et al. 2009), which would provide favorable conditions for ND 
transmission and spread among species (Butron & Brightsmith 2010). Expanding the 
age-structured model to include spatial connectivity for meta-population and interspecies 
interactions would provide valuable insight regarding ND dynamics on a larger scale 
(Hess 1996; Lande et al. 2001) and should be a focus of future research. 
Comparison of models 1 and 2 demonstrated that the lower R0 estimates 
predicted from model 2 primarily reflect disease dynamics in adult parakeets, 
specifically a lower transmission rate for acutely-infected adults (determined by cβA) 
and, to a lesser degree, a lower probability of acute adult infection. Juvenile parakeets, 
despite being more infectious than adults, made little impact on R0 estimates. This was 
due, in part, to the fact that 40% of juveniles were removed by natural mortality from the 
population by day 135, and the remaining would then “mature” to adults (Table 6). 
Adult parakeets, which comprised a much larger proportion of the population than 
juveniles (Table 6), naturally survived longer and had more time to influence ND 
transmission and R0. As such, lower acute adult morality in model 2 (determined by cm) 
slightly increased R0 compared to model 1. This suggested that maintaining infected 
adults for longer time in the population (i.e., not dying from the disease), would 
exacerbate an ND outbreak even though adults were less infectious compared to 
juveniles.  
I should emphasize that the parameters responsible for the differences in R0 
predictions between models 1 and 2 (cβA, cm, and p1a) were uncertain and should be 
prioritized for future investigation, especially the transmission rate and probability for 
acutely-infected adult parakeets. However, because model 2 more closely reflected the 
biological system, it is reasonable to assume that it also more accurately predicted ND 
dynamics. By extension, it is reasonable to conclude that model 1 overestimated disease 
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transmission and the magnitude of the ND outbreak. In a similar situation, Brooks-
Pollock et al. (2010) found that more realistic age-specific mortality versus constant 
mortality rates in mathematical models of human tuberculosis decreased R0 estimates 
and the effort required for disease control.  
Role of harvest 
Through scenario analysis, I determined that increasing uncompensated harvest 
rates (i.e., those not compensated for by natality), had a modest dampening influence on 
R0, meaning that higher uncompensated harvest increased the probability of ND fadeout 
(R0 < 1; Table 7). Although the increase in the proportions of fadeout was less dramatic 
in model 2 versus model 1 (6% compared to 12%; Table 7), this must be considered 
along with the already lower R0 estimates in model 2. Compensating additional harvest 
(h1) caused R0 to remain high in both models (> 2.5), indicating that an influx of 
susceptible individuals (i.e., offspring), may help sustain higher potential for an ND 
outbreak (Fig. 8); however, because the confidence intervals for R0 estimates with 
compensated and uncompensated harvest largely overlapped (results not shown), the 
influence of host population density-dependent response on R0 should be interpreted 
cautiously.  
Higher harvest rates produced slower population decline in the age-structured 
population compared to the homogeneous population (Fig. 6). This dampened effect in 
model 2 reflected, in part, the 40% removal of juveniles through natural mortality (Table 
6). High juvenile mortality is often exploited in harvested populations because their 
lower survival rates and lower reproductive value increase the probability of 
compensation (Beissinger 2001). For this reason, Choisy & Rohani (2006) predicted that 
shifting harvest to younger age classes would decrease the risk of disease-related 
mortality in hypothetical scenarios, which is supported by my results. 
Overall, higher harvest rates had minimal effect on ND dynamics (Fig. 5) and 
population size (Fig. 6). This is partly due to the way the annual harvest rate was 
prorated for the one-day time step in the model simulations, which diluted the effect of 
harvest, particularly over short time periods such as the 135-day juvenile period. In 
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addition, because the actual harvest rate is unknown, I set the baseline harvest (hb) 
conservatively low and even compensated for it with natality (Table 6). It is likely that 
even the upper limit of 10% additional annual harvest (h1) was conservative. In model 2, 
I fixed the proportion of juvenile (40%) and adult (60%) harvest as the average of what 
was recorded in market surveys throughout the year (P. Mendoza, WCS, unpublished 
data). In reality, it is recognized that seasonal harvest differences exist, which would 
likely influence ND dynamics as they do for other diseases (Hosseini et al. 2004; Altizer 
et al. 2006). For example, when I changed the fixed harvest proportions to reflect harvest 
rates during a nesting period (juveniles 90%; adults 10%), R0 was 20% higher, but the 
population decline at two years post ND introduction was 12% less compared to the 
opposite proportions (juveniles 10%, adults 90%; results not shown). 
Key parameters  
The duration of the acute (Dδ) and chronic (Dγ) infectious stages were most 
influential in determining R0, as identified in both the univariate correlation (Fig. 9) and 
multivariable classification-tree analyses (Fig. 10). The positive Spearman correlations 
indicated that longer duration of the infectious stages resulted in higher R0 estimates. In 
poultry operations, decreasing the duration of infectious stages (i.e., the length of time of 
ND viral shedding), is one of the primary goals for improving vaccination programs (van 
Boven et al. 2008; Miller et al. 2009). With captive pet birds, preventive measures such 
as vaccination could help diminish clinical signs and the duration and amount of viral 
shedding. The efficacy of ND vaccination in white-winged parakeets is unknown, 
although Denadai et al. (2010) determined that Australian parakeets could be safely and 
effectively vaccinated against ND. The negative correlation between the probability of 
acute disease-related death (pdA) and R0 in both models (Fig. 9) reflects the importance 
of removing acutely-infected individuals from the population. During an outbreak, this 
could be achieved by quarantining or culling acutely-infected individuals (Wobeser 
2002). During outbreaks of ND in commercial flocks, quickly culling all infected and 
potentially-infected individuals has been a critical component of management strategies 
to prevent expansion of the outbreak (United States Department of Agriculture 2014). 
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Neither vaccination nor quarantine, however, would be feasible to control ND in wild 
populations of white-winged parakeets. 
The classification-tree analyses provided a broad perspective of the key 
parameters and their interactions to produce disease-free or endemic ND states (Fig. 10). 
In addition to the duration of the acute (Dδ) and chronic (Dγ) infectious stages, the most 
optimal classification trees identified the transmission rate for chronically-infected 
parakeets (βc) as influencing R0, rather than the transmission rate for acutely-infected 
parakeets (βa) as in the correlation analysis. When the interaction of transmission rates 
was evaluated along with other parameters, it became clear that the rate of virus 
transmission from chronically-infected birds (βc) to susceptible individuals would 
become critical in determining whether ND would die out or persist, specifically when 
the chronic infection period (Dγ) lasted longer than approximately 47 days (Fig. 10). 
Such insight was impossible evaluating correlation alone, and demonstrates the value of 
multivariable analyses. Even though the most optimal classification trees retained only 
three or four parameters, the predictive error rates were relatively low for both models, 
indicating that the identified optimal classification trees correctly predicted infection 
fade out or an endemic state in almost 90% of independent simulations. 
Limitations  
My findings are dependent on several modeling assumptions. For instance, I 
assumed that ND transmission was density dependent in white-winged parakeets. 
Density-dependent transmission is commonly assumed for wildlife diseases (McCallum 
et al. 2001; Lloyd-Smith et al. 2005). In most cases of wildlife diseases, empirical data 
are difficult to obtain to confirm transmission, but Hochachka & Dhondt (2000) used 
pre- and post-enzootic data to conclude that mycoplasma conjunctivitis transmission in 
house finches was density dependent. In some situations, the mode of pathogen 
transmission may not be constant throughout the year as demographic seasonal traits 
affect social behavior and spatial structure of the host population (Oraby et al. 2014). For 
example, Hosseini et al. (2004) combined frequency- and density-dependent 
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transmission for Mycoplasma gallisepticum to represent seasonal variation in social 
structure of house finches.   
A similar situation could occur with ND transmission in white-winged parakeets 
as flock size fluctuates throughout the year (Shroads 1974). During the roughly 4-month 
breeding season, when pairs separate for nesting and flock size decreases, transmission 
may be more consistent with frequency dependence. During the post-breeding period, 
when adults along with their fledglings rejoin the flock, transmission may be density 
dependent. Addressing the role of chance in pathogen transmission could be evaluated 
by incorporating demographic stochasticity into the model. A stochastic approach could 
also assess the influence of changing the initial conditions, e.g., number of ND-
infectious individuals released into the population. For instance, I assumed that just one 
infectious individual would be introduced into a susceptible population of white-winged 
parakeets. In reality, it is common for authorities to release dozens to hundreds of 
potentially exposed individuals confiscated from markets (E. Daut, Chapter 2). While 
this was beyond the scope of the present work, including demographic stochasticity and 
density-dependent population natality and mortality processes in a seasonal age-
structured model would provide a method to more thoroughly investigate the influence 
of harvest on ND dynamics (Lande et al. 2001). 
Recommendations  
Few realistic options exist to control an ND outbreak in wild white-winged 
parakeets or other parrots. Assuring that criollo chickens and fighting cocks in the 
Amazonian region are vaccinated against ND would reduce the probability of cross 
infection to psittacine species in animal markets. In the models, I used a non-threatened 
psittacine species; however, many parrots are threatened in Peru—often by illegal 
trade—and could be seriously affected by an introduced infectious disease (BirdLife 
International 2014a). The most effective preventive measure would be to avoid releasing 
confiscated parakeets without prior health screening and, ideally, preventing illegal 
harvest in the first place. Authorities should coordinate more effectively with non-
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governmental organizations in Peru working to decrease illegal wildlife trade (Daut et al. 
2015), including wildlife rescue centers and zoological parks to assist with quarantine 
and rehabilitation of confiscated individuals. Similarly, authorities could increase 
collaboration with veterinary colleges to assist with physical exams and diagnostic 
testing of confiscated animals. Finally, combined efforts to increase enforcement of 
Peru’s wildlife legislation and to decrease demand for wild-caught native birds for the 
domestic pet market would help mitigate the risk of introducing infectious diseases 
(Chapter 2).  
In conclusion, this study improves understanding of ND dynamics in a wild 
population of harvested psittacines. I demonstrate that the hypothetical release of a 
confiscated individual infected with ND would provoke considerable population decline 
in a wild population of white-winged parakeets. To my knowledge, this is the first study 
to use infectious disease modeling to link illegal wildlife trade and disease introduction 
in a native wildlife population. The differences I observed in both R0 and disease 
dynamics between the homogeneous and age-structured populations highlight the 
importance of incorporating even simplistic age structure in disease modeling. While I 
recognize that further enhancements, such as including density-dependent regulation and 
demographic stochastic properties, could contribute to the understanding of ND 
dynamics, my initial models provide a baseline for future evaluation. I encourage the 
conservation community to examine other disease risks associated with illegal wildlife 
trade, particularly in endangered species where disease may contribute to species 
extinctions. 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE IMPORTANCE OF EPIDEMIOLOGY AND R0 IN WILDLIFE 
REHABILITATION
*
 
 
Synopsis 
Wildlife rehabilitators are at the intersection between individual and population–
level wildlife health. Epidemiology is the study of diseases at population levels and 
mounting evidence suggests that disease outbreaks can impact wildlife populations. The 
basic reproduction number (R0) is used as a threshold value to predict whether a disease 
will result in an outbreak or die out. It is defined as the expected number of secondary 
cases caused by one infectious individual (the index or primary case) during this 
individual’s entire infectious period in a fully susceptible population. Rehabilitators 
should be familiar with the concept of R0 and the important effect on and the role they 
have with wildlife disease epidemiology. 
Introduction 
Historically, wildlife biologists have speculated that parasites and disease have 
little impact on wildlife populations, believing that most infections are relatively benign 
(Hudson et al. 2002). Disease outbreaks may cause high mortality within a population, 
but typically these outbreaks were considered unusual exceptions resulting from 
environmental factors interrupting the delicate natural balance. However, evidence is 
mounting that disease, particularly wildlife epidemics, is a serious concern for the long– 
 
 
*Reprinted with permission from “The importance of epidemiology and R0 in wildlife rehabilitation” by 
E.F. Daut. 2012. Wildlife Rehabilitation Bulletin. 30(2): 1-4, Copyright 2012 by National Wildlife 
Rehabilitators Association. 
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term health of wildlife populations (Daszak et al. 2000) and is even capable of causing 
species extinction (Smith et al. 2006).  
Disease can be unpredictable in wildlife populations. Why do some diseases 
suddenly emerge, sweep through a population, and then suddenly disappear without 
infecting all individuals? Why do other diseases remain endemic in many populations, 
causing high mortality each year? Investigating the answers to these questions is the 
labor of wildlife disease epidemiologists, with the goal of helping to manage and protect 
wildlife populations.  
Epidemiology is the study of diseases (in this case infectious) and how often and 
why they occur in different groups of animals. The key term is groups of animals. 
Epidemiologists work at the level of populations. Individual animals are not a concern 
until they are included into categories such as “susceptible,” “infected,” “dead,” or 
“recovered” (either temporarily or permanently immune) individuals. Wildlife 
rehabilitators, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with the health and well-being 
of individual animals and may find the population approach somewhat coldhearted. 
Nevertheless, individual wild animals unite epidemiologists and rehabilitators in many 
critical ways, the most fundamental being R0, the basic reproduction number.  
Basic reproduction number 
How an infection behaves when it first appears in a population of susceptible 
individuals is critical to the health of the population. Being able to predict how an 
infection will act is important for management of the disease and the animal population. 
In most cases, the infection will follow one of three paths: (1) it will start an outbreak 
(epidemic), (2) it will burnout, meaning that after a few cases of infection it will 
disappear, (3) or it will become endemic, meaning it will become stable within the 
population. Which path the infection follows can be predicted by the basic reproduction 
number (symbolized as R0). The definition for the basic reproduction number is the 
expected number of secondary cases caused by one infectious individual during this 
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individual’s entire infectious period in a fully susceptible population (Heesterbeek 
2002).  
The concept of R0 can be illustrated best by evaluating a practical example, such 
as the fictitious introduction of canine distemper virus into the raccoon population on 
Galveston Island, TX by a single infected raccoon. Assuming that the local raccoons 
have had no previous exposure to the distemper virus and therefore have no immunity to 
protect them from the virus, they all are susceptible to infection. Distemper virus is 
highly contagious, often fatal, and easily spread by direct contact (usually by inhalation) 
with infected bodily fluids. Raccoons that survive the infection are immune to future 
infections. The single infected raccoon (the index or primary case) will be infectious for 
three weeks after arriving on the island. The question to consider is: How many local 
raccoons will the infected raccoon contact—in close enough proximity to transmit the 
virus—during the 21 day infectious period? Although many factors could influence this 
scenario, one of the most important is the number of contacts that occur between 
infected and susceptible raccoons. Imagine, for instance, if the infected raccoon was 
released following the breeding season when many curious young juveniles were in the 
population versus being released during the coldest part of the year (as cold as it can get 
in Texas) when activity and potential contacts would be relatively low.  
In reality, calculating R0 according to the strict definition is almost impossible in 
wildlife populations that are experiencing an infectious disease outbreak. Epidemics are 
rarely identified at the moment an infected individual enters a susceptible population and 
the number of contacts between susceptible and infectious individuals is difficult, if not 
impossible, to estimate for most infections in the field. Yet, despite the challenges with 
calculating the actual value of R0, it is still an essential concept in epidemiology and 
infectious diseases and arguably “one of the foremost and most valuable ideas that 
mathematical thinking has brought to epidemic theory” (Heesterbeek & Dietz 1996). 
 The significance of R0 is not in the actual number, but in what it represents—a 
theoretical threshold. In simplified disease scenarios, R0 is a cutoff point that predicts 
whether an infection will spread, which is what we really are interested in knowing. Is 
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the disease likely to result in an epidemic, a sudden outbreak of the disease? Or will the 
disease die out? Under more complicated scenarios, R0 helps predict whether a disease 
will become endemic, indicating that it will persist in the population, often at some low 
level. In order for an infection to spread and result in an outbreak, R0 must be greater 
than one. This means that every infected individual, on average, infects more than one 
new individual, resulting in a chain reaction of new cases (Fig. 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Graphical representation of new cases of infection during an outbreak. In 
this case, each infected squirrel spreads the infection to 0–4 susceptible squirrels. The 
average number of new cases is 2.1.    
 
 
If R0 is less than one, each infected individual produces, on average, less than one 
new infected individual, indicating that the infectious disease eventually will die out in 
the population. When R0 equals one, the disease is likely to remain in the population 
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with roughly the same number of individuals infected all the time (Kermack & 
McKendrick 1927), so that: 
R0 < 1 – disease will eventually disappear 
R0 = 1 – disease will become endemic 
R0 > 1 – disease will result in an epidemic. 
 
Threshold levels are familiar concepts in wildlife ecology. You may be familiar 
with the analogous threshold property of λ, the Greek letter lambda (also written as just 
R), which represents the fundamental net reproductive rate of a population under 
simplified conditions. Lambda combines the birth of new individuals with the survival of 
existing individuals. The value of the concept lies in its threshold property similar to R0. 
If λ is greater than one the population will grow; if λ is less than one the population will 
decline (Dublin & Lotka 1925) . 
R0 has other important uses for wildlife diseases in addition to its threshold 
property. The magnitude of R0 can be used to gauge the risk and severity of an epidemic 
of an emerging infectious disease (Heesterbeek 2002) and the final size of the 
epidemic—specifically the number of susceptible individuals remaining at the end of the 
epidemic (Andreasen 2011). If a disease is endemic, R0 helps evaluate control strategies 
such as vaccination campaigns. Different control efforts can be incorporated into 
mathematical disease models to test which strategy and how much effort (cost) it would 
require to reduce R0 below one, and theoretically eliminate the infection from the 
population (Li et al. 2011). For example, R0 estimates were used to illustrate that 
mosquito control would probably be much more effective in controlling an outbreak of 
West Nile virus (WNV) than would be attempting to control bird populations (Wonham 
et al. 2004). In fact, it was shown that reducing American crow (Corvus 
brachyrhynchos) densities—the bird species that has suffered some of the greatest 
mortality in the United States due to WNV—might actually increase the chance of 
disease transmission and provoke an outbreak. 
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Calculating R0 
Because it is virtually impossible to calculate R0 using actual outbreak data, there 
are numerous methods to estimate R0–like thresholds for a specific disease and 
population. Some methods are very basic and incorporate the bare minimum information 
necessary. Other methods use complicated models to incorporate more sophisticated data 
about the population under study, such as different age and social groups, physical 
distribution in the environment, and status of immunity. An important point to consider 
is that there is no universal R0 value for a disease (Li et al. 2011). For example, R0 for 
squirrel pox virus will not always be 2.05 because it depends on the situation where and 
when this value was calculated. The R0 for another outbreak of squirrel pox may be 2.12, 
but it should never reach a hugely different value such as 19.0, assuming the same 
method was used for calculation because such a large value would be inconsistent with 
the disease’s behavior. What this means is that R0 must be interpreted within the context 
of the disease and population at the time it is investigated and, most importantly, the 
method used to calculate R0. 
Most methods to calculate R0 include aspects of the three main factors of 
infectious disease epidemiology: (1) the natural history or progression of the infection in 
an individual host, (2) how the infection spreads from infected to susceptible individuals, 
and (3) the environment and behavioral characteristics of the specific host population 
(Ward et al. 2009). Calculating an R0–like threshold value for a hypothetical outbreak of 
distemper virus on Galveston Island can be done relatively easily by using basic disease 
parameters published in the scientific literature regarding distemper epidemiology 
(Deem et al. 2000) and previously studied outbreaks in raccoons (Roscoe 1993). 
Important values to estimate are the transmission probability (how likely is it that the 
disease will be passed from an infectious to susceptible individual), the contact rate (how 
many individuals, on average, will the infected raccoon contact on a daily basis), and 
how long the infected raccoon will remain infectious. Estimates for these values, along 
with several simplifying assumptions, can be used to calculate R0 for a susceptible 
raccoon population of 1,000 individuals on the island. By using the Jacobian method 
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(Roberts 2007), R0 would be approximately 8.45. Since this threshold value is greater 
than one, it strongly suggests that there would be an epidemic of distemper in the 
raccoon population on the island.  
Conclusion 
Wildlife rehabilitators are at the intersection between individual and population–
level wildlife health. From an individual perspective, rehabilitators deliver a valuable 
service providing care and assisting wild animal welfare. From a population perspective, 
rehabilitators collectively observe and handle a large sample of wild animal populations 
from across the United States. These observations have been critical for surveillance 
programs such as West Nile virus (Nemeth et al. 2006), but overall have been sorely 
under–utilized. Recent efforts are encouraging rehabilitators to use standardized on–line 
patient record systems to maximize the collection and distribution of wildlife health 
information generated by rehabilitators across the country; WILD–ONe, which stands 
for Wildlife Incident Log/Database and Online Network, recently launched by the 
Wildlife Center of Virginia is one example. Collating records across geographic regions 
and standardizing data entry will make the data more accessible and useful for disease 
surveillance.  
Lastly, rehabilitators interact with wildlife populations every time a rehabilitated 
animal is released back to the wild. By definition, the basic reproduction number, R0, is 
an individual–based metric that sheds valuable light on potential impacts of disease on 
wildlife populations. By definition, a single infected individual can cause an epidemic, 
which should be enough to cause all of us to pause the next time an animal is released 
back to the wild.  
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CHAPTER V 
ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN COMBATING 
ILLEGAL WILDLIFE-PET TRADE IN PERU  
 
Synopsis 
Illegal trade in wild animals for pets is a global conservation and animal-welfare 
concern. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with different philosophical 
perspectives toward wildlife work to decrease illegal trade at international and national 
levels. My objective was to examine the efforts of conservation and animal-welfare 
NGOs working to decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade for domestic markets in Peru. I 
identified 28 NGOs potentially engaged in reducing the trade, and conducted semi-
structured interviews with > 1 representative from each (n = 33 interviews). Only five 
NGOs, each with a strong dual-perspective toward wildlife that prioritized both wildlife 
populations and individual wild animals, demonstrated high effort to decrease illegal 
wildlife-pet trade. These dual-perspective NGOs incorporated anti-trade efforts in all 
four work categories I identified (i.e., outreach, advocacy, development, and husbandry). 
Using thematic analysis of interview transcripts, I determined that dual-perspective 
interviewees were motivated to combat the trade by concern for individual animals and 
populations—in essence, their moral pluralism. Overall, interviewees considered the 
government lax with enforcement of wildlife legislation. Interview data suggest that the 
dual-perspective NGOs’ persistent efforts have decreased illegal wildlife-pet trade in 
two regions of Peru. I recommend that stakeholders and governments searching for  
 
 
*Reprinted with permission from “Role of non-governmental organizations in combating illegal wildlife-
pet trade in Peru” by E.F. Daut, D.J. Brightsmith, and M.J. Peterson. 2015. Journal for Nature 
Conservation 23:In Press. Copyright 2015 by Elsevier GmbH. 
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collaborators to help curb illegal trade consider approaching NGOs with programs that 
address both conservation of wildlife populations and individual wild animal welfare. I 
urge the scientific community to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies under different 
ecological and socio-economic conditions to assist on-the-ground efforts to decrease 
illegal wildlife-pet trade.  
Introduction 
Illegal wildlife trade is a global conservation and animal-welfare concern. Illegal 
harvest and trade of wild animals undermine natural resource management (Broad et al. 
2003), threaten biodiversity (Nekaris et al. 2010; Sung et al. 2013), foster corruption and 
violence (Warchol 2004), permit spread of infectious diseases (Karesh et al. 2012) and 
invasive species (Carrete & Tella 2008), and result in considerable animal suffering and 
mortality (Cantú et al. 2007; Sollund 2013). Controlling illegal wildlife trade is a global 
challenge (Wilson-Wilde 2010; House of Commons 2012; Schneider 2012; Wyatt 
2013b). Several types of groups work to decrease illegal wildlife trade, including 
intergovernmental organizations such as Interpol, government agencies, and, 
increasingly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In recent decades, the role of 
NGOs has expanded to include assisting governments with wildlife management and 
development of conservation and animal-welfare policy (Lapham & Livermore 2003; 
Wilkins 2005; Rodríguez et al. 2007). Many NGOs also support a spectrum of efforts to 
decrease illegal wildlife trade ranging from raising public and government awareness 
(World Wildlife Fund / Dalberg 2012; African Wildlife Foundation 2013; Conservation 
International 2013b; Humane Society International 2013) to directly increasing 
enforcement of laws designed to protect wildlife or manage sustainable harvest 
(Freeland Foundation 2013; International Fund for Animal Welfare 2013; The Last 
Great Ape Organization 2013; Wildlife Conservation Society 2013). 
Many factors influence NGOs’ decisions to engage in the work they do (Powell 
& Steinberg 2006; Lewis & Kanji 2009). Choosing to combat illegal wildlife trade may 
stem, in part, from perceived need, available funding, and compatibility with the NGO’s 
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mission (Gauri & Fruttero 2003; Townsend & Townsend 2004; Delfin & Tang 2008; 
Brockington & Scholfield 2010a). On an international level, prominent NGOs that raise 
awareness and promote their efforts to combat illegal wildlife trade can be broadly 
divided into two categories differing in their philosophical perspectives toward wildlife. 
Conservation NGOs, based on principles synthesized by Soulé (1985), typically focus on 
managing sustainability of species, populations, and ecological processes. In 
Conservation Biology, Soulé (1986: pg. 10) argued that: “Conservation biology is the 
biology of scarcity. The conservation biologist is called in when an ecosystem, habitat, 
species or population is subject to some kind of artificial limitation—usually a reduction 
of space and numbers.” Conversely, animal-welfare NGOs, whose contemporary 
ideology was formalized by Singer (1975), prioritize individual, sentient animals and 
defend their well-being. This differs from the “animal-rights” movement that focuses on 
deeper political and philosophical claims about legal status of animals (Regan 1983). 
Reducing individual pain and suffering is a key concept for animal welfarists as Singer 
(1975: pg. 17) wrote in Animal Liberation: “There can be no moral justification for 
regarding the pain (or pleasure) that animals feel as less important than the same amount 
of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans.” 
These philosophical differences have led to clashes between conservationists and 
animal-welfarists over certain wildlife management practices that forsake non-human 
organisms in order to protect native biodiversity (Hutchins & Wemmer 1987; Rawles 
1997; Hutchins 2007; Perry & Perry 2008). Many animal welfarists, for example, protest 
hunting or culling of individuals to prevent habitat degradation due to over-abundance of 
certain species, such as ungulates (Rawles 1997), or threats to native wildlife caused by 
introduced species (Perry & Perry 2008). With respect to illegal wildlife trade, 
conservation and animal-welfare NGOs’ philosophical differences are often reflected in 
the priorities and activities they perform, which can be complementary (Fraser 2010; 
Paquet & Dairmont 2010; Dubois & Fraser 2013). In a case study of three NGOs 
combating illegal wildlife trade in Cambodia, Wyatt (2013a) described how all three 
aided law enforcement, but in different parts of the country. Conservation NGOs usually 
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prioritize combating illegal trade of endangered and/or keystone species, such as tigers, 
elephants, and rhinos (Sitas et al. 2009; Conservation International 2013a; World 
Wildlife Fund 2014). Animal-welfare NGOs, likewise strive to save these charismatic 
creatures, but also prioritize individuals of common species regardless of their 
conservation status, often through rescue centers (Humane Society International 2011).   
In many nations, illegal trade in wild animals for the domestic pet market 
exceeds smuggling of wild animals for international markets (Shepherd 2006; Alves et 
al. 2012; Pires 2012). Although not as well studied or publicized as international wildlife 
trade of charismatic species, recent publications are raising awareness of the magnitude 
of domestic wildlife-pet trade (Ceballos-Mago et al. 2010; White et al. 2012; Sung et al. 
2013), and the species involved such as turtles (Ceballos & Fitzgerald 2004) and 
songbirds (Godoy & Matushima 2010). These types of wild animals, among others such 
as parrots, snakes, and primates, are popular pets in many Neotropical countries (Drews 
2001; Duarte-Quiroga & Estrada 2003; Moreno & Plese 2006; Cantú et al. 2007; Herrera 
& Hennessey 2007; Ceballos-Mago & Chivers 2010; Alves et al. 2012).  
Peru is an archetypal example of a megadiverse Neotropical country with a 
thriving illegal wildlife-pet trade designed to fulfil demand from domestic consumers, 
particularly in urban areas (Ríos et al. 2008; Gastañaga et al. 2010; Shanee 2012). Much 
of Peru’s domestic trade was established during the 1960s and 1970s when Peru was one 
of the largest wildlife exporters in Latin America (Dourojeanni 1972; Thomsen & 
Brautigam 1991). Excess animals, or those not selected for export, were then sold in 
local markets. Today, although significant global demand still exists for exotic animal 
pets (Bush et al. 2014), Peru is not a major international supplier (MINAG 2011). 
Limited commercial harvest for export is allowed for certain wildlife species (mostly 
songbirds), permitted under an annual quota system (see Methods in Chapter 2 for 
legislative details). While the quota system theoretically could provide a legal path for 
domestic consumers to own a wild-caught animal as a pet, Peruvian authorities regard 
essentially all domestic wildlife trade as illegal because it is conducted without 
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appropriate permits and licenses (C. Abramonte, Administración Técnica Forestal y de 
Fauna Silvestre, personal communication). 
With a strong domestic demand in Peru, individuals from common to globally 
endangered species are captured from the wild and offered for sale in animal markets 
throughout the country (Ríos et al. 2008). Peruvian governmental records demonstrate 
that 1,125 juvenile yellow-footed tortoises Chelonoidis denticulata, a threatened species, 
were confiscated between 2000 and 2012 (IUCN 2013a; E.F.Daut, unpublished data). 
This is a concern because confiscated individuals typically represent approximately 3% 
of the trade (Cantú et al. 2007; Nguyen 2008), and adult C. denticulata are heavily 
hunted for bush meat (Pilco 2012). In a recent survey of Peruvian animal markets, 
Gastañaga et al. (2010) estimated that 80,000–90,000 wild-caught parrots were sold 
illegally in the domestic market annually. Because conservation and animal-welfare 
organizations are active in Peru, it is reasonable to assume that both types of NGOs work 
to decrease the domestic illegal wildlife-pet trade.  
To my knowledge, no study has examined NGOs working to decrease domestic 
illegal wildlife-pet trade in Latin America. Evaluating NGOs and the strategies they use 
to curb illegal trade should assist stakeholders and governments attempting to direct 
funding and encourage efforts to decrease the trade. Peru is an ideal country to conduct 
such a study because it has considerable illegal wildlife-pet trade, numerous 
conservation and animal-welfare NGOs are active there, and it is probably representative 
of regional trade issues within tropical biodiversity hotspots (Myers et al. 2000). The aim 
of my study was to identify NGOs working to decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade in Peru 
and characterize key NGO actors’ perceptions of the trade. Specifically, I addressed two 
questions with respect to differing philosophical perspectives toward wildlife: (1) what 
differences exist in NGOs’ efforts to decrease the trade and activities used? and (2) what 
drives NGO actors to combat illegal wildlife-pet trade? Although this study was not 
designed to quantify effectiveness of their anti-trade activities, I provide examples where 
NGOs’ efforts appear to have successfully decreased the trade. Finally, I draw 
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conclusions for those interested in supporting or replicating Peru’s NGOs’ anti-trade 
efforts.  
Methods 
I used a symbolic interactionist framework to guide my qualitative research and 
content analysis (Mead 1934; Čapek 2006). Symbolic interactionism is a theoretical 
perspective that attempts to make meaning out of social life and views humans as the 
active constructors of social life. It is an appropriate approach to use for studying how 
NGO participants bestow meaning on wildlife and illegal wildlife-pet trade and for 
trying to understand their motivations for combating trade. Traditionally, interactionism 
is based on acting people—humans that receive social stimuli (objects)—which they 
then evaluate in terms of their self, previous experiences, and on-going judgment. 
Blumer (1986: pg. 81) explained this process as self-indication; a “moving 
communicative process in which the individual notes things, assesses them, gives them a 
meaning, and decides to act on the basis of the meaning.”  
Selection of NGOs 
During fieldwork in Peru (October 2012–May 2013), I searched for NGOs 
working with wildlife and potentially combating illegal trade in wildlife for use as pets. I 
did not consider illegal bush meat trade or non-commercial wildlife harvest by native 
communities as part of the search rubric. I searched among traditional conservation 
NGOs, zoological parks, wildlife rescue centers, and animal-welfare organizations that 
typically focus on domesticated pets regardless of their funding level, size, duration of 
work, or geographic focus (international, national or regional within Peru). To identify 
potential NGOs and the type of work they engage in, I examined (1) websites, blogs, and 
Facebook pages found by using the Google search engine, (2) published materials such 
as conference proceedings and technical reports, and (3) information provided by 
governmental development agencies (Brockington & Scholfield 2010b). Several NGOs 
were identified during initial informal interviews conducted by E. Daut through the 
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snowball method, where one interviewee recommends other potential subjects (Wright 
& Stein 2005). Snowball sampling facilitates identification of potential participants in a 
select, less accessible, population (Wright et al. 1992). I also received suggestions from 
two NGO members working with wildlife who reviewed my draft list. My search 
generated 131 NGOs that broadly fit my criteria including, 49 conservation NGOs, 18 
animal-welfare organizations, and 64 zoos or wildlife centers. I expect that my database 
includes most, if not all, NGOs combating illegal wildlife-pet trade in Peru during my 
study.  
I divided the NGOs into three categories according to their philosophical 
perspective toward wildlife: whether they primarily focused on (1) wildlife populations, 
(2) individual wild animals, or (3) both. For simplicity, I labelled these NGOs as 
conservation, animal-welfare, and dual-perspective, respectively. After reviewing the 
NGOs’ on-line and/or published materials, I identified 31 NGOs likely to be working to 
decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade, and of these, interviewed representatives of 28 (14 
conservation, nine animal-welfare, and five dual-perspective, Table 8). I was unable to 
interview representatives from three NGOs due to logistical constraints. All 28 NGOs 
had been working in Peru for > 5 years. They were located in eight political departments 
across Peru, and included (1) all NGOs I confirmed as working to decrease illegal 
wildlife-pet trade in Peru, (2) national NGOs with a strong potential to work in this 
arena, and (3) transnational conservation NGOs with known wildlife-trade efforts in 
other countries.   
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Table 8.  Non-governmental organizations evaluated in Peru, their perspective toward wildlife 
(conservation, animal-welfare & dual-perspective), and level of effort based on the number of 
work categories (n = 4) and work activities (n = 12) in which they participated. 
No. NGO Perspective 
Category
a
 
effort 
Activity
b
 
effort 
1. Amazon Shelter (For Animal and 
Environmental Protection) 
Dual-perspective 4 9 
2. Centro de Rescate Taricaya Dual-perspective 4 8 
3. Ikamaperu Dual-perspective 4 7 
4. Neotropical Primate Conservation (NPC) Dual-perspective 4 9 
5. Pilpintuwasi Dual-perspective 4 7 
6. Unidos por los Animales (UPA) Animal-welfare 3 5 
7. Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) Conservation 3 3 
8. Asociación Crax Perú Animal-welfare 2 2 
9. Centro de Rescate de Osos Andinos Animal-welfare 2 2 
10. Conservation International Conservation 2 2 
11. Esperanza Verde Animal-welfare 2 2 
12. La Granja Villa - Norte y Sur Animal-welfare 2 3 
13. Organización Científica para Conservación 
de Animales Acuáticos (ORCA) 
Animal-welfare 2 3 
14. Parque de las Leyendas Animal-welfare 2 3 
15. Pronaturaleza (Fundación Peruana para la 
Conservación de la Naturaleza) 
Conservation 2 2 
16. Sociedad Zoológica de Frankfurt Conservation 2 3 
17. Amazon CARES (Amazon Community 
Animal Rescue, Education and Safety) 
Animal-welfare 1 2 
18. Brigada Fauna Silvestre Animal-welfare 1 2 
19. Fauna Forever Conservation 1 1 
20. Naturaleza y Cultura Internacional Conservation 1 1 
21. World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Conservation 1 1 
22. Yunkawasi  Conservation 1 1 
23. Asociación para la Conservación de la 
Cuenca Amazónica (ACCA) 
Conservation 0 0 
24. Center for International Forestry Research 
(CIFOR) 
Conservation 0 0 
25. Centro de Conservación, Investigación y 
Manejo de Áreas Naturales (CIMA) 
Conservation 0 0 
26. Centro de Ornitología y Biodiversidad 
(CORBIDI) 
Conservation 0 0 
27. ProPurús Conservation 0 0 
28. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) Conservation 0 0 
a
 Categories: outreach, advocacy, development, and husbandry. 
b 
Activities: direct public education, indirect public education, television/radio spots, public 
protests, directly assisting authorities, policy/legislation advancement, development and 
management of conservation or protected areas, community development, natural resource 
management, research, ecotourism, wildlife rehabilitation/husbandry of individual wild animals. 
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Work activities 
To characterize the work that each NGO undertook, I evaluated 12 typical 
activities discussed in literature in which conservation and/or animal-welfare NGOs 
participate (Castro & Locker 2000; Salem & Rowan 2007). I used data gathered from 
published materials and my semi-structured interviews (see next section) to assess each 
NGO’s participation in the 12 activities during a 10-year period (2002–2012), or for 
however long the NGO had been working in Peru if < 10 years. I then assigned a 
binomial value (0 = no; 1 = yes) for each activity the NGO participated in with respect to 
decreasing illegal wildlife-pet trade. Data were not available to quantify the time spent 
or effort made within each activity, so all activities were weighted equally. For 
simplicity, and to avoid overlap among similar activities, I grouped the 12 activities into 
four general work categories: (1) Outreach (direct public education, indirect public 
education, television/radio spots), (2) Advocacy (public protests, directly assisting 
authorities (including community-level authorities), policy/legislation advancement), (3) 
Development (conservation/protected areas, community development, natural resource 
management, research, ecotourism), and (4) Husbandry (wildlife 
rehabilitation/husbandry of individual wild animals).  
The 28 NGOs were assigned a level of effort in decreasing illegal wildlife-pet 
trade depending on their participation in the four general work categories: none (no work 
categories), low (one or two categories), medium (three categories), or high (all four 
categories). To confirm that there were no specialized NGO that worked within one 
category, but with many activities, I conducted a parallel analysis of level of effort by 
summing the number of the 12 activities in which each NGO participated (possible 
values: 0-12). The results were essentially identical to the category-level analysis; 
therefore, for brevity and clarity, I report only the category-level analysis (Table 8). In 
this study, “level of effort” is an indirect measure of NGOs’ work to decrease illegal 
wildlife-pet trade based on the number and diversity of categories in which the NGOs 
participate. I assumed that highly dedicated NGOs are driven to combat the trade and use 
different tactics because (1) the perceived complexity and magnitude of the trade 
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mandates a multifaceted approach, and (2) there is a lack of dedicated single-activity 
NGOs in Peru specialized to combat one or two aspects of the trade.  
Semi-structured interviews 
I conducted semi-structured individual interviews (Peterson et al. 1994) with > 1 
member of the 28 NGOs (n = 33 interviews). An interview guide (Table 9) was used to 
provide a framework for exploring themes related to illegal wildlife-pet trade. The 
interview objectives were to (1) identify activities, if any, performed by the NGOs to 
help decrease illegal domestic wildlife-pet trade, and (2) explore the interviewees’ 
knowledge and opinion of the trade and possible motivations to combat the illegal 
domestic trade in Peru. Prospective interviewees were contacted either through email or 
by visiting the NGO’s office. I selected interviewees purposively by their level of 
knowledge regarding the NGO’s activities and/or their role with wildlife-related 
projects. All interviewees had extensive experience (> 10 years) working with NGOs in 
Peru and/or Ecuador. Interviewees were told that the purpose of the research was to 
better understand domestic wildlife (especially parrot) trade in Peru and the roles of 
different actors in the trade. Interviews were conducted in either Spanish or English 
depending on the interviewee’s preference, lasted 30–90 minutes, and 29 were 
conducted in-person and four via Skype. Interviews were digitally recorded if 
permission was granted by the interviewee (29 of 33 interviews). Hand written notes 
were taken during and immediately following interviews. All interviews were conducted 
by E. Daut during part of her yearlong field season in Peru (August 2012-July 2013).  
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Table 9.  Guiding questions for semi-structured interviews regarding NGOs’ (conservation, animal-welfare & dual-
perspective) role in decreasing illegal wildlife-pet trade in Peru. 
 
1. What is your role with the NGO? 1. ¿Cuál es su papel en la organización? 
2. How long have your worked with the NGO? 2. ¿Cuánto tiempo ha trabajado con la ONG? 
3. What are the general goals of the NGO? 3. ¿Cuáles son los objetivos generales de la ONG? 
4. What type of work does the NGO do with wildlife?  4. ¿Qué tipo de trabajo hace la ONG con la fauna silvestre? 
5. What activities does the NGO participate in to 
decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade? (if any) 
5. ¿Qué actividades realiza la ONG para reducir el comercio 
ilegal de fauna silvestre como mascotas? (si existen) 
6. What is your opinion of illegal wildlife-pet trade? 6. ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre el comercio ilegal de fauna 
silvestre como mascotas? 
7. What is the government doing to monitor or control 
the trade? 
7. ¿Qué está haciendo el gobierno para monitorizar o 
controlar el comercio? 
8. Have you observed illegal trade in the field or in the 
markets? 
8. ¿Ha observado el comercio ilegal en el campo o en los 
mercados? 
9. Can you describe an example of a positive impact of 
the activities the NGO has implemented to decrease 
the trade? 
9. ¿Puede describir un ejemplo de un impacto positivo de 
las actividades que la ONG ha realizado para reducir el 
comercio? 
10. Do you know of any other NGO that is working to 
decrease illegal wildlife trade in Peru? 
10. ¿Sabe usted de cualquier otra ONG que trabaja para 
reducir el comercio ilegal de fauna silvestre en el Perú? 
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Illegal wildlife trade themes 
I analyzed the thematic content of language used in the 29 recorded interviews to 
evaluate interviewees’ perceptions and knowledge regarding illegal wildlife-pet trade 
and their motivations to combat the trade. These interviewees represented 24 of the 28 
NGOs, and included 15 conservation, eight animal-welfare, and six dual-perspective 
interviewees. Recorded interviews were transcribed and statements pertaining to wildlife 
trade in Peru coded using Atlas.ti7 Scientific Software Development GmbH (Berlin, 
Germany).  
Four broad code categories, grounded on interview data, were used: level of 
knowledge, trend of illegal wildlife trade (IWT), aware of IWT work, and wildlife-work 
priorities. The level of knowledge code was used for any statement that reflected the 
interviewees’ knowledge (or lack thereof) and opinion regarding illegal wildlife-pet 
trade. Opinions concerning the historic trend of the trade in Peru were coded as trend of 
IWT. Statements regarding interviewees’ knowledge of specific NGOs (other than their 
own) working to decrease the trade were coded as aware of IWT work. Comments 
indicating the interviewees’ perspective toward wildlife and priority to protect individual 
wild animals or conserve wildlife species/populations and their habitat were coded as 
wildlife-work priorities. 
Interviewees’ knowledge regarding illegal wildlife-pet trade was further 
classified and coded as considerable IWT knowledge or fair IWT knowledge. I based this 
classification on the degree of detail regarding the trade, including any indication of 
personal experiences with, or observation of, illegal trade activities. “Every time we go 
to work in the communities we find all types of wild animals as pets… particularly 
monkeys” is representative of statements coded as considerable IWT knowledge. 
Whereas, “… in Iquitos, I have heard that primates are caught for medical studies… I 
don’t know how many they take from the forests” represents statements coded as fair 
IWT knowledge.  
The code awareness of IWT work was sub-coded as authority work to evaluate 
statements regarding the government’s efforts, and specifically ineffectiveness, to 
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decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade. Statements were categorized using the following three 
codes: corruption, decentralization, and not a priority. While the first and third code are 
self-explanatory, decentralization refers to the government’s policy that transferred 
oversight and control of Peru’s natural resources to regional governments (MINAG 
2007a). Codes were then sorted with respect to the three NGO categories (conservation, 
animal-welfare, and dual-perspective) for descriptive statistics.  
Comments coded as wildlife-work priorities were sub-coded as individual and 
population to reflect interviewees’ concerns for one or the other, and to evaluate what 
may drive their work priorities. Statements coded as individual indicated concern for 
individual wild-animal welfare, such as, “There was the feeling of total disgust you get, 
to see so many animals in poor condition, dirty, in small cages… monkeys with cats, 
turtles with rabbits, all types of parrots.” Statements that reflected interest in wildlife 
species and populations, including their habitat, were coded as population and are 
represented by, “The work we do with wildlife is to generate some norms for use—
hunting and fishing—to restrict the hunting of vulnerable species,” and “ The threats to 
wildlife that I see right now are primarily from habitat destruction.”  
Results 
I present the results in two parts, starting with a mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative findings to highlight differences among NGOs’ effort and activities used to 
tackle Peru’s illegal wildlife-pet trade. I follow with a qualitative presentation of 
interviewees’ perspective of wildlife and how concern for individual wild animals, 
wildlife populations, or both may influence their motivation to combat illegal trade. 
 Overall, 79% of the 28 NGOs made some effort to decrease illegal wildlife-pet 
trade in Peru (Table 10). The only NGOs that made no effort to decrease the trade, 
according to their work activities, were six conservation NGOs. More than half of the 28 
NGOs (54%) scored low for their effort to decrease the trade, while 7% made a medium 
effort. The five dual-perspective NGOs (18%) were the only ones that demonstrated high 
effort to decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade. 
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Table 10.  Percentage of conservation, animal-welfare, or dual-perspective non-governmental 
organizations’ (n) effort and participation in work categories designed to decrease illegal wildlife-pet 
trade in Peru, 2002–2012. 
Perspective 
toward wildlife 
 Categories 
Effort  Outreach
a
 Advocacy
b
 Development
c
 Husbandry
d
 
 n % n % n % n % n % 
Conservation  none 6 43 0  0  0  0  
(14) low 7 50 7 50 0  2 14 0  
 medium 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 0  
 high 0          
Animal-welfare  none 0          
(9) low 8 89 8 89 0  2 22 6 67 
 medium 1 11 1 11 1 11 0  1 11 
 high 0          
Dual-perspective none 0          
(5) low 0          
 medium 0          
 high 5 100 5 100 5 100 5 100 5 100 
a
 Outreach activities: direct public education, indirect public education, and television/radio spots.  
b 
Advocacy activities: public protests, directly assisting authorities, and policy/legislation advancement. 
c 
Development activities: development and management of conservation or protected areas, community 
development, natural resource management, research, and ecotourism. 
d
 Husbandry activities: wildlife rehabilitation/husbandry of individual wild animals. 
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Indirect public education, such as publishing posters or fliers, was the most 
common activity employed by NGOs (68%) to help decrease the trade. A typical 
conservation NGO in the study participated in one or two education campaigns 
concerning illegal wildlife-pet trade during the 10-year period evaluated. By 
comparison, animal-welfare NGOs more actively used direct and indirect public 
education to raise awareness about the trade through permanent informative billboards 
and/or weekly public presentations at their facilities.  
The dual-perspective NGOs not only employed diverse public education 
strategies to raise awareness and decrease the trade, but also systematically incorporated 
anti-trade effort throughout all four work categories (Table 10). Their efforts ranged 
from typical animal-welfare tasks, such as caring for individual wild animals, to 
traditional conservation strategies including either creating conservation areas or 
supporting natural resource management projects designed, in part, to alleviate illegal 
wildlife-pet trade. Further, all five dual-perspective NGOs were involved with research, 
conservation, and/or rehabilitation and release of threatened primate species. Direct 
public education and advocacy activities comprised the backbone of their anti-trade 
efforts. Dual-perspective interviewee P133 explained their NGO’s educational strategy 
targeting individual and population elements this way: 
You always have to focus on the education in schools and with very small 
children—so the message sticks—because, frequently they [the children] are the 
ones that ask for the animals, and the parents are going to fulfil their wish. So, on 
the one hand, there is the need to educate to reduce demand….But, it is also 
important to educate for respect of biodiversity. We are a megadiverse country 
and all of our biodiversity is passing through the markets. 
The majority of the interviewees (79%), regardless of the NGO category they 
represented, possessed considerable knowledge regarding details of illegal wildlife-pet 
trade in Peru (Fig. 12A). Only one interviewee had no knowledge of the trade, whereas 
six interviewees demonstrated fair knowledge. Of the 12 interviewees who expressed 
opinions regarding the trend of illegal wildlife-pet trade, most (83%) maintained the 
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trade was decreasing (Fig. 12B) particularly in comparison to the rampant trade in the 
1980s–1990s. Conservation interviewee P97 stressed the importance of keeping the trade 
in historic perspective and shared his first-hand experience: 
In the past [early 1970s] there was much more trade. Hundreds of thousands of 
parrots were sent through Iquitos—a gigantic operation. There was impressive 
mortality. The legal exports were 20–30 thousand birds a year, but in reality they 
captured 100–150 thousand, but most died from poor care in Iquitos. 
Two interviewees, both from dual-perspective NGOs, argued the trade was increasing 
where they worked due to vendors marketing more heavily to tourists in Amazonian 
regions. Dual-perspective interviewee P50 explained the situation this way: 
The illegal trade is getting worse because of all the tourists. They buy baby 
animals thinking they are saving them. I have been here for 30 years, and up until 
15 years ago, there never were any baby ocelots, or sloths in the market, because 
the locals know that they are difficult to raise, and they are not pets. The tourists 
think they saved them, but they do not realize that they had to kill the mother to 
get the baby. Fifteen years ago, the locals used to hunt sloth and they would feel 
bad whenever they found a baby. But now, there are so many [wildlife] “rescue” 
centers around Iquitos that exhibit animals just for the tourists, the locals know 
that the centers or tourists will buy these animals. 
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Figure 12.  Percentage of interviewees’ responses NGOs’ philosophical perspective toward 
wildlife [dual-perspective (Dual), animal-welfare (A-W) and conservation (Con)] regarding 
illegal wildlife-pet trade in Peru (October 2012–May 2013) by (A) level of knowledge about the 
trade, (B) trend of wildlife trade, and (C) awareness of high-effort NGOs working to decrease 
illegal wildlife-pet trade. Proportion of interviewees responding per NGO is listed above 
columns.  
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Of the interviewees from conservation and animal-welfare NGOs, only 24% were aware 
of the high-effort NGOs working to decrease the trade (Fig. 12C), and notably, only one 
conservationist interviewed was aware of any of the dual-perspective NGOs’ work. 
Nineteen interviewees (58%) mentioned that the Peruvian government was not 
doing enough to decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade. Seventeen of these interviewees 
offered at least one of the three primary reasons for the government’s laxity (Fig. 13). 
The most common reason mentioned was that the government did not prioritize wildlife 
as part of its effort to combat illegal commercialization of natural resources, because 
most officials regulating trade are forestry engineers and therefore focus on timber 
extraction. Animal-welfare interviewee P57 reflected on the irony of the governmental 
agency’s name responsible for managing Peru’s natural resources, the Dirección 
General Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre (General Direction of Forestry and Wildlife): 
In this case, it is the Dirección General de Forestales, because they are most 
concerned about timber harvest. Timber generates much, much more money, 
especially in comparison to wildlife…but, consequently they permit the 
destruction of habitat. So, on one side, they do not control the sale of [native] 
birds on the streets and in the markets, and on the other side, nor do they stop the 
tremendous illegal [timber] extraction. 
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Figure 13.  Percentage of non-governmental organizations interviewees’ opinions (n = 
17) regarding reasons why Peruvian government does little to tackle illegal wildlife trade 
(October 2012–May 2013): corruption, decentralization (transfer of wildlife regulation 
to regional control), and not a priority. 
 
 
Corruption was the second most common explanation for the government’s lack 
of enforcement of wildlife and natural resource conservation legislation. While 
discussing illegal wildlife trade in Peru, conservation interviewee P71 explained: 
The state has a department to monitor that it does not happen. The thing is that 
the government does not follow through with the sanctions—they are not 
fulfilled. I think the laws here are good, but not enforced. Part of the problem is 
that there is corruption—pay the judge or the police and ya, you are free. 
Another conservation interviewee P140 jokingly expressed the government’s corruption 
problem by punning the agency’s name: 
The Dirección General Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre [DGFFS], you know the 
nickname don’t you? It’s the Dirección General de Falcificación, Fraude y 
Soborno (General Direction of Falsification, Fraud and Bribery). And, I mean it’s 
true. It has to be the most corrupt place in Peru. 
Three interviewees mentioned that corruption and overall ineptitude was facilitated by 
the government’s policy to decentralize oversight and control of Peru’s natural resources 
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to regional governments. The legislative chaos that ensued was considered, in part, 
responsible for the government’s laxity with confronting illegal wildlife-pet trade. 
Although interviewees from all three types of NGOs expressed concern for 
individual animals, the level of passionate concern for individual wild animal welfare 
was most prominent and consistent from dual-perspective interviewees and considered a 
primary driver to combat illegal wildlife-pet trade. Dual-perspective interviewee P115 
said succinctly: “The first thing I have to do when I see a captured monkey [for sale or 
as a pet] is that I have to rescue it.” Dual-perspective interviewee P133 similarly 
expressed concern for wild animals for sale: 
When I go to the [animal] markets, I get this sensation, like it is a jail for the 
animals. The central market made renovations and now it is more clean and 
modern, but it is the same cruelty. It has to stop. 
There appeared to be no exclusion criteria for the type of wild animal that dual-
perspective NGOs would assist, such as taxa or abundance in the wild. According to 
dual-perspective interviewee P62, concern for the individual wild animal, regardless of 
its conservation status, motivated their NGO to action: 
The individual animals are very important to us. That is why we are more 
activists, because we want to protect individuals. It doesn’t matter if the species 
is endangered or not. For example, the capuchin monkeys…they 
[conservationists] would never spend money to protect those common species. 
We do it because we have the passion. 
While concern to help individual wild animals captured for the illegal pet trade 
was a major driver for dual-perspective interviewees, conservation of wild-animal 
populations was also frequently mentioned and considered a second important motivator 
to combat the trade. In reference to their wildlife rehabilitation efforts, interviewee P118 
explained: 
In our type of work, it is always a big debate. Do you go for population and 
habitat protection, or do you protect the individual? I think you need to go in 
between. There are many factors involved without one simple solution. What do 
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we want to protect? Ultimately, we want to protect the wild ones and we have to 
minimize any risk from animals that we introduce. 
Dual-perspective interviewees were acutely aware of the debate between individual and 
population approaches to wildlife welfare and conservation. Despite possible criticism 
from conservationists, the dual-perspective interviewees embraced their “dualness”. 
Unique among these interviewees was the affirmation of a strong connection between 
individual wild animals and wildlife populations and the importance to consider both. 
Interviewee P59 expressed their NGO’s philosophy this way: 
Specifically, we try to join the two things, populations and individuals. We deny 
a difference between the individual and the population, they are the same 
thing…, and when you worry about the welfare of the individual wild animal that 
permits you to better understand the species and stimulates more serious work 
with wild populations. 
Dual-perspective interviewee P62 elaborated further on how their NGO’s approach 
differs from a typical conservation (population) focus: 
We go out to directly help the animal. You gain awareness when you see many 
cases of suffering animals. The conservationists think they are going to save the 
wildlife populations with their studies and publications. I think they don’t 
understand the situation, because they don’t know the individual. They are more 
focused on conserving the animals because they are part of nature. Meanwhile, 
we see the wild animals as living beings that deserve protection individually—
and as part of their populations. 
Dual-perspective interviewees were not the only interviewees to express concern 
for individual wild animals. Occasionally conservation interviewees expressed concern 
for individual animals caught for the illegal wildlife-pet trade; however, the dominating 
perspective was that trade was not a serious threat to populations, as conservation 
interviewee P91 said: 
In the wild, I do not think the trade is affecting species. Despite the enormous 
numbers that are trafficked, they are still lower than what they were. It is not 
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going to affect the wildlife populations—of those species—because they 
reproduce so quickly. What is worse than the damage to the populations, for me 
what is unjustified, is the mistreatment of the animals. For me, that is 
unacceptable. 
Several animal-welfare interviewees also expressed concern for individuals, such as 
interviewee P28 who said: 
The issue that angers me most, and in which I try to help when I can, is the 
trafficking of the wildlife….I have gone to the markets, but for me, I cannot go 
much, because it is too traumatizing to see all the animals.  
However, this same interviewee explained the pragmatic reason why their NGO did not 
prioritize combating illegal wildlife-pet trade despite the impact it can have on animal 
welfare: 
Well, you have to start with something. Here in Peru, the problem with stray 
dogs is very severe, so we started with the stray dogs on the street. But we give 
funding to help wildlife rescue centers and for animal transport. 
The decision to prioritize work that addressed “severe” needs in Peru was echoed 
by many conservation interviewees. With respect to wildlife, conservation interviewees 
considered the greatest needs as habitat preservation and resource management to 
conserve wildlife species and populations. Most interviewees from conservation NGOs 
mentioned their efforts within and around protected areas to preserve forested areas 
and/or to improve community control of their natural resources, including forestry and 
hunting management. Illegal wildlife-pet trade was not considered a serious threat to 
populations and therefore not a work priority, as conservation interviewee P71 
explained: 
I do not think the wildlife trafficking is a serious problem. I do not know the 
volumes or the quantities of wildlife that are being commercialized. But, I do 
know that deforestation is a big threat, and also the big construction projects like 
the new highways and hydro-electric dams—without any environmental plans. 
 108 
 
Most interviewees, regardless of their NGO type, acknowledged that Peru has many 
human-driven activities resulting in habitat loss and degradation that threaten wildlife 
populations and biodiversity. Conservation interviewees’ concerns overwhelmingly 
prioritized these broad habitat and population-level threats and were considered a 
primary driver for their work. Interviewee P72 summarized many of the major threats 
mentioned by conservation interviewees: 
The threats to wildlife, that I see now, principally are the destruction of habitat—
the deforestation from illegal timber harvest. But, much more damaging are land 
use changes, in general, for agriculture. They [farmers] burn all the forest to 
make their crops or put their cattle—that is the worst of all—even worse than the 
[legal] mining operations. The mining operations affect a huge area, but they are 
obligated to strengthen the conservation around the area. Instead, with the 
farmers, they go and burn, then move to the next plot and nobody forces them to 
be responsible for the land….The illegal [gold] mining, on the other hand, is 
impressively damaging in Madre de Dios. Those are the big threats for 
biodiversity. 
Discussion 
My results demonstrate that NGOs in Peru are working to decrease the illegal 
wildlife-pet trade, but suggest that effort expended is related to the NGO’s philosophical 
perspective toward wildlife. Although both conservation and animal-welfare NGOs 
sometimes worked to decrease the trade, NGOs with a philosophical perspective that 
prioritized both wildlife population conservation and individual wild animal welfare 
were the most dedicated, directing most, if not all, of their work activities on the issue of 
illegal wildlife-pet trade. The dedication of these NGOs was surprising because the 
literature typically represents NGOs as either focusing on wildlife conservation or 
animal-welfare, not both (Irwin 2003; Brockington & Scholfield 2010b). However, a 
recent study demonstrated that it is not uncommon for animal welfare and conservation-
oriented citizens to share concern for both the conservation of wildlife populations and 
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welfare of individual animals (Dubois & Fraser 2013). Dual-perspective NGOs appear to 
balance commitment for both individuals and populations by not distinguishing 
differences between the two—individuals make up populations and, therefore, both are 
threatened by illegal wildlife-pet trade.  
It is reasonable to assume that firmly held wildlife-conservation and animal-
welfare values synergistically drive dual-perspective NGOs to tackle the illegal wildlife-
pet trade while many other NGOs do not. As Booth (2009) maintains, such moral 
pluralism can compound motivation. Further, all five dual-perspective NGOs are small 
and primarily volunteer-based. Previous research on motivations of volunteers suggest 
that multiple drivers exist for volunteers helping at wildlife-rehabilitation centers or with 
conservation projects (Kidd et al. 1996; Martinez & McMullin 2004). For example, 
direct hands-on and practical activities appeal to volunteers from both groups, such as 
working directly with individual animals, while long-term benefits for the environment 
and populations, such as those gained from habitat protection and public education, are 
important concerns for both conservation (Caissie & Halpenny 2003) and wildlife-
rehabilitation volunteers (Siemer et al. 1994).  
The comparatively low effort to decrease the illegal trade expended by both 
conservation and animal-welfare NGOs suggests that tackling this issue was not a 
priority for these organizations. Although most interviewees were well aware of the 
trade (Fig. 12A), and often expressed concern for the individual wild animals in the 
trade, other more severe needs appeared to motivate conservation and animal-welfare 
NGOs. Domestic animal welfare was the primary driver for the few “traditional” animal-
welfare organizations included in the study, while zoo and wildlife rescue centers 
prioritized providing care for their captive animals—a costly commitment, particularly 
with a never ending supply of confiscated wild animals for which to care. It is also 
possible that the animal-welfare NGOs did not prioritize anti-trade work because they 
were aware of the efforts of the dual-perspective NGOs and did not feel obligated to 
duplicate such work (Fig. 12C). 
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Conservation interviewees clearly prioritized conservation of wildlife 
populations and mitigating serious threats caused by habitat degradation and resource 
misuse. Further, because the illegal wildlife trade in Peru is largely composed of 
common species (Ríos et al. 2008), and the general opinion that the trade had decreased 
over time (Fig. 12B), conservation NGOs were consistent with the mission formalized 
by Soulé (1986). It was surprising, however, that so little collaboration existed between 
conservation and dual-perspective NGOs, particularly with respect to the dual-
perspective NGOs’ conservation and rehabilitation efforts of threatened primates. Many 
large conservation NGOs are involved with wildlife rehabilitation projects in other 
countries (e.g., Conservation International 2012; Wildlife Alliance 2014). Dual-
perspective interviewees claimed they were rebuffed by the large conservation NGOs 
following many proposals for collaborative projects. Because only one conservation 
interviewee acknowledged knowing of the anti-trade work conducted by the dual-
perspective NGOs (Fig. 12C), it may be that the dual-perspective NGOs need to better 
promote their work. 
Most interviewees strongly agreed that the Peruvian government should do more 
to combat illegal wildlife-pet trade (Fig. 13). In many cases, interviewees implied that 
control of the trade was the government’s responsibility (despite the governments lack of 
interest and corruption) and beyond the scope of their NGO’s work. Allegations of 
governmental corruption and ineptness are not novel. Previous studies have documented 
the Peruvian government’s poor regulation and control of the country’s natural resources 
(Sears & Pinedo-Vasquez 2011; Swenson et al. 2011; Urrunaga et al. 2012), including 
wildlife (Shanee 2012). The degree of official corruption, however, including 
accusations of local authorities as wildlife traffickers, was alarming, but unfortunately 
not unique to Peru (Christy 2010; Kakabadse 2011).  
I equated NGOs’ effort to decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade to the number and 
diversity of categories in which they work. In theory, an NGO could be highly dedicated 
to decreasing trade by focusing effort within one of the four work categories or even just 
one of the 12 activities I evaluated. However, I found no evidence of this from the 28 
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NGOs in my study. It appears that the NGOs strongly interested in decreasing illegal 
wildlife-pet trade—the dual-perspective NGOs—deliberately used multifaceted 
approaches to pursue their goals. I suspect the reason may be a consequence of the 
interconnected elements of illegal trade and the NGOs dedication to tackle multiple 
aspects of the trade as part of an integrated program. For example, awareness of the 
challenges of caring for confiscated wildlife could lead to assisting authorities during 
market raids, followed by public education to decrease demand for wildlife pets and 
establishing protected areas to decrease illegal harvest.  
Although, the five dual-perspective NGOs represent only 4% of the original 131 
NGOs I identified, they appear to be having a positive impact. Two areas of Peru now 
have less illegal wildlife-pet trade largely due to their efforts. The first is Lima, Peru’s 
capital, where the municipality recently closed the largest and most historic animal 
market in an effort to decrease illegal wildlife-pet trade, mistreatment of animals, and 
risks to public health (Anon. 2013). Municipality officials stated that years of pressure 
from animalistas (animal activists), and changing public sentiment, helped decrease the 
trade, and was what motivated them to close the market (A. Anicama, Municipalidad de 
Lima, personal communication). Wildlife authorities suspect that closing the market will 
decrease illegal trade further, because it will make it more difficult for illicit vendors to 
sell wildlife and it sends a clear message to society that the municipality is taking illegal 
trade more seriously (C. Abramonte, Administración Técnica Forestal y de Fauna 
Silvestre, personal communication). The second area includes the city of Tarapoto and 
rural communities along the eastern Andean slopes in northern Peru. Two dual-
perspective NGOs have worked a combined 22 years educating the public about 
consequences of illegal wildlife-pet trade on individual animals and populations, and 
increasing government effort to tackle trafficking in this area (Shanee 2012).  
It is unclear which strategies are most effective for decreasing illegal wildlife-pet 
trade in domestic markets. Although rarely discussed in the scientific literature, raising 
public awareness about the harm illegal wildlife trade has on individual animal welfare 
may be an effective tool to help reduce the wildlife trade (Baker et al. 2013). Raising 
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awareness, increasing enforcement, decreasing demand, offering market alternatives, 
and improving regulation of sustainable harvest are all commonly discussed strategies, 
and individually have been successfully implemented by NGOs. Targeted education 
campaigns by NGOs have decreased demand for parrots in Saint Lucia (Jenks et al. 
2010), rhino horn in Yemen (Vigne & Martin 2013), and shahtoosh in India (Misra 
2003). Strategies promoted by NGOs to increase enforcement of domestic wildlife 
statutes have helped conserve snakes in China (Jiang et al. 2013). Further research is 
needed, however, to evaluate the effectiveness of the array of strategies used to decrease 
illegal wildlife trade under various ecological and socio-economic conditions. I 
encourage the conservation and animal-welfare communities to engage in evidence-
based research and systematic reviews to assist on-the-ground efforts to decrease all 
forms of illegal wildlife trade (Pullin & Knight 2001; Blumstein 2013). 
Conclusion 
Illegal wildlife trade is driven by complex socio-economic factors (Singh 2008; 
TRAFFIC 2008; Nekaris et al. 2010). Response by Peru’s most dedicated NGOs 
combating the trade is equally complex, in part, because illegal wildlife-pet trade is at 
the intersection of wildlife conservation and animal welfare. Nowhere else are these two 
philosophical perspectives wedded so closely in terms of numbers of individuals traded 
and species threatened by the trade. My findings that dual-perspective NGOs make more 
effort than either conservation or animal-welfare NGOs to decrease the illegal wildlife-
pet trade implies their willingness to tackle the complexity of the trade—a willingness 
driven by their motivation to prioritize both individual wild animals and wildlife 
populations. Because many NGOs combating illegal wildlife-pet trade are small and 
volunteer-based, I recommend that NGOs consider developing a dual focus for their 
anti-trade efforts that addresses both individual wild animals and wildlife populations to 
attract motivated volunteers to further their causes. Stakeholders, including governments 
as well as large international conservation and animal-welfare NGOs, searching for 
partners dedicated to decreasing illegal wildlife-pet trade should consider NGOs with 
integrated dual perspectives toward wildlife.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
My dissertation adds to the limited knowledge regarding the scale, regulation and 
potential health consequences of legal and illegal wildlife, particularly avian, trade in 
Peru. The methodological approaches I used and many of my research findings could be 
applied to illegal wildlife trade systems in other countries. Specifically, I addressed (1) 
the magnitude and composition of the Peru’s domestic pet-bird market and the influence 
of legal export quotas on the illegal native bird trade for domestic consumers, (2) the 
consequences of a hypothetical introduction of an infectious pathogen, Newcastle 
disease virus, into a susceptible population of wild white-winged parakeets and the 
utility of epidemic threshold values, and (3) the role of NGOs in combating illegal 
wildlife-pet trade in Peru and how different philosophical perspectives toward wildlife 
influence NGOs' effort. The following is a summary of the major findings of my 
dissertation research. I end with recommendations to decrease illegal wildlife trade in 
Peru and future research needs to fill knowledge gaps. 
In Chapter II, through analysis of a five-year market study, I determined that 
Peru had an extensive illegal trade in wild-caught native birds, predominantly 
psittacines, for the domestic pet market. I found that Peru’s current legal quota system, 
which started in 2001, had little influence on avian species abundance in domestic 
markets. While the current legal export trade did not facilitate illegal domestic trade, 
regression analyses demonstrated that high historic export trade increased avian species 
abundance in the markets. This indicates that banning export trade would likely not 
eliminate Peru’s domestic trade and raises the importance of historic export trade. High 
export trade of native birds in the 1960s and 1970s helped create Peru’s domestic market 
and is now essentially a proxy for the established tradition of trade in native birds to 
fulfill demand from domestic consumers. In Chapter III, using mathematical models, I 
demonstrated that illegal bird trade could theoretically expose a susceptible population 
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of white-winged parakeets to ND provoking an outbreak with considerable disease-
related mortality. High harvest rates would dampen the magnitude of the outbreak. 
Lower, more “realistic” estimates of the basic reproduction number (R0) were generated 
when ND transmission was modeled including age-structure versus a homogenous 
parakeet population. My results should encourage conservation scientists to use age-
structured infectious disease modeling as an informative tool to investigate potential 
synergistic effects of disease and illegal trade on wildlife populations.  
In Chapter IV, I extended the discussion of the importance of epidemic threshold 
values (R0) to the wildlife rehabilitation community and demonstrated that, as an 
example, a single infected raccoon released into a susceptible population could provoke 
an outbreak of distemper. Increased awareness of wildlife disease transmission and 
dynamics should motivate wildlife rehabilitators to ensure their patients are free of 
infectious pathogens prior to release. In Chapter V, I used a qualitative approach to 
demonstrate that many NGOs in Peru were working to decrease the illegal wildlife-pet 
trade, but the effort expended was related to the NGOs’ philosophical perspective toward 
wildlife. The NGOs most dedicated to combating the illegal trade had a dual 
philosophical perspective that prioritized both wildlife population conservation and 
individual wild animal welfare. This indicates that stakeholders and governments 
searching for committed collaborators to help curb illegal wildlife trade should consider 
approaching NGOs with integrated conservation and animal-welfare perspectives toward 
wildlife.  
Recommendations 
The drivers, consequences, and mitigation of illegal wildlife trade are 
complicated, as indicated, for instance, by the non-linear relationship between legal and 
illegal trade. Given the complexity, each trade system should be evaluated independently 
to understand the unique elements involved and, as such, provides an ideal opportunity 
to develop interdisciplinary scientific collaboration. By working together, conservation 
and animal-welfare scientists along with criminologists, economists, and conservation 
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psychologists offer complementary approaches to document impacts of illegal trade, 
improve understanding of drivers, and develop effective mitigation strategies including 
integrated programs to reduce supply and demand. With mounting evidence 
documenting illegal wildlife trade for domestic consumers, collaborative research efforts 
should increase focus on illegal trade within source countries and take advantage of local 
and regional NGOs with expertise combating domestic trade.    
Increased globalization and demand for exotic animal pets has created worldwide 
movement of wild-caught and captive-bred animals, and with them, potential pathogens. 
While the risk of spreading infectious diseases from illegal wildlife trade on a national 
level is considerable, the risk and potential consequences are greater on an international 
level where infectious pathogens could be introduced across continents. Increased 
collaboration between wildlife ecologists and epidemiologists is needed to provide the 
knowledge and specific data on wildlife population demographics and disease dynamics. 
This information then needs to be linked with global trade figures, economic drivers and 
policy measures to help develop realistic risk assessments and simulation models to 
better understand the potential outcome of introduced infectious diseases via global 
wildlife trade.    
In Peru, I am optimistic that coordinated mitigation and strong political will 
could swiftly decrease supply and demand for illegally-captured wildlife for the 
domestic pet market. I include the following recommendations, based on my research 
findings and experiences in Peru, to assist the government and relevant stakeholders 
decrease the illegal wildlife trade. 
(1) Increase training of wildlife authorities and national and municipal police in 
wildlife species identification, confiscation records management and proper 
handling and basic husbandry. Several identification guides for commonly 
confiscated species already exist and should be made widely available in print 
and electronic form. Additional information regarding confiscation and 
husbandry protocols could be provided in short training videos with help from 
wildlife rescue centers, zoological parks and relevant NGOs. 
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(2) Increase enforcement of wildlife legislation in primary source regions, 
particularly ports and markets in the Amazonian cities Iquitos and Pucallpa, 
before the captured animals leave their native habitat and are transported long 
distances to Lima and other coastal cities. Sentencing guidelines should be 
established and widely distributed to local prosecutors, judges, and the media to 
increase the perception that illegal wildlife trade is a serious crime. Penalties 
should be extended to include owners of transport companies (shipping and 
trucking) from which wildlife are confiscated to increase accountability. Also, 
penalties should be increased for trafficking wild animals that have been 
“altered” in some form, such as cutting birds’ wing feathers to prevent flight and 
dying feathers to change appearance. Such alterations greatly increase the time 
required in rehabilitation and diminish chances of release back to the wild. 
(3) Improve transparency and promotion of enforcement of wildlife legislation by 
publicizing every wildlife confiscation and outcome through coordination with 
the media, and writing press releases and posts on departmental websites. Several 
NGOs have active websites that could serve as links to improve public relations, 
and combat the image of governmental corruption, especially within the 
conservation and animal-welfare communities. 
(4) Coordinate more effectively with NGOs working to decrease the illegal wildlife 
trade, including wildlife rescue centers and zoological parks, to assist with 
confiscations, quarantine and rehabilitation of individuals. Increase collaboration 
with veterinary colleges to assist with physical exams and diagnostic testing of 
confiscated animals. 
(5) Coordinate public-education campaigns with pet industry representatives (i.e., 
pet-supply companies, breeder associations, veterinary colleges and associations) 
to demonstrate the benefits of owning captive-bred pets and to increase stigma 
for purchasing a wild-caught native species, as native wildlife are a critical part 
of Peru’s unique cultural and biodiversity heritage.  
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(6) Coordinate public-education campaigns with the Tourism Ministry (Ministerio 
de Comercio Exterior y Turismo) and international and national tourism 
companies to raise awareness of Peru’s wildlife conservation legislation to 
decrease purchase of wildlife and their derivatives, and to cultivate respect and 
national pride to conserve Peru’s distinguished role as a megabiodiverse country.  
(7) Encourage collaboration among NGOs working to decrease illegal wildlife trade 
to maximize the outcome of their efforts. Large, well-funded, conservation 
NGOs should consider partnering with smaller, dual-perspective NGOs that have 
established community-based and social-media networks for public education 
programs. 
Future research 
My dissertation provides a foundation to investigate future research questions, 
for example:  
(1) How does supply and demand interact to drive Peru’s domestic pet bird 
trade? In case of the most abundant native bird illegally for sale in Peru’s 
market, Brotogeris versicolurus, it appears that the market may be supply 
driven. For other species, such as larger psittacines that have good talking 
abilities, high consumer demand appears to drive the trade. Understanding the 
drivers of the trade would help design best practices to decrease the illegal trade, 
such as providing consumers options of captive-bred (native or exotic) birds.  
(2) How could Peru’s nascent aviculture industry develop to fulfill demand for 
pet birds from domestic consumers? Captive-bred exotic birds such as 
Australian parakeets and canaries made up 62% of the entire pet bird market 
during our study, indicating strong demand and potential for exotic birds to 
serve as conservation “green” substitutes for consumers. Many aviculturists 
expressed interest in expanding breeding operations to include more exotic 
species and native birds, but stringent governmental regulations limit 
opportunities. However, consumer preferences are unknown. For example, do 
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consumers prefer exotic or native birds as pets? Could consumers be persuaded 
to purchase captive-bred individuals to benefit conservation of Peruvian 
species?   
(3) How would ND transmission dynamics change when additional host species 
such as other parrots and poultry are involved? Many parrot species are 
susceptible to ND, and while feeding together at fruiting trees or clay licks, 
individuals could be potentially exposed to ND. Furthermore, along with the 
growing human population in many Amazonian regions, so are the formal and 
informal poultry operations, which increase the potential risk for disease 
transmission between domestic and wild birds.  
(4) What are the most effective mitigating strategies to decrease Peru’s illegal 
wildlife-pet trade? Peru’s NGOs use various tactics to decrease illegal trade, 
such as public education and policy development, but the outcomes and cost-
effectiveness of their efforts are unclear. Improved understanding of the most 
effective mitigating strategies would assist efforts to combat illegal wildlife-pet 
trade throughout the region.   
By most measures, native wildlife populations are doing poorly (Pimm & Raven 
2000; Sitas et al. 2009; Butchart et al. 2010; Hoffmann et al. 2010). Illegal wildlife trade 
for the pet industry contributes to the decline of many populations of wildlife species, in 
addition to compromising individual animal-welfare, and being a source of potential 
disease transmission—grim consequences simply to fulfill demand for pets. Arguably, 
having a wild-caught animal as a pet is not a requirement to sustain life, and differs from 
other types of wildlife trade that have long-standing cultural traditions associated with 
perceived medicinal benefits and/or consumption for sustenance. Decreasing illegal 
wildlife trade will require coordinated efforts at local, national, regional and 
international scales, starting with increased knowledge and appreciation of nuanced 
features of specific trade systems. My dissertation provides an example of how natural 
and social science research approaches were used to improve understanding of Peru’s 
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illegal wildlife trade system. It is my hope that my findings will encourage the scientific 
community to similarly investigate other trade systems.    
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APPENDIX A  
DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Detailed explanation for 16 independent variables used in my analysis of export 
quotas and avian abundance in Peruvian animal markets and in governmental 
seizure records (2007–2011).  
 
Biological factors: 
Region: one of the four major biogeographical regions where species were most 
predominantly distributed in Peru: Amazon basin, dry forest, coastal plains, and Andean 
mountains (Schulenberg et al. 2007). For the parrots-only subset model, this variable 
was condensed into two regions, Amazon and non-Amazon. 
Range (km
2
): estimates of the size of wild geographical ranges of native species in Peru 
based on shapefiles used for distribution maps in Birds of Peru guide (Schulenberg et al. 
2007). Values were calculated using ArcGIS software V.10 (Esri, Redlands, CA) 
directly from the polygon data.   
Abundance: a 3-point scale of wild-range abundance based on Birds of Peru guide 
(Schulenberg et al. 2007): 1 = vagrant to uncommon, 2 = uncommon-fairly common to 
fairly common-common, and 3 = common to abundant. For species that had > 2 distinct 
geographical areas with different abundances, I used the higher abundance. For the 
parrots-only subset model, abundance was condensed into a 2-point scale: 1 = vagrant to 
uncommon-fairly common and 2 = fairly common to abundant. An abundance score was 
unavailable for one species, Phoenicopterus chilensis. 
Conservation rank: a binomial scale for the conservation status of native birds included 
in the study based on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (2013b) and on Peru’s 
2004 list of threatened species (MINAG 2004): 1 = least concern, 2 = near threatened, 
vulnerable, or endangered. I used the more threatened status for those species that were 
included on both IUCN and Peru lists.    
Capture: a 3-point ease-of-capture scale of how easily individuals of avian species 
recorded in the study can be captured from the wild, for example by removing chicks 
from nests, using mist nets or other types of traps such as bal-chatri traps or a 
combination of methods:  1 = easy, 2 = moderate, and 3 = difficult.   
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Body mass (gm; log-transformed): a measure of avian body size (Dunning Jr. 2008) was 
available for 146 of the 150 species included in the study. A sympatric substitute with 
similar body dimensions was used for three species. I was unable to obtain a published 
weight or suitable substitute for one species, Piezorhina cinerea. When male and female 
values were available, I used an average. For the parrots-only subset model, body mass 
and price were highly correlated (VIF > 5); I retained the price variable as it contributed 
more to the model.   
Color (square-root transformed): a composite, unit-less, value based on the number of 
contrasting colors of male plumage, (if sexually dimorphic), per species x the % of body 
coverage of those contrasting colors, based on color plates in Birds of Peru bird guide 
(Schulenberg et al. 2007). I defined contrasting colors as primary colors not typically 
found in background (terrestrial) nature and include: red, orange, yellow, blue, indigo, 
violet, and white. Only obviously contrasting shades of the same primary color were 
counted as separate colors, such as dark aquamarine blue and powder blue. Only colors 
easily observable on a bird in a perched or standing position were considered and 
included contour, tail and wing feathers (top sides) and colors around the eye and face 
patch. I did not include color of the beak, iris, legs or feet.  
Voice: a 3-point scale of the species’ ability to mimic sounds ("talk" in the case of 
parrots) or to sing in complex and/or pleasing sounds. I used on-line resources 
(http://www.all-pet-birds.com/parrot-characteristics.html) and expert opinion to gauge 
parrots' talking ability and the “Xeno-Canto” website (http://www.xeno-canto.org/) to 
listen to birds’ songs and to subjectively rank them on the pleasantness of their song: 1 = 
poor talking ability or simple/harsh vocalizations, 2 = medium talking ability or semi-
pleasing vocalizations, and 3 = excellent talking ability or pleasing/complex singing 
vocalizations. 
Trade factors: 
Current quota
a
 (square-root transformed): summed national commercial harvest 
(export) quotas for native avian species (2007-2011) recorded in the market survey 
and/or seizure records during the study (MINAG 2007b, 2008, 2009, 2011).  
Past quota
a
 (square-root transformed): summed national commercial harvest (export) 
quotas for native avian species (2001-2006) recorded in the market survey or seizure 
records during the study (e.g., MINAG 2001b). 
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Total quota
a
 (square-root transformed): summed national commercial harvest (export) 
quotas for native avian species (2001-2011) recorded in the market survey or seizure 
records during the study. 
Quota years
a
: summed number of years (2001-2011) with national commercial harvest 
(export) quotas for native avian species recorded in the market survey or seizure records 
during the study.  
U.S. import (log-transformed): summed imports of avian species originating from Peru 
during 1970-1974 (Clapp & Banks 1973b; Clapp & Banks 1973a; Clapp 1975; 
Greenhall 1977) and 1980-1989 (Nilsson 1985, 1989, 1990, 1992). The United States 
was the major importer of Neotropical birds during the 1970s and 1980s (Thomsen & 
Mulliken 1992), and I considered these values more reliable than CITES permit records 
because CITES permits may be issued but not used.  
CITES permit (log-transformed): summed export permit values of native birds from 
Peru listed in CITES trade database from 1975-1979 and 1990-2006 (CITES 2014b). 
CITES records were based on gross export reports from Peru and the search criteria 
included: all import countries, wild sources, all trade purposes and live animals.  
Price (U.S. dollar; square-root transformed): selling prices given to us by vendors of 
native birds (mostly parrot species) in markets during the study period. In most cases, 
only one value was collected per species; however, whenever multiple values were 
collected, either in the same city or in different cities, the values were averaged. Values 
were converted from Peruvian nuevos soles to U.S. dollars using the average conversion 
rate during the study period (http://usd.fx-exchange.com/pen/). For the parrots-only 
subset model, price and body mass were highly correlated (VIF > 5); I retained the price 
variable as it contributed more to the model. 
CITES Status: a binomial scale to classify native birds recorded in the study as (1) not 
listed on any CITES Appendix, or (2) listed on either Appendix I or II (CITES 2013). 
None of the avian species included in the study were listed on CITES Appendix III. For 
the parrots-only subset model, the CITES Status variable was not included because all 
species were listed on either Appendix I or II. 
a
 The four quota variables (current quota, past quota, total quota and quota years) were 
highly correlated (VIF > 5); I retained only quota years to reduce multi-collinearity. 
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APPENDIX B 
AVIAN SPECIES IN MARKETS AND SEIZURES  
 
 
 
 
Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Accipiter striatus Sharp-shinned Hawk  1  II 
Accipitridae Hawk 46    
Agapornis fischeri
c
 Fischer's Lovebird 1,560   II 
Agapornis personatus
c
 Yellow-collared Lovebird 2,271   II 
Agapornis roseicollis
c
 Peach-faced Lovebird 2,512   II 
Agapornis sp.
c
 Lovebird 325    
Amazona aestiva
d
 Turquoise-fronted Amazon 19 3  II 
Amazona amazonica Orange-winged Amazon 1,027 120  II 
Amazona farinosa Southern Mealy Amazon 272 51  II 
Amazona festiva Southern Festive Amazon 520 33  II 
Amazona mercenarius Scaly-naped Amazon 12 10  II 
Amazona ochrocephala Yellow-crowned Amazon 351 17  II 
Amazona sp. Amazon Parrot 11 26   
Anatidae Wild Duck 6    
Andigena hypoglauca Grey-breasted Mountain-toucan   2   
Anhima cornuta Horned Screamer 29    
Anisognathus igniventris Scarlet-bellied Mountain-tanager    500  
Anisognathus somptuosus Blue-winged Mountain-tanager   200  
Table B1.  Number of avian species (native, regional, exotic and ornamental) observed for sale in animal markets in nine 
Peruvian cities, recorded in government seizures, and/ or with commercial harvest (export) quotas (2007–2011). CITES 
trade status according to Appendices. 
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Ara ararauna Blue-and-yellow Macaw 115 24  II 
Ara chloropterus Red-and-green Macaw 82 10  II 
Ara macao Scarlet Macaw 47 15  I 
Ara militaris Military Macaw 7 4  I 
Ara severus Chestnut-fronted Macaw 52 3  II 
Ara sp. Macaw 41 17   
Aramides cajaneus Grey-necked Wood-rail 16    
Aratinga weddellii Dusky-headed Parakeet 609 217 5,000 II 
Ardea alba Great White Egret 1    
Ardea cocoi Cocoi Heron 19    
Ardeidae Heron 4    
Arremon abeillei Black-capped Sparrow 2    
Asio clamator Striped Owl 2   II 
Athene cunicularia Burrowing Owl 22 5  II 
 Bird  13,285   
Bolborhynchus orbygnesius Andean Parakeet 49   II 
Brotogeris chiriri
d
 Yellow-chevroned Parakeet 5   II 
Brotogeris cyanoptera Cobalt-winged Parakeet 2,568 58 5,000 II 
Brotogeris pyrrhoptera Grey-cheeked Parakeet 216 4  II 
Brotogeris sanctithomae Tui Parakeet 1,349 51 4,350 II 
Brotogeris sp. Parrot 11 1,403   
Brotogeris versicolurus White-winged Parakeet 12,093 5,012 5,000 II 
Bubo sp. Owl  2   
Bubo virginianus Great Horned Owl 3 5  II 
Burhinus superciliaris Peruvian Thick-knee  1  100  
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Busarellus nigricollis Black-collared Hawk 7   II 
Buteo sp. Hawk 1    
Buteogallus meridionalis Savanna Hawk 7   II 
Buteogallus solitarius Black Solitary Eagle  1  II 
Butorides striata Striated Heron 31    
Cacicus cela Yellow-rumped Cacique    500  
Capito auratus Gilded Barbet    60  
Capito aurovirens Scarlet-crowned Barbet 7    
Caprimulgidae Nightjar 2    
Caracara plancus Southern Caracara   1  II 
Carduelis atrata Black Siskin    15,000  
Carduelis magellanica Hooded Siskin    15,300  
Carduelis sp. Siskin 283 7   
Carduelis uropygialis Yellow-rumped Siskin    150  
Catamenia analis Band-tailed Seedeater 3  900  
Cathartes aura Turkey Vulture   600  
Celeus sp. Woodpecker 8    
Cephalopterus ornatus Amazonian Umbrellabird 1    
Chloroceryle amazona Amazon Kingfisher 1    
Chloroceryle sp.  Kingfisher 18    
Chlorophanes spiza Green Honeycreeper    300  
Chlorophonia cyanea Blue-naped Chlorophonia    1,200  
Chrysomus icterocephalus Yellow-hooded Blackbird 4  1,200  
Ciccaba virgata Mottled Owl  1  II 
Cissopis leverianus Magpie Tanager   300  
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Claravis pretiosa Blue Ground-dove 16  2,700  
Cochlearius cochlearius Boat-billed Heron 3    
Coereba flaveola Bananaquit   1,200  
Colonia colonus Long-tailed Tyrant   60  
Columbidae Dove 18    
Columbina cruziana Croaking Ground-dove  311  8,500  
Columbina minuta Plain-breasted Ground-dove    900  
Columbina talpacoti Ruddy Ground-dove 5  2,000  
Coragyps atratus Black Vulture 1 2 1,400 II 
Coryphospingus cucullatus Red-crested Finch 10  300  
Crotophaga major Greater Ani 18  120  
Crypturellus undulatus Undulated Tinamou 36 8   
Cyanerpes caeruleus Purple Honeycreeper   1,200  
Cyanocorax mystacalis White-tailed Jay 71  2,400  
Cyanocorax sp. Jay 4    
Cyanocorax violaceus Violaceous Jay  5    
Cyanocorax yncas Green Jay 6  3,000  
Dacnis flaviventer Yellow-bellied Dacnis   120  
Dacnis lineata Black-faced Dacnis   150  
Dives warszewiczi Scrub Blackbird 2,041    
Erythrura gouldiae
c
 Gouldian Finch 157    
Euphonia chlorotica Purple-throated Euphonia    800  
Euphonia minuta White-vented Euphonia   1,200  
Euphonia saturata Orange-crowned Euphonia 1    
Euphonia sp. Euphonia 8    
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Euphonia xanthogaster Orange-bellied Euphonia   1,200  
Eurypyga helias Sunbittern 38    
Falco femoralis Aplomado Falcon  9  II 
Falco peregrinus Peregrine Falcon 3 15  I 
Falco sp. Falcon  6   
Falco sparverius American Kestrel 43 15  II 
Falconidae Falcon  8   
Forpus coelestis Pacific Parrotlet 3,504 70 600 II 
Forpus sp. Parrotlet 29 110   
Forpus xanthops
e
 Yellow-faced Parrotlet 24 22  II 
Forpus xanthopterygius Blue-winged Parrotlet  46   II 
Gampsonyx swainsonii Pearl Kite 1   II 
Geothlypis aequinoctialis Masked Yellowthroat    60  
Geranoaetus melanoleucus Black-crested Buzzard-Eagle 3 13  II 
Geranoaetus polyosoma Variable Hawk 11 10  II 
Geranoaetus sp. Hawk  2   
Glaucidium brasilianum Ferruginous Pygmy-owl 1   II 
Glaucidium sp. Pygmy Owl 7    
Graydidascalus brachyurus Short-tailed Parrot 279 1  II 
Harpagus bidentatus Double-toothed Kite  4  II 
Harpia harpyja Harpy Eagle  1  II 
Herpsilochmus sp. Antwren 3    
Hylatomus lineatus Lineated Woodpecker 2    
Icterus croconotus Orange-backed Troupial   300  
Icterus graceannae White-edged Oriole 180  1,500  
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Icterus mesomelas Yellow-tailed Oriole    750  
Jacana jacana Wattled Jacana 40    
Knipolegus aterrimus White-winged Black-tyrant   60  
Leptotila pallida Pallid Dove 3    
Leptotila sp. Dove 33    
Leptotila verreauxi White-tipped Dove 2  1,000  
Lonchura striata
c
 White-rumped Munia  747    
Megaceryle torquata Ringed Kingfisher 47    
Megascops choliba Tropical Screech-owl 3   II 
Megascops watsonii Tawny-bellied Screech-owl 1   II 
Melanerpes cruentatus Yellow-tufted Woodpecker   100  
Melopsittacus undulatus
c
 Budgerigar 43,521    
Mesembrinibis cayennensis Green Ibis 4    
Metriopelia ceciliae Bare-faced Ground-dove 4  3,000  
Metriopelia melanoptera Black-winged Ground-dove   1,500  
Milvago chimachima Yellow-headed Caracara 2   II 
Mimus longicaudatus Long-tailed Mockingbird 195  1,200  
Mitu tuberosum Razor-billed Curassow 21    
Molothrus bonariensis Shiny Cowbird 65    
Momotus momota Amazonian Motmot    300  
Myiopsitta monachus
d
 Monk Parakeet 2   II 
Myiozetetes similis Social Flycatcher    280  
Neopsephotus bourkii
c
 Bourke's Parrot 2   II 
Nothocrax urumutum Nocturnal Curassow 1    
Nothoprocta ornata Ornate Tinamou    800  
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Nothoprocta sp. Tinamou 8    
Nyctibius grandis Great Potoo  1   
Nyctibius griseus Common Potoo 1    
Nyctibius sp. Potoo 1    
Nycticorax nycticorax Black-crowned Night-heron  4   
Nyctidromus albicollis Pauraque 1    
Nymphicus hollandicus
c
 Cockatiel 2,172    
Opisthocomus hoazin Hoatzin 4  50  
Ortalis guttata Speckled Chachalaca 81 1   
Orthopsittaca manilatus Red-bellied Macaw 40   II 
Oryzoborus angolensis Lesser Seed Finch    400  
Padda oryzivora
c
 Java Sparrow 212   II 
Pandion haliaetus Osprey  1  II 
Parabuteo unicinctus Harris's Hawk 8 25  II 
Paroaria coronata
d
 Red-crested Cardinal 279   II 
Paroaria gularis Red-capped Cardinal 28  1,500  
Passer domesticus
d
 House Sparrow 17    
Passeridae Songbird 69    
Patagioenas albilinea Southern Band-tailed Pigeon 7  1,000  
Patagioenas cayennensis Pale-vented Pigeon 11    
Patagioenas oenops Peruvian Pigeon 4    
Pelecanus sp. Pelican  1   
Penelope jacquacu Spix's Guan 70    
Penelope sp. Guan  1   
Phalacrocorax Guanay Cormorant  2   
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
bougainvilliorum 
Phalacrocorax brasilianus Neotropical Cormorant 6 2   
Phalcoboenus megalopterus Mountain caracara  5  II 
Phalcoboenus sp. Caracara  1   
Pheucticus aureoventris Black-backed Grosbeak    3,000  
Pheucticus chrysogaster Golden-bellied Grosbeak 155  6,000  
Pheucticus sp. Grosbeak 4    
Phoenicopterus chilensis Chilean Flamingo  1  II 
Phrygilus fruticeti Mourning Sierra-finch    800  
Picidae Woodpecker 15    
Piezorhina cinerea
e
 Cinereous Finch 64  600  
Pionites melanocephalus Black-headed Parrot 74 1  II 
Pionites sp. Parrot 33 6   
Pionites xanthomerius Black-legged Parrot 17 7  II 
Pionus chalcopterus Bronze-winged Parrot 89 5  II 
Pionus menstruus Blue-headed Parrot 232 34  II 
Pionus sordidus Red-billed Parrot 3   II 
Pionus sp. Parrot  2   
Pionus tumultuosus Plum-crowned Parrot 1   II 
Pipile sp. Piping-guan  2   
Pipra erythrocephala Golden-headed Manakin    60  
Pitangus sulphuratus Great Kiskadee 9    
Plegadis ridgwayi Puna Ibis   100  
Poephila acuticauda
c
 Long-tailed Finch 1    
Poephila personata
c
 Masked Finch 4    
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Poospiza hispaniolensis Collard Warbling-finch 183  5,550  
Porphyrio martinicus Purple Gallinule 2    
Psarocolius angustifrons Russet-backed Oropendola   800  
Psarocolius decumanus Crested Oropendola    120  
Pseudastur occidentalis  Grey-backed Hawk 2   II 
Psilopsiagon aurifrons Mountain Parakeet 202   II 
Psittacara erythrogenys Red-masked Parakeet  1,072 73  II 
Psittacara frontatus Cordilleran Parakeet 493 50 6,050 II 
Psittacara leucophthalmus White-eyed Parakeet 775 146  II 
Psittacara mitratus Mitred Parakeet 126 7 5,000 II 
Psittacara sp. Parakeet 35 95   
Psittacidae Parrot 117 106   
Psophia crepitans Grey-winged Trumpeter 16 2   
Pteroglossus azara Ivory-billed Aracari    50  
Pteroglossus castanotis Chestnut-eared Aracari 25 1 60  
Pteroglossus inscriptus Lettered Aracari 4    
Pteroglossus sp. Aracari 48    
Pulsatrix perspicillata Spectacled Owl 1   II 
Pyrilia barrabandi Orange-cheeked Parrot 19   II 
Pyrrhura roseifrons Rose-fronted Parakeet 4   II 
Pyrrhura sp. Parakeet 15    
Rallidae Rail 1    
Ramphastos ambiguus Yellow-throated Toucan  1   
Ramphastos culminatus Yellow-ridged Toucan 1   II 
Ramphastos cuvieri Cuvier's Toucan 12 3  II 
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Ramphastos sp. Toucan 24 1   
Ramphastos toco Toco Toucan  1  II 
Ramphocelus carbo Silver-beaked Tanager 95  1,500  
Ramphocelus nigrogularis Masked Crimson Tanager   160  
Rhodospingus cruentus Crimson-breasted Finch    150  
Rostrhamus sociabilis Snail Kite 3   II 
Rupicola peruvianus Andean Cock-of-the-Rock  1  II 
Rupornis magnirostris Roadside Hawk 5 1  II 
Saltator aurantiirostris Golden-billed Saltator 8  300  
Serinus canaria
c
 Island Canary 2,080    
Sicalis flaveola Saffron Finch 1,741 441 11,000  
Sicalis luteola Grassland Yellow-finch    7,500  
Sicalis sp. Finch 6    
Spheniscus humboldti Humboldt Penguin  9  I 
Spizaetus sp. Hawk-eagle 3    
Sporophila castaneiventris Chestnut-bellied Seedeater    11,000  
Sporophila corvina Variable Seedeater   450  
Sporophila lineola Lined Seedeater    600  
Sporophila luctuosa Black-and-white Seedeater 569  10,500  
Sporophila peruviana Parrot-billed Seedeater 13  8,000  
Sporophila sp. Seedeater 5    
Sporophila telasco Chestnut-throated Seedeater    7,000  
Strigidae Owl 38 8   
Sturnella bellicosa Peruvian Meadowlark 306  1,200  
Sula variegata Peruvian Booby  1   
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Tachuris rubrigastra Many-coloured Rush-tyrant    300  
Taeniopygia guttata
c
 Zebra Finch 1,596    
Tangara arthus Golden Tanager    1,400  
Tangara chilensis Paradise Tanager 1  1,500  
Tangara chrysotis Golden-eared Tanager    800  
Tangara cyanicollis Blue-necked Tanager 8  1,500  
Tangara gyrola Bay-headed Tanager 1  2,400  
Tangara mexicana Turquoise Tanager    2,000  
Tangara nigrocincta Masked Tanager    1,000  
Tangara nigroviridis Beryl-spangled Tanager 1  2,100  
Tangara parzudakii Flame-faced Tanager    1,800  
Tangara schrankii Green-and-gold Tanager    1,800  
Tangara sp. Tanager 27    
Tangara velia Opal-rumped Tanager    240  
Tangara xanthocephala Saffron-crowned Tanager    1,800  
Tersina viridis Swallow Tanager   800  
Thraupis bonariensis Blue-and-yellow Tanager 1  7,500  
Thraupis episcopus Blue-grey Tanager 343  7,850  
Thraupis palmarum Palm Tanager    800  
Thryothorus superciliaris Superciliated Wren 3    
Tigrisoma lineatum Rufescent Tiger-heron 11    
Tinamidae Tinamou 25    
Trochilidae Hummingbird 8    
Trogon melanurus Black-tailed Trogon    30  
Trogon personatus Masked Trogon    45  
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Table B1.  Continued 
Scientific name
a
 English name 
Market 
counts 
Seizure 
counts 
Export 
quotas
b
 
CITES 
Appendix 
Turdus fuscater Great Thrush    300  
Turdus serranus Glossy-black Thrush    180  
Turdus sp. Thrush 7    
Tyto alba Barn Owl 11 3  II 
Volatinia jacarina Blue-black Grassquit 9  15,000  
Vultur gryphus Andean Condor   9  I 
Zenaida auriculata Eared Dove 74  2,000  
Zenaida meloda West Peruvian Dove 413    
Zenaida sp. Dove 9    
Zonotrichia capensis Rufous-collared sparrow 218  3,000  
Total  92,761 21,745 241,005  
a 
Includes recent taxonomic changes according to: del Hoyo, J.; Collar, N. J.; Christie, D. A.; Elliott, A.; Fishpool, L. 
D. C. 2014. HBW and BirdLife International Illustrated Checklist of the Birds of the World. Barcelona, Spain and 
Cambridge UK: Lynx Edicions and BirdLife International 
b 
No export quotas were published for 2010 
c 
Captive-bred ornamental species 
d 
Regional or exotic species 
e 
Endemic species  
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APPENDIX C 
DERIVATION OF R0 
 
Derivation of the basic reproduction number (R0) using the next-generation matrix 
method. 
 
The expressions for the basic reproduction number (R0) were derived using the 
next-generation matrix method (van den Driessche & Watmough 2002). To construct the 
next-generation matrix, (FV 
-1
), I defined the matrices F and V as:  
 
𝐹 =  [
𝜕𝐹𝑖(𝑥 
𝜕𝑥𝑗
] 𝑥 = 𝑥0  and  𝑉 =  [
𝜕𝑉𝑖(𝑥 
𝜕𝑥𝑗
] 𝑥 = 𝑥0, 
 
where the (i, j) entry of matrix F was the rate at which infected individuals in 
compartment j produce new infections in compartment i and the (i, j) entry of V was the 
net rate of change of animals in the compartment by any other means. I considered that E, 
IA and IC were the infected states but that new infections occurred only in the E compartment. 
The rates were evaluated at the disease-free equilibrium (DFE) x = x0.   
Setting 𝐼 = (E, IA, IC)
T  for model 1,it follows that 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
=  𝐽𝐼 = (𝐹 − 𝑉  𝐼 , 
where J denotes the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the DFE and F and V matrices 
are:   
𝐹 =  [
0 𝛽𝐴𝑆0 𝛽𝐶  𝑆0
0 0 0
0 0 0
] 
 
𝑉 =  [
𝑑 + ℎ + 𝛼 0 0
−𝛼𝑝1 𝑑 + ℎ + µ𝐴 + 𝛿 0
−𝛼(1 − 𝑝1 −𝛿(1 − 𝑝2 𝑑 + ℎ + µ𝐶 + 𝛾
] 
 
Following (Diekmann et al. 1990; van den Driessche & Watmough 2002), the basic 
reproduction number R0 is defined as the spectral radius (dominant eigenvalue) of matrix 
FV 
-1
. That is, 
R0 = ρ(F V 
-1
) = R0A + R0C , (C1) 
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where 
𝑅0𝐴 = 
𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑆0
(𝑑 + ℎ +  𝛼 (𝑑 + ℎ + µ
𝐴
+  𝛿 
 
 
𝑅0𝐶 = [
𝛼(1 − 𝑝1 
(𝑑 + ℎ + 𝛼 
+ 
𝛼𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2  
(𝑑 + ℎ + 𝛼 (𝑑 + ℎ + 𝜇𝐴 +  𝛿 
] 
𝛽𝐶𝑆0
(𝑑 + ℎ + 𝜇𝐶 +  𝛾 
 
 
The expression for R0A can be interpreted as follows: a fraction αp1/(d + h + α) 
of exposed hosts E progress to state IA and spend an average of 1/(d + h + µA + δ) 
days in state IA over the expected duration of infection. Multiplying by βAS0 gives the 
expected number of secondary infections resulting from interactions between susceptible 
and acutely infected hosts. 
Similarly, the expression for R0C can be interpreted as follows: a fraction αp1/(d + 
h + α) of exposed hosts E progress to state IA, and of these acutely infected hosts, a fraction 
δ(1−p2)/(d + h + µA + δ) progress to state IC spending an average of 1/(d + h + µC + γ) 
days in state IC over the expected duration of infection. Alternatively, a fraction α(1− 
p1)/(d + h + α) of exposed hosts progress directly to state IC and spend an average of 1/(d + 
h + µC + γ) days in state IC. Multiplying by βCS0 gives the expected number of secondary 
infections resulting from interactions between susceptible and chronically infected hosts. 
For model 2, setting 𝐼 = (Ej, IAj, ICj, Ea, IAa, ICa)T, it follows that 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
=  𝐽𝐼 = (𝐹 − 𝑉  𝐼 , 
where J denotes the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the DFE. I assumed that new 
infections only occur when a susceptible bird (Sj or Sa) becomes exposed (Ej or Ea) 
after direct contact with an infectious juvenile or adults. Thus, F and V matrices 
are:  
 
F = 




















000000
000000
SS0SS0
000000
000000
SS0SS0
0aC0aAa0aC0aAj
0jC0jAa0jC0jAj


, 
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V = 

























621
51
4
311
21
1
)1()1(00
000
0000
000)1()1(
0000
00000
cpp
cp
c
cpp
cp
c




, 
 
where   c1 = dj + hj + Ω + α, 
c2 = dj + hj + Ω + μAj + δ, 
c3 = dj + hj + Ω + μCj + γ, 
c4 = da + ha + α, 
c5 = da + ha + μAa + δ, 
c6 = da + ha + μCa + γ. 
 
Thus, R0 is defined as: 
 
R0 = ρ(F V 
-1
 ) = ½[ 𝑅01 + 𝑅02  + √(𝑅01 − 𝑅02 2 + 4𝑅03𝑅04],  (C2) 
 
where 
 
R01 = 
𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑗𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐2
+ 
𝛼(1−𝑝1 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐3
+ 
𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐2𝑐3
+ 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐4𝑐5
+ 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐2𝑐5
+
 
Ω𝛼(1−𝑝1 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐4𝑐6
+ 
Ω𝛼(1−𝑝1 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐3𝑐6
+ 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐4𝑐5𝑐6
+ 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐2𝑐5𝑐6
+
 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐1𝑐2𝑐3𝑐6
, 
R02 = 
𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑗𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐2
+ 
𝛼(1−𝑝1 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐3
+ 
𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐2𝑐3
+ 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐4𝑐5
+ 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐2𝑐5
+
 
Ω𝛼(1−𝑝1 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐4𝑐6
+ 
Ω𝛼(1−𝑝1 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐3𝑐6
+ 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐4𝑐5𝑐6
+ 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐2𝑐5𝑐6
+
 
Ω𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐1𝑐2𝑐3𝑐6
, 
R03 = 
𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑆𝑗0
𝑐4𝑐5
+ 
𝛼(1−𝑝1 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐4𝑐6
+ 
𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑗0
𝑐4𝑐5𝑐6
, 
R04 = 
𝛼𝑝1𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑆𝑎0
𝑐4𝑐5
+ 
𝛼(1−𝑝1 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐4𝑐6
+ 
𝛼𝑝1𝛿(1−𝑝2 𝛽𝐶𝑆𝑎0
𝑐4𝑐5𝑐6
. 
 
The terms R01 and R02 represent the average number of secondary juvenile or adult 
infections, respectively, produced by one exposed juvenile Ej during its entire infection 
period. The terms R03 and R04 represent the average number of secondary juvenile or 
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adult infections produced by one exposed adult Ea during its entire infection period, 
respectively.  
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APPENDIX D 
LIFE EXPECTANCY SCENARIOS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D1.  Mean basic reproductive number (R0) estimates from 10,000 simulations of 
Newcastle disease transmissions for homogenous (model 1) and age-structure (model 2) 
populations of white-winged parakeets with no additional harvest (h1=0 blue), and three 
additional uncompensated harvest rates. (h1=2% red, h1=5% green, and h1=10% black) and for 
three life expectancies (Dd = two, five, and nine years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D2.  Population size at two years post Newcastle disease introduction for homogeneous 
(model 1) and age-structure (model 2) populations of white-winged parakeets with no additional 
harvest (h1=0 blue), and three additional uncompensated harvest rates. (h1=2% red, h1=5% 
green, and h1=10% black) and for three life expectancies (Dd = two, five, and nine years).    
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APPENDIX E 
JUVENILE AND ADULT TRAJECTORIES 
 
A       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure E1.  Deterministic two-year time trajectories for Newcastle disease transmission 
for juvenile and adult white-winged parakeets (model 2). Panel (A) shows results with no 
additional harvest (hl = 0) and (B) 10% additional (uncompensated) harvest (hl = 10%). 
Depicted are susceptible (S), exposed (E), acutely-infected (IA), chronically-infected 
(IC) and recovered (R) classes for juveniles and adults.  
